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Intellectual Property (IP) is becoming an increasingly important source of collateral in debt-based 
financial transactions. This thesis will show that IP and financing are intrinsically linked. They both 
can be used to drive company growth. When the two interact a virtuous growth spiral can form. It will 
be shown that IP can be used to obtain financing which allows for company growth and the creation 
of more IP rights. The new IP rights then allow the IP owner to obtain more financing. The pattern of 
growth can continue in this pattern.  However, due to the legal complications the formation of such a 
growth spiral is hindered.     
 
The thesis examines how security interests in intellectual property right are treated in secured finance 
law and IP law in the US and the UK. It will show that there is a conflict between laws particularly in 
the perfection and priority of such security interests. The conflict between the two sources of law 
makes it difficult to determine where a security interest must be registered in order to be perfected. 
The conflict also creates conflicting registers for such interests.  Due to conflicting registration 
provisions it is also difficult to determine the priority of conflicting security interests in an IP right. 
Additionally, IP laws are often inadequate for determining issues on perfection and priority. The 
thesis will offer suggestion on legal reforms which will best alleviate the legal problems of taking 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual Property and finance are intrinsically linked and can allow a company to achieve 
exponential growth. IP rights can be used as collateral to obtain financing which allows the IP owner 
to expand its portfolio of intellectual property rights and so on.  This interaction between Intellectual 
Property (“IP”) and finance can lead to a virtuous spiral of company growth. In theory, the growth 
spiral is simple and elegant, however, in practice, the growth spiral is often inhibited because of the 
inherent tension between IP laws and the laws of secured lending. The current state of law makes it 
difficult for IP owners to use their IP as collateral. This problem is becoming more important because 
in an increasing number of companies have found that their most valuable assets are their IP rights. It 
is also problematic for the economy as a whole as traditional financing laws are strained to 
accommodate the digital or knowledge-based economy. 
1. The Problem 
Despite the emergence of a new economy of intangible property, there is still a clash between the laws 
of secured finance and IP law which makes IP ill-suited for use as collateral. Some critics have even 
suggested that “[the] legal treatment (of the secured financing of intellectual property assets) is 
complex, cumbersome and inconsistent and in large measure, the law is unusable from the point of 
view of sustaining a coherent security legal regime in intellectual property assets.” 1 The statement 
was made in reference to the UK, but it can apply to many other jurisdictions as well. Indeed in most 
jurisdictions, the laws of financing, in general, are still based on tangible asset models which cause 
uncertainty when used on intangible assets. Legal uncertainty is further exacerbated by IP law which 
often includes security interests with assignments or transfers of the IP.   
The main area of uncertainty caused by the conflict is on perfecting the security interest and on the 
priority of conflicting interests. The conflict arises as both sets of law have their own provision on 
registration and perfection. Because of this conflict, creditors are uncertain which register to file the 
interest in order to perfect it. If also creates uncertainty as to which filing will have greater priority. 
There are also inherent problems within IP laws themselves because the laws which govern security 
interests were created to govern transfer and assignments of the applicable IP right. This is 
problematic because security interests are not an absolute transfer of the transfer of the right. In this 
regard, the rules on registering transfers and the priority of transfers are ill-suited to govern security 
interests. As Raymond states: “The intellectual property registration schemes which exist are mainly 
concerned with documenting the creation of intellectual property rights and not those security 
interests which arise by way of subsequent dealing with intellectual property as economic assets.”2 
The thesis will show that legal uncertainty has made creditors reluctant to use IP as collateral or to 
devalue the IP right in order to hedge the risk involved.  This in turn inhibits the ability of an IP owner 
from using their IP to obtain financing which inhibits company growth. In such cases, IP and finance 
are unable to interact to allow for exponential growth which results in a growth spiral (the “IP-
Finance Growth Spiral”).  
2. Focus on the legal position in the UK and the US 
This thesis will focus on how a security interest in an IP right is taken under the laws of the UK and 
the US. In should be noted that the UK is comprised of separate legal jurisdictions which share 
                                                          
1 Iwan Davies, 'Secured Financing of Intellectual Property Assets and the Reform of English Personal Property 
Security Law' (2006) 26(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 559, 563. 
2 Anjanette Raymond, ‘Intellectual Property as Collateral in Secured Transactions: Collision of Divergent 
Approaches’ (2009) 10 Business Law International 27, 32. 
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statutory laws in some areas.3 For example, registered IP law is governed by UK statutes which are in 
force throughout the UK.4 The same is true for company law which is governed throughout the UK by 
the Companies Act5. The Companies Act contains provisions on taking security in the assets of an 
applicable UK registered business entity (called a ‘company’ in this thesis).6 In cases where the IP 
right is owned by a business entity not governed by the Companies Act, the owner will be called an 
individual owner. For this reason, laws that are in force throughout the UK, such as the Companies 
Act and the registered IP acts, are referred to in this thesis as UK laws. However, the thesis will also 
discuss principles of common law and equity that relate to the taking of security in England and 
Wales.  Such laws will be referred to as English law or the English common law. Additionally, 
Scottish laws on security interests will also be discussed for the sake of comparison and to show 
problems of UK-wide law conflicting with legal principles of individual UK jurisdictions. Laws 
which are only in force in Scotland will be referred to as Scottish law.  
The U.S. laws for taking security interest in a registered IP right are from state and federal sources. 
Registered IP law is solely governed by federal law.7 The laws of secured lending are harmonised 
throughout the US through the adoption of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.8 Article 9, 
therefore, is a creature of state law and is referenced as state law in the thesis. The distinction between 
corporate or individual ownership of an IP right is not as in important in the US. This is because state 
registers under Article 9 are indexed by the name of the debtor regardless of whether it is a corporate 
entity or individual. However, when the thesis refers to a corporation, it indicates that the business 
entity is legally incorporated in one of the states.  
This thesis will discuss the use of security interests in patents, registered trade marks, registered 
designs and copyright. The definition of those IP rights is the same as it is defined and governed by 
the applicable IP Act in the applicable jurisdiction. Any differences in how a relevant IP right is 
defined in the US and the UK is not of relevance to this thesis. The only relevant differences in the 
applicable Acts are in reference to the use of the applicable IP right as security which is discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Any rights outside of these acts in the US and the UK are outside of the scope of 
this thesis.9 
Also, insolvency is briefly discussed in this thesis, in relation to the determination of10 priority of 
competing interests. The term insolvency is used in the UK whereas the term bankruptcy is used in 
the US.11 In the UK, bankruptcy specifically refers to the insolvency of individuals. Under Title 11 of 
the United States Code, bankruptcy is the general term and can be used in relation to both businesses 
and individuals. In this thesis, the term “insolvency” is generally used unless US law is specifically 
being referenced.  In discussions on US law, the term bankruptcy will be used.  
Also, occasionally other jurisdictions are mentioned in a limited context, particularly in Chapter 6. 
However, they are mentioned only for the sake of comparison with UK and US law.  
                                                          
3 Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System’ (7th ed Cavendish Publishing 2004) Chapter 2. 
4 Patents Act 1977; Trade Mark Act 1994; Registered Designs Act 1948;  and Copyright, Patents and Designs 
Act 1988. 
5 Companies Act 2006. 
6 As defined in the Companies Ac 2006 s 1. Any business that the Companies Act governed will be called a 
company. Also, s 33 sets out companies and businesses not created under the Act or governed by the Act. 
7 Patent Act, Title 35 United States Code; Copyright Act , Title 17 United States Code; and Lanham Act Title 15 
United States Code. 
8 United States Uniform Commercial Code Section 9. 
9 For example, unregistered trade mark rights in a passing off action. 
10 In the United States, companies are registered under the law of individual states. For an example of such laws 
see New York Business Corporation Law, New York Code § 602. 
11 Insolvency Act 1986;  Title 11 United States Code, Chapters 7 and 11. 
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3. Structure  
This thesis makes significant contributions to the study of IP as a financial asset. It considers the 
numerous legal impediments creditors face when taking security in an IP right.  Firstly, the thesis 
shows the increased importance of IP to businesses and the economy as a whole.  Since the 
emergence of the digital economy, two significant changes have occurred which have increased the 
importance of IP in business. The first is the emergence of business whose main value comes from 
their IP and intangible assets. Companies such as Facebook and Google represent this type of 
company. The other change is that even traditional “brick and mortar” companies have found that 
their IP has become more important in their asset portfolio. The greater importance of branding and 
having a digital presence is one example of some of the changes in the market that have contributed to 
this change. In both types of companies, IP is becoming increasingly important in financing and in 
particular in secured lending. 
Chapter 2 will introduce legal concepts in secured lending. It then will consider the use of IP as an 
asset in debt-based lending. From there it will show the increasing importance of intangible property 
in the digital economy. This also increases the importance of IP rights.  Finally, the chapter will 
explain how IP has the potential to create company growth. It will also show that financing leads to 
the same growth. When combined together, under the right conditions, an exponential growth spiral 
can occur. Examples of how this works in practice are given at the end of Chapter 2. 
The thesis will show that one consequence of legal uncertainty of using IP is the devaluation of the IP 
right. Chapter 3 will briefly describe IP valuation. It will explore the main methods of IP valuation 
and their inherent flaws.  It will then show that in cases where IP is valued for the purposes of secured 
lending, increased risk is calculated into the value. This makes IP less valuable as an asset than it 
would be if there weren’t as many legal problems in the process.  
Chapters 4 and 5 will examine specific legal problems from the use of IP in secured lending in the US 
and the UK. It will be shown that a conflict between the laws of secured financing and IP creates 
significant uncertainty for creditors. In particular, legal problems are found in the perfecting, 
registering and prioritising of security interests in IP right. In both the US and the UK, there are 
competing laws and registers for interests in IP. This makes the effect of registration unclear. It is also 
unclear how competing interests are prioritised when such interests are registered at different registers 
and governed by different laws. 
In the UK, it will be shown that the registered IP acts themselves have problematic rules on perfection 
and priority. One reason for this problem is that provisions on transfers or assignments of the 
respective IP right are applied to security interests. Since security interests are not an absolute transfer 
of the IP right, the schemes of perfection and priority in the registered IP acts are ill-suited for this 
purpose. This creates several problems. One problem is that creditors may be required to file multiple 
notices of the same transaction in order to perfect an interest in multiple IP rights, after-acquired 
property, or for a floating charge that has crystallised.  The priority schemes in the registered IP Acts 
also create confusing and complex rules for determine priority. It will also be shown that the creation 
of mortgages in registered IP causes problems on how the debtor can use and protect the respective 
registered IP right.    
In Chapter 4, it will also be shown that the registered IP acts conflict with the Companies Act. This 
exacerbates the problems with multiple filings and uncertain priority already found within the 
registered IP acts. In cases where the owner of the registered IP is a registered company, the creditor 
will have to file at the company register in order to perfect the interest and then make additional 
filings for each IP right being taken as security at the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office 
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(“UKIPO”) in order to gain priority. The multiple filings also lead to additional questions on how 
priority will be determined. 
Although copyright is an unregistered right, the use of copyright as security also will be considered. It 
will be shown that the Copyright, Patents and Designs Act (“CPD”) does not conflict with the 
Companies Act but it does contain inadequate provisions on taking security in a copyright.12 The main 
problem when taking security in a copyright of an individual, there is no place to register the interest. 
This makes it extremely difficult to use copyright as collateral.  
The last problem examined in Chapter 4, is cross-border conflicts in UK wide registered IP rights. 
The application of Scottish law to take security in UK IP rights will be considered. Also, cross-border 
conflicts between the laws of England and Wales and Scottish will be discussed. It will be shown that 
in certain circumstances, the Companies Act and the registered IP acts require the application of 
national law which can to additional conflict.  
Finally, in Chapter 4, recent attempts at reformation of secured lending laws will be examined. This 
will include discussion of attempts at UK wide reformation and also attempts at reformation in 
England and Wales. From there, specific legislative changes will be proposed. Three particular 
suggestions will be made. One will be for the Companies Act to govern security in registered IP 
owned by registered companies. The Companies Act should govern both the perfection of the interest 
and the ranking of competing interests. The second proposal is for the creation of register at the 
UKIPO for security interests in all IP rights of individual owners. The third proposal is closely related 
and will argue for the reform of IP laws to create harmonised rules for taking security in IP rights. 
Chapter 5 considers the legal problems when taking security in registered IP rights in the US. It will 
show that main problem is uncertainty on whether the registered IP acts pre-empt Article 9. This 
problem is further exacerbated by a lack of precedential case law. There are many problems created 
by the conflict between Article 9 and the registered IP acts. One problem is that creditors are 
uncertain on where and how to register the security interest. They are also uncertain on how to 
sufficiency describe the IP in the filings in order to perfect the interest.  Also, the conflict creates 
problems in taking after-acquired IP rights. Each registered IP act will be examined along with any 
relevant case law. Finally, the chapter will show that Article 9 should govern the perfection and 
priority of all security interests in registered IP as its mechanisms and registers are better suited. 
The thesis will also show in Chapter 6 that security in IP is a cross-border and international problem. 
The World Intellectual Property Organisation’s (“WIPO”) report on the use of intellectual property in 
secured lending is considered and used to discuss two points. The first is how the laws of other 
jurisdictions govern the use of IP as security. The second is how the laws of the US and the UK 
compare to other jurisdictions. The rest of the chapter will then discuss the recent work of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“Uncitral”) which released recommendations on the 
use of IP as security. The laws of the US and the UK will be compared to the Uncitral 
recommendations.  
 In Chapter 7, the securitisation of IP revenue is compared with taking IP as security. This comparison 
is made because securitisation uses contractual mechanisms rather than registration mechanisms to 
take security over receivables. It will be shown that securitisation does not have the same legal 
conflicts with IP law. Also, the comparison will show that without such conflicts, for the most part, IP 
is able to function like other assets as collateral. 
                                                          
12 Copyright, Patents and Designs Act 1988. 
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Finally, the thesis will consider the best proposals for legal reform. In general, it is shown that the 
laws and mechanisms of secured financing are better suited to govern security in IP so statutory 
amendments should be made to reflect this. This is considered in relation to the UK in Chapter 4 and 
the US in Chapter 5. Overall conclusions on the best methods of legal reform are discussed in Chapter 
8. 
CHAPTER 2: IP AS AN ASSET 
“Just as physical assets were used to finance the creation of more physical assets during the industrial 
age, intangible assets should be used to finance the creation of more intangible assets in the 
information age.” 13 
1. Secured Lending 
Financing is the second component in the growth spiral and is of equal importance to IP. It also, like 
IP, is important in its own right as it a crucial component for any business’s growth regardless of 
whether that business sells tangible or intangible goods. This thesis will focus on the use of IP as 
security in secured lending. This chapter will discuss general concepts of security, the use of IP as an 
asset and the IP-Finance Growth Cycle.   
Secured lending is an important part of financing.14  It is also an important part of business growth. 
Throughout the stages of business growth, financing will probably include some form of secured 
lending15. This is true regardless of the size or the maturity of the company16. In secured lending, a 
creditor takes a property interest in an asset or assets of the debtor. The purpose of taking security is to 
give a creditor extra assurance that if the debtor is unable to repay a loan and if the debtor’s assets are 
insufficient to meet claims of all creditors, the financier will be able to use the security to obtain full or 
partial repayment of the loan.17 A security interest reduces the creditor’s risk that the loan will be 
repaid.18 In turn, the reduction of risk allows borrowers to have better access to credit and at a cheaper 
cost. The main purpose of secured finance is to reduce the amount of risk faced by creditors.19 The 
reduction of risk allows borrowers to have better access to credit and at a cheaper cost. 
The concept of security and security mechanisms differ widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Additionally, there is little to no international harmonization of secured financing. Even the same type 
of legal jurisdictions can have widely divergent laws. For example, even though the US and England 
are common law jurisdictions, they have remarkably different laws on secured finance.20  However, 
                                                          
13 Ken Jarboe, ‘Intangible Asset Monetization: The Promise and the Reality’ (Athena Alliance Working Paper 3, 
2008) <http://www.athenaalliance.org/apapers/IntangibleAssetMonetizationreport.htm accessed on 24 February 
2016. 
14 Many academics such point out that security and collateral are not interchangeable terms. When using the 
term “security” as a noun, it has the same meaning as collateral, with the former being the preferred term in 
England and the later in the US. See Roy Goode, ‘Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security’ (Louise 
Gullifer ed, 4th Edn Sweet and Maxwell 2012) 1. 
15 For a full discussion of the importance of financing in company growth see Edith Penrose, ‘The Theory of the 
Growth of the Firm’ 1959  reprint of 1st edn Martino Fine Books 2013. See also: John Ruhnka, ‘A venture 
capital model of the development process for new ventures’ (1987) Spring Volume: 2, Issue: 2   Journal of 
Business Venturing 167. 
16 Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne, ‘Corporate Finance Law’  (1st  edn  Hart Publishing 2011) 22 
17 Roy Goode, ‘Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security’ (Louise Gullifer ed, 4th Edn Sweet and 
Maxwell 2012) 1. 
18 Steven Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., ‘A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtor’s 
Choices Seriously’ (1994) 80  Va. L. Rev. 2021.   
19 Ibid.   
20 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
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most academics agree that fundamental characteristic of a security interest is that it is a grant of a right 
in an asset which the grantor owns or has an interest.21 Also, it is generally agreed that all systems of 
secured transactions have three important stages or mechanisms: attachment, perfection, and priority.22   
A security interest will take on a unique identity based on how the jurisdictional law deals with those 
stages.  
Attachment refers to the initial interaction between debtor and creditor which allows an interest to 
attach to the collateral.23 At this stage of the transaction, the debtor and creditor are bound by their 
agreement. Attachment generally occurs upon formalized agreement between debtor and creditor. 
After attachment, the security interest is enforceable between the creditor and debtor. Conflicts 
between IP law and secured finance law do not generally create problems for the attachment of the 
security interest to an IP right. For this reason, only brief references are made to attachment in the 
thesis. The main problems come in the areas of perfection and priority.  
 Perfection occurs when the security interest becomes binding upon third parties.24   Perfection is also 
often used to determine priority. In such cases, the date when the security was perfected will determine 
priority amongst competing interests. However, it should be noted that perfection is not always a 
priority date. For example, in the Companies Act, the registration of a charge perfects it but priority is 
determined by the date that the charge was created.25 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
4.  
A security interest is usually perfected by a transfer of possession, a transfer of title or by following 
the requirements of a statute. For example in the US, a security interest is perfected by registering the 
interest at the applicable state register.26 The transfer of possession is found in some of the simplest 
forms of secured lending such as the common law pawn.  A pawn is created when the debtor gives the 
physical possession of an asset to a creditor to hold until the debt is discharged.  Security interests in 
IP cannot be created by a transfer of possession because of the intangible nature of an IP right. In the 
early US case of Waterman, the court rejected the theory that the possession of a patent can be 
transferred or that a mortgage in a patent could be created through the transfer of possession.27  In 
English law as well, the courts have rejected the use of possessory security interests in intangibles.28 
This will be discussed in further detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  
Perfecting a security interest through a transfer of title will be an important part of the discussion in 
this thesis. In both the US and in England and Wales, mortgages can be taken in an IP right through 
the transfer of title. Also, the registered IP statutes in both jurisdictions contain priority schemes which 
are closely related transfers of title and ownership. The legal relationship between ownership and title 
particularly impacts the nature of security interests. Goode describes differing concepts of ownership 
                                                          
21 Roy Goode, ‘Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security’ (Louise Gullifer ed, 4th Edn Sweet and 
Maxwell 2012) 3. 
22 In Europe, security began in Roman law in the Middle Ages and these three stages developed over time. For a 
full analysis on how this evolved into modern day secured finance law see: Willem Zwalve, ‘A Labyringth of 
Creditors: A short introduction to the history of security interests in goods’,  in Eva Marie Kieninger (ed), 
Security Rights in Movable Property in European Private Law’ Cambridge University Press 2009. 
23 Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne, ‘Corporate Finance Law’  (1st  edn  Hart Publishing 2011) Chapter 6. 
24 Ibid. 
25 For a full discussion on the concept of perfection and priority see Hugh Beale, Michael Bridge, Louise 
Gullifer and Eva Lomnicka, ‘The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing’  (Oxford University Press 2012). 
Also see Companies Act 1985 s 360.  
26 United States Uniform Commercial Code Section 9. 
27 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (11 S.Ct. 334, 34 L.Ed. 923. 
28 Your Response Ltd v. Datateam Business Media Ltd. [2015] Q.B. 41. 
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and title as a fundamental divide between “the formal and the functional” approach.29 This refers to 
systems of secured finance which require a transfer of title or ownership as opposed to systems which 
only require notice filing to perfect the interest. Goode notes that “the very concept of security varies 
widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending as it does on concepts of ownership and possession 
which are inherently fluid It appears to be recognised everywhere that a security interest involves a 
grant of a right in an asset in which the grantor owns or in which he has an interest, but legal systems 
differ in their concept of ownership for this purpose. The most fundamental divide is between the 
formal and functional approach. ”30  The divide between the formal and functional approach is due to 
two divergent legal theories on how security interests function. The formal approach categorises 
security interests as a property right. The functional approach categorises security interests as being 
more of “shadow over the property right.” One difference that has been pointed out is that the latter 
secures a monetary claim toward the debtor and does not create a property right for the creditor 
whereas the former creates the right to have the property right transferred to the creditor.31 A full 
discussion of the characterisation of security interests as a property right is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, it should be noted that legal tension is created by mortgages in a registered IP right. 
The tension is caused by a conflict between theories of property, title and ownership. This will be 
briefly discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4 it will be discussed in relation to mortgages taken 
in registered IP rights. In Chapter 5, it will be discussed in relation to whether a security interest is a 
type of assignment of a registered IP right.  
Security interests are often perfected by registering the interest at the applicable register. The security 
interests predominately discussed in this thesis will be ones that are perfected in this way. In the UK, 
charges under the Companies Act are perfected by filing at the Companies Register. Also, each 
registered IP Act has its own non-mandatory registration scheme to perfect a security interest in the 
applicable registered IP right. In the U.S., under Article 9, security interests are perfected by 
registering the interest at the applicable state registry. Additionally, there is uncertainty as to whether 
the registered IP acts require registration at the applicable IP office to perfect a security interest in a 
registered IP right. This will be fully discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The issue of priority arises when the debtor cannot repay all of its debts. When the debtor becomes 
insolvent, and there are competing security interest in the debtor’s assets, then the interests must be 
ranked according to their priority. In other words, priority is the determination of which creditor will 
be paid first. Goode points out that “A creditor taking a security interest will wish to satisfy himself on 
two points: no prior interest will prevail over his security and that his security will not be overridden 
by a subsequent disposition by the debtor. Hence, any prospective secured creditor must look 
backwards and forwards to safeguard his position.”32If there are many creditors, then priority will 
become important to creditors as the creditor with the highest priority will have a better chance of 
recovering the money owed to them when the debtor goes insolvent. In the Companies Act and in the 
common law, the basic rule is that priority is determined by which interest was created first.33 In the 
US, priority in determined by which interest was perfected first.34 In both countries, however, the rules 
of priority are extremely complex. In this thesis, the priority of competing interests in an IP right will 
                                                          
29  Roy Goode, ‘Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security’ (Louise Gullifer ed, 4th Edn Sweet and 
Maxwell 2012) 3 
30 An interesting discussion of the topic is found in MG Bridge, ‘Formalism, Functionalism, and Understanding 
the Law of Secured Transactions’, (1999) 44 McGill Law Journal 567. 
31 This is an oversimplification of the issue but for the purposes of this thesis it provides essential background 
information. 
32 Roy Goode, ‘Goode on Commercial Law’ ( Ewan McKendrick ed  4th edn 2010) 696. 
33 Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne, ‘Corporate Finance Law’  (1st  edn  Hart Publishing 2011) 272 
34 Ibid at 273. 
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be discussed. In Chapters 4 and 5, basic priority rules which impact the ranking of competing interests 
will be considered, however, a full discussion of the rules and problems of prioritising creditors is 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
Security interests are the foundation of secured financing, but they are not the only type of secured 
financing. 35 In addition to security interests; quasi-security interests have developed which allow a 
creditor to use contractual devices which achieve a similar result to the use of a security interest.36 
Quasi-security is an umbrella term to describe a wide variety of contractual methods that allow the 
creditor to have the same economic benefit of taking a security but without having to do through the 
formalities to take a security interest. In this thesis, securitisation is the only type of quasi-security that 
will be discussed. In Chapter 8, the securitisation of IP revenue will be considered. A comparison 
between taking security in IP and the securitisation of IP revenue streams will be made.  
2. IP as an Asset 
It is better to consider IP to be a bundle of rights rather than just a single right capable of transfer. In 
the past, one of the most important aspects of an IP right was the ability to excluding third parties 
from using the IP without permission. This right gave the IP owner a negative right to a chose in 
action. IP differs in many ways from other forms of property. One of the reasons for this is because of 
its very nature as intangible property. There are several distinctive traits found in IP that are not found 
in other types of property. Firstly, IP is infinite, and there is an unlimited amount of it. For example, 
this is different from a mineral, where there is only a limited and finite amount. Another difference is 
that it cannot be possessed. Tangible property can be possessed at any one time by only a limited 
number of users. Traditional concepts of possession and use do not apply to IP in the same way that 
they do to IP. In this regard, IP can theoretically be used by an infinite amount of users.   
Another important difference between IP and some other types of property is that IP is often thought 
of as a public monopoly rather than a simply property right.37 One theory behind IP is that it is quid 
pro quo arrangement between society and the IP owner. Some believe that IP should not be used as a 
financial asset because it may not be beneficial to society to do this even if it is beneficial to the IP 
owner.38  In this view, IP is not therefore seen as a personal asset but rather as part of a bargained 
exchanged between a government and the IP owner. It is argued that the government gives the IP 
owner a degree of exclusivity for the IP right because the IP gives a public benefit.39 Under this 
rational, using IP in highly complex financial deals does not provide benefit to the public so IP should 
not be used in this way. The purpose of this thesis is not to debate the nature of IP and whether its use 
as a financial asset is justified. Instead, the thesis takes a pragmatic approach and recognises that IP is 
already being used in this way and will continue to be used in this way.  
When discussing IP as an asset, it is important to note that it is characterised as a type of intangible 
property.40  Although IP is considered a type of intangible property, it has some important differences 
that were mentioned above. The two terms are certainly not mutually exclusive. Just as problems arise 
                                                          
35 This is also excluding the use of the term security as an investment share.  
36 Hugh Beale, Michael Bridge, Louise Gullifer and Eva Lomnicka, ‘The Law of Security and Title-Based 
Financing’ (Oxford University Press 2012). 
37 Although there are numerous articles and books on this topic, see for example: D. Vaver, Intellectual 
Property: still a “bargain”?’ 2012 European Intellectual Property Review 579. 
38 Mark Lemley, ‘Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding’, (83) 2005 Texas Law Review 1031.   
39 See also D. Barnes, ‘Congestible Intellectual Property and Impure Public Goods’ (2011) 9(8) Northwestern 
Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 533. 
40 For a discussion on developing an IP portfolio as an asset see: Patrick Sullivan, First Steps in Building an 
Intellectual Property Program and Portfolio, (17) 2009-2010 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 361 
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from the mismatch between the laws of secured financing and the laws of IP, conflicts also arise from 
treating IP like any other type of intangible property. Under Accountancy Standards41 intangible 
property is an asset when it has three characteristics. The three critical attributes are that it must be 
identifiable, be under the control of its holder and have a future economic benefit for that holder.42 
Most IP right have these three characteristics.  Intangible assets include a wide variety of assets. For 
example, the AICPA includes in its list of intangibles the following assets: 
 Airport gates and slots, Bank  customers  -  deposits, loan, trust and credit 
card ,Blueprints, Book libraries, Brand names, Broadcast licenses,  Buy-
sell agreements, Certificates of need, Chemical formulas, Computer 
software, Computerized databases, Contracts, Cooperative agreements, 
Copyrights, Credit information files, Customer contracts, Customer & 
client lists, Customer relationships, Designs & drawings, Development 
rights, Distribution networks, Distribution rights, Domain names, Drilling 
rights, Easements, Employment contracts, Engineering drawings, 
Environmental rights, FCC licenses, Favorable financing, Favorable leases, 
Film libraries, Food flavorings & recipes, Franchise agreements, Historical 
documents, HMO enrollment lists, Insurance expirations, Insurance in 
force, Joint ventures, Know-how, Laboratory notebooks, Landing rights, 
Leasehold interests, Literary works, Loan portfolios, Location value, 
Management contracts, Manual databases, Manuscripts, Medical charts and 
records, Mineral rights, Musical compositions, Natural resources, 
Newspaper morgue files, Non compete covenants, Options, warrants, 
grants, rights, Patent applications, Patents - both  product & process, 
Patterns, Permits, Prescription drug files, Prizes and awards, Procedural 
manuals, Production backlogs, Product designs, Property use rights, 
Proposals outstanding, Proprietary computer Software, Proprietary 
processes, Proprietary products, Proprietary technology, Publications, 
Retail shelf space, Royalty agreements, Schematics & diagrams Securities 
portfolios, Security interests, Shareholder agreements, Solicitation rights, 
Stock & bond instruments, Subscription lists, Supplier contracts, Technical 
& specialty Libraries, Technical documentation, Technology sharing 
agreements, Title plants, Trade secrets, Trained & assembled workforce, 
Trademark and trade names, Training manuals, Use rights - air, water, 
land.43 
The assets in the AICPA are extremely varied. In particular, IP rights (especially registered IP rights) 
have distinctive legal characteristics which distinguish them from the other intangible assets. For 
example, IP rights have legally mandated rules on their creation, registration and use. Most of the 
other types of intangible assets in the list do not have the same requirements. However, despite the 
differences between IP and other types of intangible, IP is often taken as security along with a bundle 
of other intangible rights without specific reference. This can create complication when securing an IP 
right. In Chapter 5 particularly, it will be shown that describing IP rights as “general intangibles” can 
be problematic when trying to perfect a security interest in a registered IP right.   
                                                          
41 There are many but in this work, International Accountancy Standards (“IAS”) will be used. Others include 
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), International Financial Reporting Standards, etc. 
42 IAS 38, available at http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias38. Last accessed 10 February 2014. 
43 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Special Committee on Financial Reporting. Improving 
Business Reporting – A Customer Focus: Meeting the Information Needs of Investors and Creditors, 1994. 
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It is also important to note that, traditionally, security was taken in IP by virtue of the fact that the IP 
was part of a bundle of assets. The emphasis in these deals was to capture as many assets as possible, 
and IP was included inadvertently or as an afterthought. 44 As Raymond points out: “Historically, IP 
has rarely been used as security for financing and in limited occasions when it was included, it was 
done by accidentally capturing the asset within a traditional security device. The resultant security 
gave little value for the ‘caught’ IP and offered few IP protections for the property itself. Moreover, 
the security device itself may have been created in such a manner as to destroy the IP rights (IPRs). 
The situation left businesses and financiers uneasy about creating security devices over IP as 
valuation was difficult and the industry was unsettled. In recent years both the business and the 
financing industry has begun to move forward in the recognition of this asset category. However, the 
progression of the use of IP as an asset has been slow as a large number of difficulties remain with the 
use of this asset category as a source of collateral.”45 
Also, IP was most commonly monetized through licensing and even occasionally through the 
secondary sales of the IP right. Lending through intangibles is not an entirely new phenomenon, but it 
has never been a common method of raising finance. In this regard, IP was not often used as collateral 
in its own right. Now, however, IP owners are beginning to realize that these assets can generate 
significant financing options on their own. Rather than have the IP act as insurance above and beyond 
the required collateral; trademarks, patents and copyrights have been pledged as the primary source of 
collateral in a wide range of situations.46” This trend is occurring in small businesses to large 
multinational ones. In the U.S. state of New Hampshire new laws had been introduced to help small 
business owners facilitate lending using their IP as collateral. One study reported that since the 
introduction of the law, 18 percent of the businesses surveyed said that because of the new laws, they 
had been able to use patents as collateral in obtaining a loan.47 At the other end of the spectrum 
investment banks, such Goldman Sachs, have begun offering loans secured solely by intellectual 
property.48  
The current state of law causes two problems. One problem is that there is a reluctance to use IP as an 
asset or to view it as an asset class.49 Lipton has recognised this reluctance in regards to information 
products: “it is precisely because there are significant practical risks that creditors are often hesitant in 
accepting information products as loan security, even if they are protected as ‘property’ under patent 
or copyright laws so that standard finance theory can be applied.” 50 
Traditional secured financing laws and intellectual property acts must be changed so as to better 
encompass the monetization of such important assets. Although it would seem at times that such 
practices are entrenched and will be difficult to reform it should be remembered that financing 
mechanisms were once an innovation themselves:  
3. Emergence of the Digital Economy and the Importance of IP in Finance 
                                                          
44 Ibid at 281. 
45 Raymond, ‘Intellectual Property as Collateral in Secured Transactions: Collision of Divergent Approaches, 
(2009) 10 (27) Business Law International 32. 
46 Ken Jarboe, ‘Intangible Asset Monetization: The Promise and the Reality’ (Athena Alliance Working Paper 3, 
2008) <http://www.athenaalliance.org/apapers/IntangibleAssetMonetizationreport.htm. Last accessed on 24 
February 2016. 
47 Ibid at 55. 
48 See < http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investment-banking/services/financing.html accessed on 5 
April 2016. 
49 Iwan Davies, 'Secured Financing of Intellectual Property Assets and the Reform of English Personal Property 
Security Law' (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies No 3, 559-583 




The OECD first reported in Intellectual Assets and Value Creation51 that in the 1990’s business 
investment in intangibles first bypassed the amount of business investment in tangibles.52 The 
emergence of the digital economy has led to two major changes in businesses. The first has been the 
emergence of IP driven businesses whose main assets are IP rights. In particular, they have emerged 
in the digital marketplace with companies like Google and Facebook.  In many jurisdictions, 
traditional businesses underpinned by tangible assets have become increasingly replaced by 
businesses whose most important assets are intangible including IP. The second change is that IP 
assets have become increasingly important in all companies. This is true even in traditional 
companies, where IP rights have become increasingly important to the business and its overall 
growth. In fact, many such companies have reported that a significant portion of their value is from 
their IP rights.53 Fortune 50054 has recently reported that in the top 100 companies, 75% of their 
market capitalization is in their intangibles.55 These two changes have had a profound effect on the 
global economy. The OECD has reported that now the preponderant form of wealth worldwide is 
intangible capital. Hargreaves reported in his 2011 report on the digital economy that: “Profound and 
far from complete economic and technological changes mean that an appropriate and enabling IP 
framework has become one of the prerequisites for prosperity.” 56 
Despite the shift in the world economy, there has been little legal change to how IP is treated as an 
asset. It has been reported that laws which are inhospitable to the intangible economy and the very 
economic policy of some countries adversely affects their economic growth. 57 For example, one 
report showed that due to the current state of US law $9 trillion worth of intangible assets that are 
largely hidden from investment.58 Recent articles have considered whether legal restraints on the use 
of IP in financial exacerbated the effect of the credit crunch on small and medium enterprises. The 
UK government has noted that the availability of credit has been in tight supply throughout the credit 
crunch and even in the years after. The report noted that the ability of small and medium size 
                                                          
51 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation Development, ‘Creating Value from Intellectual Assets’ (Meeting 
of the OECD Council March 23, 2008) <http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/36701575.pdf accessed on 1 May 2016. 
52 Also see:  Pricewaterhouse Coopers Report: Technology Executive Connections: Exploiting intellectual 
property in a complex world, Interview: an executive at a European telecommunications company at p8, (June 
2007) available at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/   
53 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation Development, ‘Creating Value from Intellectual Assets’ (Meeting 
of the OECD Council March 23, 2008) <http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/36701575.pdf accessed on 1 May 2016. 
54 The same results were also found by the Intangibles Research Project by New York University and 
Brookings Institute which showed that since 1978 to the year 1998 the assets of non-financial corporations had 
shifted towards intangibles. The reported was published by Patrick Sullivan, ‘Value-Driven Intellectual Capital’  
(John Wiley and Sons 2000). 
55 Carol Corrado, Intangible Capital and Economic Growth’ (National Bureau of Economic Growth, Working 
Paper 2006) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w11948 last accessed on 24th February 2014. This paper is primarily 
concerned with the US economy. They have also continued to research this phenomenon outside of the US and 
in 2012 published a paper which focused on both the US and EU economies: Intangible Capital and Growth in 
Advanced Economies: Measurement Methods and Comparative Results, Institute for the Study of Labour. For a 
study of the EU market solely see: Hannu Piekkola, Intangible Capital –Driver of Growth in Europe, (2011) 
Report 167, University of Vaasa report funded by the European Commission. 
56 Ian Hargreaves, ‘Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth’ (An independent report 
2011) < https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32563/ipreview-
finalreport.pdf accessed 2 May 2016, p 10. 
57 National Institute of Economic and Social Research, ‘Measuring the UK’s Digital Economy with Big Data’ 
(2013), < http://niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/publications/SI024_GI_NIESR_Google_Report12.pdf. It should be 
noted that Google UK cosponsored the study. It is also interesting that the report does not define ‘Digital 
Economy’ or ‘Big Data.’ 
58 Ken Jarboe, ‘Intangible Asset Monetization: The Promise and the Reality’ (Athena Alliance Working Paper 3, 




technology firms was extremely limited.59 The government also recognised the new importance of IP 
as collateral: “Smaller and newer firms, which often have less security to use as collateral, or firms 
with intangible assets such as intellectual property, find it harder to raise bank finance. This applies 
equally to more established small firms seeking to develop new products and services or to expand 
their businesses." 60 The report suggests that the UK government recognises that the credit crunch was 
exacerbated by the fact that it is difficult to use IP as collateral.  
Because of the changes in the economy, legal complications in using IP as collateral in secured 
lending need to be removed. WIPO reports that “[t]he financial potential of IP assets is currently 
limited […] by systems and policies that are still largely geared to tangible assets."61 Despite the 
enormous economic changes, the inherent tension between secured finance law and IP law has yet to 
be remedied. This tension affects the ability of both companies and the economy to grow.  
4. The IP-Finance Growth Spiral 
In Chapter 1, the concept of an IP-Finance Growth Spiral was introduced. The theory is that both IP 
and finance contribute to business growth. When a business is able to access financing and create 
more IP at the same time, a discrete growth spiral forms. Growth spirals are also theorised to form in 
other areas of economic growth.62 In fact, recently, a new theory has been presented that the modern 
economy is a growth spiral rather than a growth cycle. Binswanger’s theory is in relation to the 
growth pattern which emerges from the flow of household spending and the money supply.63 
Economic theory is outside the scope of this thesis but it should be noted that his description of an 
economic growth spiral can be applied to the relationship between IP and finance: “In this way the 
circular flows, which formerly had prevailed, turned out into an upward-moving spiral. In each round 
the growth process creates more possibilities for growth which in turn induces further growth. By 
contrast, where growth is insufficient, profits diminish, leading to a reverse spiral, which ends in 
losses and in a shrinking process. This results in a growth imperative.”64 
One of the underlying goals of Intellectual Property (“IP”) is to promote innovation and growth. It 
was shown above that the ownership of IP rights is becoming increasingly important in facilitating 
company growth. The Hargreave report noted the importance of IP in company growth “Participants 
in competitive markets have a strong reason to innovate to create and capture new value, and 
competition is the strongest incentive for firms to innovate. In the words of Ed McCabe: ‘creativity is 
one of the last remaining legal ways of gaining an unfair advantage over the competition.’”65 In the 
digital economy, new businesses have emerged which trade mostly on their IP rights. Also, IP is 
playing a more important role in the growth of traditional businesses as well. Those types of 
businesses are increasingly reliant on their IP to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace and 
to bring in increased revenue. As a company grows it is able to generate more IP rights which in turn 
                                                          
59 Matthew Abrams, ‘Tapping the intangible: security interests and intellectual property’  (2014) 27(3) 
Insolvency Intelligence 34, 35. 
60 Department for Business Innovation & Skills,’ Registration of Company Charges: Issues to be resolved 
before the preparation of draft regulations’ (URN 11/862, April 2011) 10. 
61 World Intellectual Property Organisation, ‘The Securitization of Intellectual Property Assets—A New Trend’ 
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62 Hans Binswanger, ‘The Growth Spiral: Money, Energy and Imagination in the Dynamics of the Market’ 
(2013 Springer). 
63 Ibid at 4. 
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65Ian Hargreaves, ‘Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth’ (An independent report 
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leads to company growth. When Binswager’s growth spiral is applied to IP and company growth, at 
each round of growth a company will be able to generate new IP rights which create the possibility of 
more growth which in turns lead to the creation of additional IP rights. 
Financing is the second component in the growth spiral. It also leads to company growth. Throughout 
the life cycle of any company, often a company will need financing in order to grow.66 This is true 
from a start-up to a publicly traded company.67 Academics have identified that businesses have a life 
cycle. They have also identified different stages of growth in the business life cycle. The most 
commonly identified stages of business growth are as follows68: Seed, Development, Early Growth 
and Maturity69. Not all businesses go through each of these stages. Some may never get through their 
seed phase, and most will never reach maturity. However, many companies cannot reach the next 
stage of business growth without external financing. This is because, in many cases, sales and revenue 
are not enough to drive company growth to the next stage.70 When Binswager’s growth spiral is 
applied to financing and company growth, at each stage of business growth when a company receives 
financing, they will use it increase their revenue which will lead to the possibility of more growth. In 
this thesis, only secured lending will be discussed in relation to financing and company growth. 
The combination of IP and financing in the same growth round increase the potential of the growth 
spiral. As a company grows, it can use IP as security to get financing, which can be used to create 
more IP which then leads to more financing. By contrast, if IP cannot be used for financing, a reverse 
spiral can be created. In this case, growth will be insufficient and profits will diminish. This thesis will 
discuss the legal complications which can either impede the IP-Finance Growth Spiral or even cause a 
reverse cycle. It will be shown that the conflict between IP law and secured finance laws causes 
uncertainty for creditors. This uncertainty means that creditors are less likely to offer loans with IP as 
security, or they will charge more for such lending. In Chapter 3, additionally, it is shown that legal 
uncertainty causes IP valuations to be discounted to quantify extra risk. A high discount rate means 
that IP owners may not be getting as much for their IP right as they would if there was less legal risk. 
The examples in Chapter 3 show quantitatively how legal uncertainty impacts the IP-Finance Growth 
Spiral.  When the legal uncertainty of taking security in IP rights is alleviated, then there is more 
opportunity for the IP-Finance Growth Spiral to form.  This will lead to better company growth which 
in turn leads to better economic growth as a whole. 
 
 
                                                          
66 In some stage of company growth there may not be revenue and even in later stages of company growth sales 
cannot drive all growth. See Robert Angell, ‘Financing Growth in Small Companies’,  2007 Jan/Feb 
Commercial Lending Review 27.  
67 The amount of external funding needed is often determined by the following formula (Angell at 28): 
EFN = A/S x FS – L/S x FS – M x (S0 + FS) 
EFN = external funds needed 
A/S = the expected change in assets per dollar 
of new sales 
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of new sales 
M = the net profit margin 
S0 = current sales 
68 See Brian Gregory, Matthew Rutherford et al, ‘An Empircal Investigation of the Growth Cycle Theory of 
Small Firm Financing’ 2005 43(4) Journal of Small Business Management 382. See  also fn 15. 
 
69 R. Punt, The Use of Intellectual Property as. Security for Debt Finance, 1997 3 I.P.Q. 279. 





CHAPTER 3: IP VALUATION 
1. Introduction 
Before IP can be used in a financial transaction, it first needs to be valued. Many scholars have argued 
that the difficulties in valuing IP accurately have traditionally been a barrier to collateralization and 
securitisation.71 Legally uncertainty directly affects the value of IP in debt based finance. In order to 
understand how risk impacts IP value, a brief discussion of IP valuation will be given.  This chapter 
will identify the risk and inherent problems in IP valuation. It will also show that if the legal risk in 
using IP as security is minimised IP valuation can be more accurate.   
This chapter will discuss the general principles of valuing IP. The three main methods of valuation are 
the income method, the market method, and the cost method. Each method will be described below in 
relation to valuing IP. Additionally, relevant variations on each method are discussed. In Section 4, 
valuation practices and concerns will be discussed in relation to each type of right. Case studies will 
illustrate how valuation works in practice. The final section will discuss how risk and discount rates 
are applied in IP valuation. 
2. Methods of Valuation 
 
a.  Introduction 
IP is valued using a variety of methods. No one method is perfect, and each method can give an 
inaccurate valuation of an IP right. Additionally, each method has its own risks and disadvantages that 
can fail to capture the full value of the IP in question. There are, however, some steps which can be 
taken to increase the likelihood of an accurate valuation for collateralization or securitisation.   
In order to ensure a good valuation, several important questions must be asked before deciding on the 
method and scope of valuation.  The first question that should be asked is what type of IP is to be 
valued. There is not a once size fits all method for IP. Each type of IP will have its own unique 
characteristics and risks. For example, the copyright to a famous song needs to be valued differently 
that a technology patent. Despite the fact that both types of IP have revenue streams, they have 
inherent differences which will require different strategies for valuation and possibly even a different 
method of valuation.  The copyright has a much longer life than the patent, but that does not mean that 
the royalties will last as long as the licensing fees will for the patent. When valuing the copyright the 
overall fame of the artist and other songs by the artist might be helpful in the copyright to one 
particular song. Another aspect which will figure in the value of the copyright is whether the artist has 
allowed the song to be used in commercials, on TV shows, in films or other commercial arenas.  This 
assessment differs from the assessment required to value a technology patent which must use a type of 
valuation that will take into consideration the depth of market penetration of the patented technology 
and also the amount of similar technology available on the market. 
The second question is to assess the IPR in relation to other forms of IP and how the actual product 
functions.  There is some debate in the IP valuation world whether IP should be grouped together for 
valuation or valued individually.  Of course, the later makes for a more accurate valuation, but that 
level of accuracy may not be necessary, which  will be discussed in turn. An example of grouping 
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(Sweet & Maxwell 2004). 
20 
 
assets for valuation would be valuing a group of IP for a commercially available pharmaceutical 
product. The valuation would cover the patent, the know-how, the trademark and the goodwill. This 
would be done to determine what the value of that particular drug truly is and due to the IP run-off 
between all four IPR’s the valuation would be much more accurate as opposed to severing them from 
each other and value them individually.  Another example is in brand valuation. The valuation would 
need to include a range of trade marks, designs, and copyright. The latter is particularly true if the 
brand has famous advertising such as the Absolute Vodka campaign. 
The next question which needs to be determined is for whom the valuation is being done.  In the case 
of collateralization or securitisation, the valuation is going to be done (usually) on the behalf of the 
IPR holder for the financial institution or whomever the creditor may be. Since collateralizing or 
securitizing IP is not as usual as other types of assets, it is often the case that the creditor will require 
their own evaluation of the assets which is more likely to be conservative and be likely to discount a 
larger amount of risk. That is not to say that this will be more accurate since the IPR holder might 
have a better understanding of how the IPR functions from a commercial point of view.  A third party 
who does a good evaluation would likely be a hybrid between the two as they are coming from a 
neutral point and would not give the IPR an inflated worth of the holder and will understand the IPR 
better than a typical creditor. 
The last factor is the need to take a holistic view of the valuation to determine what the best method 
would best in these unique circumstances. Regardless of what method is chosen, it must be robust, 
verifiable, transparent, and give estimates on a reliable basis.  Taking a holistic should also include the 
fact that the person holding the asset in the collateralization or securitisation will ultimately want to be 
able to recover their money. In light of this, the valuer must consider what value the IPR will have 
when sold to a third party outright or after bankruptcy. 
i. Threshold Criteria 
 
In accountancy terms, an IP right has value only if it meets the following conditions: it must be 
identifiable from the other assets of the business, it must be able to produce on-going profits to the 
business, it must be protected and not in the public domain, and it must be transferable from buyer to 
seller.72These conditions must be met for the IP right to have a quantitative value. It is often difficult 
to explain to an IP owner that their IP may not have value independently from the rest of the business. 
If that is the case, then the value of that particular IP right is likely to be lower than an IP right with 
independent value. Such IP rights are only likely to have value as part of a bundle of other business 
assets. In general, though, it is easy for an IP right to meet the conditions. 
The first condition can be problematic as it is difficult to sever some IP from the underlying business 
and also from other associated IP.73  For example, it can be difficult to separate the value of an IP 
right from the underlying business in cases where a business has one key product which is protected 
by a corresponding patent (or group of patents).  In this case, valuing the patent is difficult because it 
is closely tied to the operating business. In this situation, the individual IP right can have a higher 
                                                          
72See for example, Financial Reporting Counsel, ‘Financial Reporting Standard No. 10 Goodwill and Intangible 
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value that the whole business in its entirety.74 If a third party wants to acquire that particular piece of 
IP, acquiring the entity who owns the IP may be cheaper than purchasing the IP outright.75  
This problem can also arise in cases when valuing a trademark for an individual product is sold from a 
valuable umbrella brand. It can be difficult to determine the brand value for one product without 
including some value from the overall company brand. 76  
The next condition is easier to meet as IP can generate profit in several ways. It either does so through 
a revenue stream, such as with royalties or licensing, or it can generate profit by saving the company 
money (cost saving).77 For example, a company saves money by not having to license the patent to 
make one of its products. The question of whether this profit is on-going is a little more difficult for 
IP as every IP right has a limited life span of which the end date which may not be obvious. The life 
span of a patent78 with a twenty-year term of protection is obvious. The life span of a trade mark, 
which can be protected as long as the public associates the mark with the product, is not.79 In addition 
to the legal life span, IP also has an economic lifespan. A business method patent may be legally 
protected for twenty years, but it may only have an economic lifespan of five years. 
The third condition is that the asset must be capable of being protected and cannot be used freely in 
the public. 80 For the most part, this condition is easy to meet as an IP right is a type of protected right. 
Assessing whether an asset meets this condition can become difficult when valuing an unregistered 
right. Valuation of unregistered rights like copyright (save for the US) requires more due diligence as 
the ownership of the right and the scope of that right will have to determine if they are protected.  
The last condition is that the right must be transferable.81 The large majority of IP rights are 
transferrable, so this is not a problem. In some jurisdictions, moral rights cannot be transferred and 
therefore cannot be monetised. Also, in some jurisdictions like the US, trademarks cannot be 
transferred without their accompanying goodwill or the trade mark will be destroyed.82 This will have 
to be taken into consideration in the valuation.83 
The above conditions are usually easily met with IP. In fact, they provide important information that 
will show the inherent value of the IP and the amount of risk that should be deducted.  
b. Valuation Methods 
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IP valuation methods have often been criticized for their lack of uniformity and for the fact that each 
method will produce different results.84 In fact, IP valuation businesses are very propriety about their 
methods of IP valuation going so far as to patent the process. Many valuation organisations also argue 
that their method is the definitive way to value IP. However, there is no one method that is best. 
Instead of relying on one method it is better if IP valuation methods were viewed as a pallet of tools 
where each method has their own utility and purpose.  
The three most common valuation methods are the income approach, the cost approach, and the 
market approach.85 After the three most common methods, other methods used to value IP will be 
discussed. Also, the discussion on each method will comment on the efficacy of a particular method 
when collateralizing or securitizing IP. 
i. Income Approach 
The first method is the income approach. This method focuses on the potential of the future income 
stream of the IP. The most difficult part of this approach is the need to accurately (as possible) predict 
the future income stream. In this method, it is generally agreed that four variables are included in the 
valuation.86 
The first variable to be determined in this method is the calculation of the income stream.87 The 
revenue stream is usually from licensing or royalties. It is notoriously difficult to guess the duration 
and the amount of royalties for certain types of IP such as copyright. The problem with this is that the 
value of the artist can have wild fluctuations. The value of Michael Jackson’s catalogue is a prime 
example of both of the fluctuations of royalty streams.  In the mid-2000’s the value of his songs 
decreased significantly after the alleged sex abuse scandals. Valuations of his catalogue in 2007 
would probably reflect these factors. Only two years later, his sudden death prompted an increase in 
the value of his catalogue. The royalties from his songs had increased unexpectedly as millions of fans 
purchased his songs and albums in a burst of nostalgia. It is unlikely that the sharp increase in 
royalties would have been forecast in a valuation before 2009.  
The next variable in income approach valuations is a calculation of the duration of the income 
stream.88 It is easier to determine the royalties of an IP right with a fixed term such as a copyright or a 
patent. The licensing fees for trade marks or trade secrets are also fully dependent on other external 
circumstances.  Trade marks are dependent on their continued linkage with the goods or services they 
represent. Trade secrets rely on continued secrecy found through contractual obligations. For these 
types of IP, the duration is quite difficult to calculate and is line with calculating how long something 
will be commercially viable. Using the income approach method to value trademarks and trade secrets 
is less accurate because of their variable duration. 
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The third variable is accounting for the amount of risk associated with generating the income 
stream.89With all forms of IP, it must be considered that the IP right could be invalidated at some 
point. There is also the risk that the technology associated with the IP right may become technically 
obsolete. In particular, there are specials risks associated with patents.  One risk is the possibility that 
a similar new patent may be registered which decreases the value of the technology underlying the 
patent.90 With patents, there is also the risk of a loss of value that can occur in patent infringement 
cases. In this case, the infringer can be held statutorily liable for three times the damage which is often 
a significant amount.  Additionally, in the infringement case, the patent could be found to be invalid, 
and therefore worthless. The revenue stream for the patent as well as for the underlying know-how or 
underlying trade secrets associated with the patent would dry up. According to some sources at least 
43% of patent claims are invalid, so valuers often add a larger risk factor into their valuation of a 
patent. 91 
The last variable in this valuation (which is not included in all types of income stream valuation) uses 
a discount rate92. According to WIPO “When the period cash flows (typically annual) are 
‘discounted,’ or adjusted by some factor that accounts for the differing value or money from one 
period to the next, it is called the present value of the asset.93 Cash flows are generally forecasted 
throughout the expected economic life of the IP. Beyond the economic life of the asset, an estimate of 
remaining value or terminal value may be appropriate.”94 For example, even after a patent expires 
there may be leftover value in the overall product since it was first to the market. Essentially, this is a 
way for valuers to account for income generated throughout the life of an asset while taking into 
consideration factors such as inflation or the amount of overall industry risk associated with the IP 
right. 
The income method is a particularly useful method for valuing most types of IP rights which have a 
proven revenue stream such as a patent or copyright with an established revenue stream. If the IP 
rights have been bundled correctly, then the valuation is more likely to be accurate. This method 
includes a certain amount of risk assessment which is likely to make the valuation more conservative 
and thus more attractive to creditors than other methods. Since there is dual value to an IP right with a 
revenue stream (the stream and the underlying IP) it is particularly useful when the asset is going to 
be securitized.95 
There are several variations of this method which are commonly used to value IP. They are as 
follows. The first variation is the discounted flow method.  It is commonly used by investors to assess 
the attractiveness of a potential investment. It is used to determine the value of an IP right by 
calculating the present day value of cash flows throughout the rest of its useful life.96This figure is 
then discounted by assessing for the time span of the asset involved. 97 Like other methods, the 
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discounted flow method also considers the duration of the economic life span of the IP right and the 
life span of the cash flow from the IP. The difference between the discounted flow method and other 
variations of the income approach is that it provides a present day value which considers the 
possibility of variable future cash flows. For this reason, this method is commonly used to value 
assets such bonds or other assets which have variable cash flows throughout their lifespan. When used 
to value IP, it is most often used to value patents. 
One of the biggest criticisms of this method is that small deviations from any projected flows can 
erode the accuracy of the valuation. In the case of patents, the main drawback is that this method 
cannot fully take into any unique risks associated with a particular patent and instead lumps all risks 
together and then adjusted with a discount rate. Additionally, when patents are valued using this 
method, it is often assumed that the asset will not have any value beyond on the life of the patent.98 
Another problem is that this method does not consider other facts that may extend the lifespan of the 
value such as legal extensions (like the paediatric pharmaceutical extension) or the additional value of 
having market dominance. Both of these factors can erode the accuracy of the patent valuation. 
Another common method of valuation for IP is the excess operating profit method which is also a 
variation of the income method. With this method, the value of the asset is determined by calculating 
the additional profits generated by the business owning the IP compared with businesses that do not 
own that IP right99. The valuation is commonly done by comparing any additional profits of the IP 
owner with similar business enterprises that do not own the IP.100 This amount which reflects the 
capitalised profit for the lifespan of the IP is then discounted to the present day to determine the value. 
One of the biggest difficulties with this method is that additional profits which are not attributable to 
the IP may be unintentionally included in the valuation. An example of this is when profit comes from 
having a more efficient production method or a better distribution network. 101Another difficulty in 
this method is the fact that similar businesses compared to the IP owner, may have their own IP, 
which performs a similar function in their business. To account for this possibility, the valuer will use 
a higher discount rate. Also, as with the market method mentioned below, it can be difficult to find 
market information on a similar business with comparable IP. This variation of the income method 
can be useful for valuing assets such as patents and their related product IP that have a fairly exclusive 
market with few competitors or comparable products. 102  
The premium profit method is another variation of the income method commonly used to value 
IP.103It is particularly useful when valuing consumer brands. In this method, the value of the brand 
(trademark and goodwill) is calculated by comparing the value of the particular, branded product 
compared with the generic equivalent of the same product. From this, the additional value that the 
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brand gives the product can be calculated. This additional brand value is then calculated over the 
product’s estimated lifespan and then netted with the amount spent on marketing and brand support. 
The value is finally then discounted to the present day. 
The difficulty in using this method is that there are few sectors which truly are unbranded, so it is 
difficult to find a true generic for comparison. Even a store brand has its own value, so a store brand 
product is not truly generic. 104 Since this method needs a generic equivalent for comparison, it is not 
well suited for valuing patents or in cases, where a trade secret gives a company market exclusion.105 
Also, it would not be a suitable method to value assets protected by copyright such as books or music. 
It could be useful for valuing trademarks when there is a generic equivalent to a branded product. 
In two variations of the income method which commonly used, the valuer calculates the amount that 
the IP right saves the company by the virtue of owning it.106 This variation is different from other 
methods which only calculate the revenue streams generated from the IP right. The first variation is 
called the cost savings method.107 This method calculates the value of an IP right by assessing the 
present value of the cost savings that the business expects to make as the result of owning the asset. 108 
The cost savings method is similar to the excess operating profit method except, in the first method 
the amount saved is calculated as opposed to the second method whether the extra profit is calculated. 
The cost savings method is fairly straightforward and provides an accurate valuation when a business 
has developed a technology during its operation and can contrast the value before the technology was 
developed versus the value after. It is more difficult to make this valuation from a third party 
standpoint and whether the technology or process would save the company money. 109 
This method is useful in collateralization and securitisation when the asset that benefits the entire 
company and is not merely a product in it110. For example, it could be used to value a method process 
patent that allows the company to manufacture or produce superior results than their competitor. It 
could even be used to value a trade secret such as Google’s search algorithms which have allowed it 
to become a market leader in internet search engines. 
The royalty saving method is a variation similar to the cost saving method. It calculates the value of 
an IP right by assessing the amount of money that the IP right owner would pay to in-license that 
right.111 A variation of the royalty savings method calculates the value of the IP right by assessing the 
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amount of royalties the owner would receive if it out-licensed the right or if the IP owner did not use 
the IP right at all.112 With either variation of the method, the IP right is valued by calculating the 
royalty stream that the business is either saving or would earn by owning this asset.  
This method has several major drawbacks. The first one is that it is difficult to find comparable public 
licensing agreements.113 The majority of licensing agreements and royalty amounts are kept 
confidential. One way this can be overcome in the valuation is by estimating the additional profits that 
are earned by exploiting the asset while the licensee is still able to receive a commercial return on the 
asset. 114 
The royalty saving method is not often used in commercialization and securitisation of IP, but it is 
commonly used to calculate damages in infringement cases. 115In those cases, the infringer will pay 
the same rate that they would have paid if they had been given a licence. This rate may be useful in 
valuing IP assets which have an established royalty rate, however using this method with comparable 
IP royalty rates in not recommended. In the case of the later any valuation would be speculative at 
best and likely to be extremely flawed. In terms of commercialization and securitisation, the method 
should not automatically be excluded as it can be used to value IP with a proven royalty stream. In 
such cases, the valuation can be extremely accurate. 
b. Market Approach 
The next method is the Market Approach. It is a common valuation method used to value some types 
of intangible property but is seldom used for Intellectual Property.116 This form of valuation uses a 
market comparable approach. Details of IP licences or sales are rarely made available to the public, 
which makes the market approach difficult to use to value IP. Also, there is not the same public 
‘market’ for IP as there is with other assets. A market approach valuation compares the value of 
similar assets by using accounting standard setters.117 The valuer will set market multiples by using 
the prices at which similar assets have been sold. Additional market multiples are created by 
comparing similar attributes. The two sets of market multiples are then applied to the asset in 
question. The market method would be an ideal method if the IP market were transparent. 
Unfortunately, it is not. The biggest drawback of this method is that public information about deals 
where IP has sold is rare; making it difficult to find comparable assets to use in the valuation.  
One flaw in this method is that inherent risk is not easily included in the valuation.118 IP rights may 
have similar attributes, but that does not mean that the two assets have the same amount of risk.119 The 
risk is generally not even the same even with comparable IP as each IP right has very specific 
attributes which create specific risks. For example, each patent’s validity is partially based on whether 
it is an inventive step away from the prior art. It cannot be assessed whether a group of patents have 
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an inventive step. It can only be assessed whether an individual patent has made an inventive step. 
Also, considering, the fact that 43% of all patents are found to be invalid in opposition or 
infringement cases.120 It is difficult to reconcile different levels of risk between patents in light of this 
fact. 
In the late 2000’s the market method gained attention from many academics and practitioners alike 
when secondary markets for IP emerged. These secondary markets were most commonly used to sell 
technology patents. 121 In the US in particular,  numerous companies specialised in finding and 
auctioning non-core patents.  The emerging market gained additional attention after several song 
catalogues were sold. This lead to an increased interest in the market approach as knowledge of IP 
values became more public. 
However, even when the secondary IP market was at its peak, there were inherent differences between 
the ideal market knowledge and the information from auctions and sales that were predominately 
occurring. Although there were public auctions, the buyers of the patents were not necessarily known. 
Also, public auctions did not prove to be as popular as private auctions where all of the parties in the 
transaction have signed non-disclosure agreements. In private auctions, usually only buyer, the seller 
and the brokerage knew the price paid for the patent. Other problems started occurring, when in one 
Ocean Tomo auction for several copyright catalogues proper due diligence had not been performed, 
and it turned out after the sale that the seller did own the copyright to the music catalogue.122 
By 2008, the secondary IP market began to dry up, and many of the brokerages went out of business. 
For example, the auction powerhouse,  Ocean Tomo, was then taken over by another company. 123 
Several factors caused the failure of the secondary IP market,  including the economic recession. The 
fact that many businesses and industries never fully embraced the idea of selling their IP rights 
through a brokerage also contributed to its downfall.124 Although auctions are regaining some 
momentum, they are still not necessarily a visible market for IP rights as the auctions and the selling 
prices are often private.  
As the enthusiasm for secondary IP markets has declined, so has interest in using the market method 
for valuing IP.  Due to the public lack of knowledge of IP prices, it is difficult to use the market 
method to value IP, and it is less accurate than other methods. This method is only useful if the details 
of the sale of a similar IP are publicly known. This is not a common occurrence. 
c. Cost Approach  
The last common method is the cost approach.  The cost approach values an asset based on what it 
would cost to replace it.125  The theory behind this method is that that the investor would pay no more 
to purchase the asset than would be paid to reproduce the asset.  There are two different styles applied 
when using this method.  The first is to evaluate the asset on a historical cost basis which calculates 
the value of the asset on its historical cost and then subtracts the amount based on depreciation and the 
reasonable useful life estimate. 126 The other style is to assess the IPR based on the replacement or 
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reproduction cost at the present day value.127 The different styles differ in their approach include 
adjustments regarding inflation (historical style), market efficiency (replacement style), competition 
and technological advances.128 The costs which are quantified in both approaches can be legal fees, 
application/registration fees, personnel costs, development costs, production costs and 
marketing/advertising costs.129 
The cost method can be useful for IP that is not directly generating revenue. For example, in a 
pharmaceutical company either style of the cost method could be used to calculate the value of a drug 
that is about to be released to market. Since there are no sales yet, the income method could not be 
used to value the drug. The first style of the cost approach could value the drug based on the historical 
cost to develop and protect the drug. The second could assess what it would cost to bring another drug 
to market. One of the most useful aspects of this method is that all of the IPR associated with the drug 
could be taken into consideration and not just the patent.  
The cost method of valuation is not without fault since not every cost and risk can be included in the 
valuation. For example, this method does not include the value of early market entry which is gained 
when owning a patent. 130 It also does not consider the cost of the underlying circumstances which 
lead to the assets development in the first place.131 The example, the R&D department of a large 
pharmaceutical company is extremely expensive. Many of their research projects do not lead to any 
revenue, but certain ones generate the majority of the company’s revenue. Using the cost method, the 
overall R&D budget is not proportionally included in the value of one drug. Instead, only direct R&D 
cost is included in the valuation. 
The cost method is extremely conservative and provides a minimum value of an asset. It is also 
particularly good for assets which are still in their early development or for ones which have not 
begun earning revenue yet. The conservative nature of the method makes it difficult to use with most 
types of intangibles which are already generating a cash flow as there is the serious risk that the 
valuation will not fully capture the value of the asset. It may, however, be useful as a type of 
secondary valuation method to check whether another method has given a reasonable valuation.  For 
these reasons, the cost method could be useful in IP collateralisation or securitisation if the IP does 
not yet have a proven revenue stream or as a backup method.  
4. IP Specific Considerations and Case Studies 
All three of the methods described above can be used to value each type of IP. However, some 
methods are more appropriate when valuing certain types of IP. A discussion of how each method can 
be used to value each IP right is set out below. Additionally, any IP specific considerations taken 
when valuing a certain type of IP right are also be discussed. 
a. Patents 
Patent valuation is different from a valuation for other types of IP because patents have several unique 
aspects. One is that a patent has a shorter life span which must be considered in a valuation.  Also, the 
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valuation must consider the product’s stage of development vis a vis the lifespan.132 The value of a 
patent forms a bell curve as the patent’s value increases as the underlying asset becomes more 
developed and then its value tapers off closer to the end of the patent term.  
The uniqueness or novelty of the patent (not just in regards to validity) must also be assessed in a 
valuation.133 If there are several similar technologies on the market that perform a similar function, the 
value of the patent will be lower. Related to this consideration is an assessment of whether competing 
or other existing technologies compete with the patented technology.134  For example, if another 
company has a more advanced technology then the patent in question will have less value. The same 
is true if another company has a technology that has a greater market share or had an earlier market 
entry. Another factor in patent valuation is the breadth and depth of the patent in relation to the 
technology it protects.135  A patent will have less value in several situations: the patent has narrow 
claims; the patent is a minor improvement on another underlying technology; the patent is part of a 
patent thicket; or if the patent can easily be designed around to avoid infringement. In these cases, the 
patent only represents a small part of the technology and therefore a small portion of the market share 
which means it will have less value.  
Strategic or economic influences on the future of the invention must also be taken into consideration. 
136 Those influences can increase or decrease the value of the patent. For example, patents for 
alternative energy are likely to have an increased value in the near future as their importance 
increases. As another example, the opposite is true for any patent for consumer video cameras which 
are being obsolete as smartphones can now record video of equal quality. 137 
The cost method is often used to value patents in technology that is in an early stage of development. 
It is considered highly reliable as it takes into consideration what it would cost the company to acquire 
or to make a comparable asset. A valuation using the cost does not always give the full value, of such 
a patent, but it does give an accurate minimum value. 
For more developed inventions, the income method is most often used to value patents. When valuing 
patents for commercialization or securitisation, the income method often results in an accurate 
valuation. Perhaps, the most famous variation of the income method used to value patents is the 
technology factor method. The Dow Chemical Company developed the method in the 1990’s.138 This 
method used the approach taken in income method and then also measures the value of the 
contribution of the specific asset to the rest of the business as part of the valuation. The technology 
factor method uses weighted values for ten utility tributes and for ten competitive attributes of the 
same technology.139 The two values are then combined into a weighted score which is used as a 
multiplier against projected cash flows.140 Many subsequent patent specific valuation methods are a 
variation on this methodology. 
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i. Case studies 
One published paper illustrated the use of the discounted cash flow method to value an oncological 
drug patent.141 The drug had been discovered in 2003, and a patent application was filed for it in 2004. 
The entire patenting process, including the extension of the initial patent registration into other 
jurisdictions, took four years to complete. The valuation was completed in 2010 and was conducted 
with the expectation that the drug would be approved and enter the market in 2015. Additionally, the 
valuation estimated that the drug would continue to be commercialised until 2024 which coincides 
with the term of the patent. 
The amount of revenue from the fourteen-year life of the drug was computed using the forecasts of 
the expected sale price and the amount expected to be sold. This forecast also took into consideration 
that the revenue was likely to be the highest in the first six years but then taper off due to the expected 
development of substitute drugs by competitors. The total investment, including the cost of the 
launch, marketing, and development of the manufacturing processes, was deducted from the projected 
sales. Additionally, C.O.G.S (cost of drugs sold) as well as general and administrative costs were also 
deducted from the revenue forecast. A corporate tax amount of 30% was also then deducted. Finally, 
the annual revenue forecast and outflows were discounted using a weighted average cost of capital of 
12%. Since the drug had not yet been approved, an additional discount rate was added to account for 
the probability of such failure. This rate was calculated at 20% in 2010, at 15% in 2011 and 2012 and 
then at 5% in 2013 and 2014. These factors lead to the valuation of the drug to be €16,114 million in 
2010. 
Another example of a patent valuation can be found in recent litigation142. In 2009, a shareholder 
derivative suit alleged that a patent valuation failed to follow accepted valuation guidelines. The 
Cement-Lock company had patented a method to convert contaminated waste products into a cement 
additive. The method was not as profitable as hoped and a group of shareholders sued the company 
alleging that the original directors of the company had a fraudulent scheme which cost the company 
millions of dollars and also made the method worthless.  
At trial, the plaintiffs introduced evidence which showed how the patent should have been valued.143 
The patent was valued using the three traditional methods of valuation. Particular attention was drawn 
to the income approach and the licence fees that were anticipated but then discounted to account for 
the fact that the technology was in an early stage of development. The valuation expert used a 15% 
discount rate. The court disagreed with this rate and suggested that 40% was more appropriate in the 
valuation of a developing technology.144 Ultimately, the court ruled that the plaintiff’s valuation was 
unreliable because it did not follow the Federal Rules of Evidence and state law. Under the applicable 
state law and in the Federal Rules of Evidence, calculations of profits from a “new commercial 
enterprise” are considered to be too uncertain to permit recovery. The plaintiff’s valuation was not 
valid because it did calculate anticipated profits.  
Instead, the court used the cost method to calculate damages.  One of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses 
had testified on this approach. The expert offered into evidence the proposal by Cement-Lock to the 
Government Research Institute where they had asked for $26.4 million to develop the technology. 
The expert reasoned that the patent was worth at least this much because “nobody is going to commit 
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to spending $26 million if the technology is not worth a lot more than $26 million.”145 The expert also 
cited additional grants and loans from the government to prove that the patent was worth at least $26 
million.  Part of the plaintiffs’ claim was that the defendants had wasted the lifespan of the patent 
which originally had at least been worth $26 million but because of the significant delays had caused 
the patent to become worthless.  
The defence introduced rebuttal witnesses and evidence to try to show that the valuation provided by 
the plaintiff was flawed as it was only two pages long and it did not adhere to the guidelines set out by 
the business valuation community. Unfortunately, the defence chose only to criticise the plaintiff’s 
expert witness and did not present any of their own expert witnesses. They also failed to object to the 
fact that the plaintiff’s expert used a current day valuation and did not adhere to the new business rule 
which would have prohibited the use of anticipated revenue in the valuation. 
The jury found for the plaintiffs and awarded them three million dollars for the breach of fiduciary 
duty and ten million for racketeering, unjust enrichment, and fraud. This decision was appealed. The 
appellate court dismissed the appeal because the jury had been properly instructed and did not want to 
second-guess their decision.  The appellate court did note that they found the plaintiff’s valuation 
“compelling and troubling” but the jury was within its rights to find for the plaintiff.  
This case highlights several important issues on patent valuation. Firstly, IP valuation can be 
subjective, and it is not always reliable. This shows that if valuations are not considered reliable, then 
there is a need for increased discount rates when valuing IP to try to hedge against any uncertainty. 
Secondly, the discount rate for IP, whether 15% or 40%, is always higher than the rate used to value 
many other assets.  
b. Trade Marks 
Not all trademarks have independent value apart from the businesses they represent. Before any 
valuation is done, it must be determined that the trademark has independent value. 146 Several factors 
are used to access whether a trademark has independent value. The first question asked is whether the 
trade mark or brand name differentiates the product or service with which it is connected in terms of 
value.147 It is often assumed there is value from the fact that registered marks differentiate their 
attached product or service from similar products or services. The assessment in valuation is different 
from a legal assessment. Instead, the question is whether the differentiation gives value. In other 
words, does the mark make it more likely that the connected product or service will be purchased 
because of the trademark?  This assessment is even more important in cases where an unregistered 
trademark is valued.  
The second test to determine whether a trademark has independent value is to identify whether any 
other parties apart from the original owner would have a commercial use for the asset.148 Many time 
IPRs owners often have an exaggerated sense of the value of their right and how useful it would be as 
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a commercial asset apart from the other assets of the business.149 If a trademark would be useful to a 
third party, then it has value apart from the business with which it is associated. 
The last question to ask is whether a third party would pay a fee or license to use the name, product or 
logo either on a duplicate product or through an extension into other product areas.150 This question is 
similar to the second one but slightly different as it focuses on licensing opportunities for the 
trademark as opposed to an outright sale. The licensing activities considered by the third question are 
to be for slightly different products or products in a related field.151 If the valuer can answer these 
three questions affirmatively then the trademark has independent value.152 Once this determination has 
been done, the next step is to determine which valuation method or methods should be used to give 
the most accurate valuation. Additionally, the valuer will need to assess whether the trademark should 
be valued as part of a bundle of related IP rights.153  
The valuation of trademarks can be complex since they are one of the most context specific forms of 
IPR. For example in the case of bankruptcy of a company, the value of their trademarks can devalue 
by 90%.154 The reverse can also be true. For example, the value of a brand can rise significantly of a 
brand when a brand is about to be acquired by another company. 
In the past, the market method was commonly used to value trademarks.155 This is unfortunate 
because, as mentioned previously, the mark method is not reliable to value IP since there is not a 
stable secondary market for trademarks. Also, when trademarks have been sold, the details of the 
mark’s sale price is often confidential.  
Luckily, within the past decade, other methods are beginning to be used to value trademarks. Some 
methods are more appropriate than others. The cost method has been shown to be useful in some 
cases.156  Although it is not the most accurate method, it does provide a valuation which reflects what 
it would cost to replace the trademark.  In this case, the cost method will not value the licensing fees 
the trademark will earn but rather the amount that a third party would pay for the asset. 
One of the best approaches to use is a variation of the income approach. However, a valuation using 
the income method will only be accurate if three conditions are met. The first is that the trademark 
generates a stream of revenue attributable to that trademark. The second condition is that remaining 
life of the revenue steam must be able to be determined. Finally, the last condition is that the valuer 
can determine a rate of return commensurate with the risk of realizing the income.157 For any trade 
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mark which has a reasonable revenue stream and where the trademark’s risk factors can be 
determined, the income method is a stable way to value the trademark.  
With any discussion of trademark valuation, goodwill must be mentioned. Despite the fact that 
goodwill and trademarks can be valued independently of each other, the best practice is to bundle 
them together. Also, as mentioned previously, in some jurisdictions, a trademark is destroyed when 
the goodwill is severed from it. Because of this, the goodwill and the trademark should be kept 
together throughout any deal; A valuation often sets the tone for the rest of the deal.158  A trademark 
and its goodwill should only be valued separately in cases where there is a compelling reason to do so.  
Domain names are closely associated with trademarks but for several reasons they deserve their own 
discussion. There is a great deal of debate on whether domain names should be considered a property 
right or whether they are a contractual right. That debate is outside the scope of this thesis, so they 
will be treated as a right closely associated with trademarks. Domain names are often a valuable part 
of the brand or umbrella trademark right, but they have their own intrinsic value as well. The above 
methods used to value trademarks can also be used to value trademarks but with some variations. It 
has been said that valuing domain names is closer to valuing real estate than to valuing any other type 
of intangible property. This is because there is a robust secondary market for domain names. One of 
the considerations in valuing a domain name is how easy it is for internet users to recognise and 
remember the domain name. This previously was one of the most important factors in domain name 
valuation a domain name but since the development of search engines, this has become less important. 
Domain names are not as important as they were previously because most internet users are more 
likely to use a search engine to find a website rather than just typing out the domain name in the 
browser. That being said domain names are still an important part in determining a web site’s search 
engine optimisation ranking. The methods of domain name valuation are given below. 
The first type of valuation often used to value domain names is the relative value method.159 This type 
of valuation is based on the idea that the domain name is tied in with the rest of the brand or 
trademark value. For example, if the brand is valued at £1 million and the domain name is worth 10% 
of that value, then the domain name will be valued at £100,000.  The relative value method is useful 
when the domain name encompasses the brand name or when the brand is represented in the domain 
name. For example, gap.co.uk can be valued with the relative value method because the domain name 
contains the brand name.  
The next method values the domain name based on the market value of similar domain names. 160 
This method is useful when the domain name is not particularly unique, not closely related to a brand, 
or descriptive. For example, books.com, is the domain name owned by Barnes and Nobles. The 
domain name is descriptive of what the company sells and therefore not entitled to trademark 
protection. The value of this domain name is exclusive from other IP and brand rights. In the method, 
the domain name is compared to other domain names that have recently been sold in a similar sector 
with similar features. The market method is useful in some cases to value domain names because of 
the large secondary market and a large amount of publically available information about domain name 
sales.  
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The next method of valuation is Replacement Cost which determines what it would cost to replace the 
domain name.161 Surprisingly, this happens often in practice when a company simply forgets to renew 
a domain name and another company quickly buys it. It is unlikely to be retrievable unless the 
purchaser of the relisted domain name either purchased in bad faith or uses it in bad faith (depending 
on the underlying dispute resolution rules applicable to the root of the domain name (e.g. co.uk). If the 
domain name is generic, it will be even more difficult to retrieve. The business will then have to 
options. They can buy the domain back by negotiating with the new owner and will probably have to 
probably an extremely high price. The second option is to buy a new domain to build up their business 
again, which can take time.162 The cost method would provide an accurate valuation of the second 
option. Another factor which must be included in a cost method valuation is how the replacement will 
affect their status in search engines.163 Search engines are an important part of most businesses and the 
ability of potential customers to find them. If a website moves to another domain name, the business 
can drop in the rankings for that search engine meaning they will be lower down on the results list and 
possibly delegated to later pages. There are also rumours of the “Google Sandbox Phenomenon” 
which means that a website cannot get very high SEO until after six months.164 This type of valuation 
reflects that the loss of a domain name can severely damage a business that is reliant of the internet 
and search engines.165 That is one of the main problems when using the cost method to value a 
domain name. In this method, only the historical cost to establish the domain name is calculated. The 
main problem with this method is that the cost to purchase a domain name is usually quite low. The 
method cannot take into consideration of how much the domain name will be worth after it is has 
been used or how much it will worth in the future.  
As seen from above, the nature of trademarks is changing and so is the way trademarks are valued. 
The most notable changes which have occurred are the emergence of the umbrella brand and the 
association of trademarks with digital assets. These changes have meant that valuation methods have 
had to have been adapted to the changes in how trademarks function. The case study below shows 
some of the challenges in valuing a trademark closely connected to a consumer brand. 
i. Case Studies 
A well-known case study, given by WIPO, showed how the income method was used to value a 
trademark of a retail petrol company.166 In the valuation, a petroleum company wanted a fair market 
valuation of the trademark for their retail brand of petrol. The valuation was b done for tax purposes. 
The premium price method was used to value the trademark. It was chosen because the value of 
branded petrol can be compared with the value of generic petrol. With petrol, the value of the 
trademark can be shown through such a comparison because there are minimum quality differences 
between petrol due to common refining and distribution channels. The value between the branded 
version and the unbranded version is known as the price premium. The value was then adjusted to 
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reflect incremental costs associated with the brand. These costs included advertising, administrative 
costs associated with their credit card program and any identified selling and admin costs that are 
required for the branded product. The premium profit was then multiplied by the expected annual 
sales of gasoline. Since a trademark can potentially have an infinite life, no terminal value was given 
in the evaluation. Finally, a discount rate of 20% was applied. The rate is the typical discount rate for 
trademarks and brands. Part of the discount rate also included an estimation of the indirect cost and 
time required to build a replacement asset. Also, included in the replacement cost analysis was the 
risk that the trademark  could become obsolete or loses its “current useful state.” As a whole, the 
overall discount rate for a trademark was quite high because of the additional factors it included. It is 
unclear how the purpose of the valuation was factored into the discount or overall value of the asset.  
Another good example of trademark valuation is a brand valuation of the Indian Premier League for 
Cricket (IPL).167 Brand Finance valued the franchise in 2013 using the relief from royalty method. 
They valued IPL as a single commercial entity which included the aggregated income from the overall 
brand as well as its individual franchises which included nine individual teams. Using the royalty 
relief methodology, brand finance assessed the notional price paid by the operation company to the 
brand company as a royalty fee. The Net Present Value of all forecasted revenue represented the value 
of the brand to IPL. The common rate of tax that will be charged on the royalties was then deducted, 
and then a final discount rate to the NPV was applied. The report did not mention how the comparison 
could be made between a branded cricket brand and an unbranded one. In this respect, it seems if they 
are actually using a version of the income method to assess the value of current royalties projected 
into the future.  
The valuation as described above led to the conclusion that the value of the brand at $3.03 billion in 
2013. The value of the trademark portfolio was estimated to make up $325.8 million of the 
franchisees. Later on in the document, this same figure is given as the brand value of the franchisees. 
From this, it can be assumed that in the valuation, brand value and trademark value were considered 
the same thing.168  
c. Copyright 
For the purposes of valuation, copyrighted words are sometimes divided into two categories: creative 
works and computer programmes. The reason for this is that creative works have different 
characteristics to IP normally found in a corporate setting.169 Some of these reasons are discussed in 
relation to the three valuation methods below. 
The income approach is useful to value both types of copyrighted works. In this method, the income 
stream of the copyrighted work is forecasted to end of its useful life of the asset. Calculating the 
royalty stream for a creative work can be more difficult than with a computer programme because it is 
uncertain how long a creative work will be popular. For example, the works of Beatrix Potter brought 
in significant royalties throughout the lifespan of their copyright protection and even after.170 This 
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could be contrasted with other authors who died the same year as Beatrice Potter, 1943, and whose 
books may have been long out of print.  
When using the income method to value computer programmes, it should be noted that the span of the 
copyright is not the same as a programme’s remaining useful life. The economic lifespan of most 
software is not more than five years. However, this depends on the type of software. Also, computer 
programmes may consist of more than one copyright because most software has numerous updates 
and upgrades. They are considered to be derivative works of the original copyright and may have their 
own protection as such.  
If the software is solely used internally within a company, variations of the income method need to be 
used to value it. The relief from royalty method is one popular method. In this method, the valuation 
is done by valuing the amount an enterprise saves by not having to pay a licence fee for the software. 
This method is particularly useful to value software in an enterprise that does not sell software or offer 
it to external clients. For example, this method would be useful to value software developed by a large 
retail grocery enterprise which developed the software to control their supply chain. 
The cost approach can be useful to value software because it calculates the cost to recreate the 
copyrighted work. This approach is not particularly useful for creative works because it is difficult to 
quantify the cost to recreate a unique work. With creative works, it is legally impossible to purchase 
or construct a substitute of the same creative work. In this regard, they are not a fungible asset which 
can be easily replaced with a substituted asset. The cost approach valuation for software can be 
applied. The cost approach is limited with regards to software because it cannot take into account the 
monopolistic right that copyright grants the owner. It is for this reason that cost approach valuations 
usually only give a minimum value of the software. 
The market approach is commonly used to value both categories of copyrighted works. In fact “there 
is a fairly active market with regards to fee simple sales of copyright. This is true with regard to all 
types of copyrighted materials.171” The same limitations of the market approach found when valuing 
other types of IP are also true in regards to copyrighted materials. Although there is a robust 
secondary market for copyrights, the transaction details of these sales are not often disclosed. Also, 
even if they are disclosed in may be difficult to derive market pricing multiples from this data. For 
example, if a portfolio of photographs is sold it may be difficult to ascertain the value of each 
photograph. 
i. Case Study 
One case study showed how the income method can be used to value a copyrighted musical 
composition, which was described as a “rock and roll ballad.”172 The composition was written as a 
work for hire by a musician under contract to a large recording studio. The reason for the valuation 
was for reporting and tax purposes. The first variable assessed was the determination that the average 
consumer popularity of a song is five years. Also, an exponential decay curve was added to account 
for consumer popularity. In other words, ten years after a popular song has been released it will have 
less than ten percent of the demand curve that it had when first released. Additionally, the song’s 
performer (also the writer) would receive a share of profit from the royalties. In this case, it was a 
50/50 split.  
From there, the total net revenue was projected with the above factors applied. The gross revenue had 
been calculated by the amount of royalties which had already been collected for that particular song.  
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After that, an additional discount rate of 16% was applied due to the great amount of uncertainty in 
predicting music royalties. The final result was that the value of the song in 2009 was around 
$110,000,000. That amount represented the value of the copyright to the copyright owner.  
The valuation is interesting because it shows how the income method can be used to value a 
copyrighted work with a limited economic lifespan. It also highlighted the large discount rate often 
applied when valuing creative works. The discount rate is due to the fact, as mentioned previously, 
that it is difficult to predict how long a work will be popular especially since so many external factors 
contribute to a work’s popularity. 
d. Design Rights 
Unfortunately, very little information is available on the valuation of design rights. In general material 
on IP valuation, design rights are usually included as part of copyright or as design patents. However, 
discussions of the valuation of design patents are also very rare.  When design rights are mentioned at 
all, they are discussed with other principles of valuing IP. In particular, they are mentioned in relation 
to the bundling of IP rights in order to value them (discussed below). For example, in cases of logos, 
they are often bundled with the rest of assets which comprise a brand.  
One rare exception is the website at the Danish Intellectual Property Office, which has a valuation 
tool for IP owners.173  The tool includes design right valuation. The user can click through several 
screens which ask a variety of questions to get an indication of the value of the design right. The 
questionnaire has eight questions to provide an overview of the value of the design. The questions 
cover the following topics: 1. The validity of the design protection; 2. Geographic protection; 3. 
Time-related exploitation opportunities; 4. Supplementary protection; 5. The size of the market; 6. 
Growth in the market; 7. Market Share; and 8. Added value.  The goal of the tool is to help owners or 
buyers get an overview of the value of the design.  Each question has a range of pre-defined scores 
ranging from one to eight. Some of the questions are subjective, and the user is reminded to “be 
honest and realistic when you answer the questions. Otherwise, the model does not produce a usable 
result.”  
It is unclear why there is no great interest in the value of design rights. It could be because they are 
one of the newer forms of IP protection. There is nothing which suggests that the valuation methods 
used to value other types of IP cannot be used to value registered designs. Hopefully, in the future, 
more information and know-how on valuing registered designs will become more widely available.  
5. Severability 
One of the main problems with IP valuation is that is difficult to determine when IP should be valued 
on its own or whether it should be valued as part of a bundle of assets.  In the first case sometimes the 
IP is severed from other IP rights and part of the business and the valuation does not accurately reflect 
the value of the IP asset. 174 For example, if one retail brand which is sold by a larger brand, it can be 
difficult to value the trademark of the one product without taking into consideration the larger 
umbrella brand and goodwill in that company. A product often does not sell well based on that 
trademark alone but because it is being offered under the auspices of the larger brand and of course 
the marketing campaign around it.175 Indeed, the trademark of such a product has many other 
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intangible assets behind such as goodwill, marketing campaigns as well as distributorship channels 
that are already in place and allow it to have a prominent place in major retail chains. Because of this, 
it can be difficult to value the trademark on its own severed from the business that sells it.  
The same is true with patents. Many inventors have found to their detriment that even when an 
invention is particularly clever,  the IP right will have little value until the IP owner can enter the 
marketplace.176  Any purchaser of a secondary IP right needs to be aware that along with the patent, 
the know-how, the trademarks, and even the testing reports need to be purchased as well, to truly 
maximize the value of the product. 177 Also, the patent owner needs to understand the high cost of 
defending that patent which makes the patent less valuable. The cost of patent litigation can be too 
high for smaller companies or individual rights owners to bear. The effect of the high cost of litigation 
on IP valuation may change slightly with the advent of no fee/ no win funding in the UK. It might 
change in the US because of patent trolls and plaintive firms starting class action cases based on IP 
infringement. Only time will tell if these factors will change how IP rights are valued. Indeed, 
knowing how and when to isolate IP from other business assets and knowing when to bundle them for 
the purposes of valuation is an art in and of itself.178   
5. Legal Uncertainty and Discount Rates 
Regardless of the type of IP being valued and the method being used to value it, risk must be 
quantified in the evaluation. Such risk is usually quantified by the use of discount rates. The ultimate 
discount rate applied in a valuation is comprised of several discount rates. One discount rate is based 
on the type of asset. Another is based on the type of transaction in which the asset will be used. Also, 
another discount rate can reflect the amount of relative risk associated with either the asset or the 
transaction.  Additionally, the discount rate often considers the “measure of the compensation of the 
investor for the commitment of capital.”179 When an investor commits capital to one investment, she 
is giving up other investment opportunities. A discount rate is used to reflect that commitment.  
The discount rate applied to IP is high when compared to other assets. The usual discount rate for IP 
is around between 15 and 30%. The lowest discount rate of an asset is usually around 4%, and that is 
used in relation to U.S. Government Securities. If the IP is owned by a newer company or is part of 
emerging technology, then the discount rate associated with the asset will be even higher. Certain 
aspects of IP do not allow for allowed discount rate. For example, with patents and trademarks, there 
is an element of risk that the IP right may not be valid. This cannot be changed because it is the very 
nature of those IP rights. Also, the territoriality of IP rights increases the amount of risk that must be 
reflected in the discount rate. This is not common with other types of intangible that are not limited by 
territory and do not require registration. This part of the discount rate given when valuing an IP 
cannot be lowered because it is due to the intrinsic nature of some IP rights. 
Additionally, as mentioned above, the type of transaction will determine the discount rate. The 
discount rate used when valuing an IP portfolio for tax purposes will be lower than the discount used 
for valuing IP that will be securitised. In particular, the discount rate when using IP as security is 
going to be higher because of the legal uncertainty. This will be discussed in greater depth below.  
Valuation experts often find it difficult to find the correct discount rate to apply when valuing IP and 
for that reason the a higher rate is often used.: “The difficulty with IP valuation is therefore that the 
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judgements required in arriving a discount rate are twofold: in addition to making judgements about 
the distinction between specific and systematic risks, it is also necessary to form judgements about the 
risk profile of disaggregated cash and income streams of the asset relative to the overall aggregate 
cash generation of the business.”180 For example, costs are likely to be far more systematically stable 
than overall aggregate cash flows and should, therefore, be discounted at a relatively low discount 
rate. “Revenues might be expected to be more systemically risky and should be discounted at a higher 
figure. However, without capital market benchmarks to benchmark the risk of individual intangible 
assets, it is often difficult to be precise about the right discount rate to adopt.”181 
6. Conclusions 
1. In order to understand how IP functions as security, it is important to understand how it is valued.  
It was shown above that the method used to value an IP right must be selected to best suit that 
particular right. In order to get an accurate valuation, the valuer needs to ensure that the best method 
is used. The valuer will also need to correctly assess whether the IP should be valued in isolation or if 
it should be valued along with other assets. Valuation is in many ways more of an art than a science.  
This makes IP valuation difficult and sometimes the results are subjective. For this reason, IP 
valuations are often not considered reliable. Some experts have said that the finance community has 
very little trust in IP valuation. Making IP valuations more reliable is outside the scope of the thesis. 
However, it should be noted that because of the view that they are unreliable, a financial organisation 
is going to try to mitigate this risk in the deal itself.  They may offer less financing or charge a higher 
interest rate in order to hedge some of the risks of valuation itself. This result of this could be twofold. 
The IP may be undervalued, or the IP owner may have to pay higher financing costs than they would 
when using another type of asset as collateral. As mentioned previously, this would hinder the 
potential of the IP-Growth Spiral. The IP owner will not be as able to increase their IP portfolio which 
means the company will not grow as much. Then when they seek to finance again, they will not 
receive as much as they would if they had a greater IP portfolio.  
For the purposes of this thesis, legal uncertainty is reflected in how IP is valued. No matter which 
method is being used, an element of risk must be included in the valuation.  In general, there is 
usually a higher commercial risk than with other intangibles than with other business or tangible asset. 
According to a valuation expert at Price Waterhouse Coopers some of the legal uncertainty 
surrounding IP leads it to have greater risk taken into consideration when it is valued: “This adds to 
the difficulties involved in reconciling IP valuation methodologies to cost of capital theory, because 
standard cost of capital theory distinguishes between commercial risks that are specific (and can be 
diversified away by investors), and commercial risks that are systematic and cannot be diversified. 
One, therefore, needs to be clear that these greater commercial risks associated with intangible assets 
are greater systematic risks if higher discount rates are to be deployed in the valuation.”182 
As mentioned previously, the discount rate for IP cannot be lowered in some areas because of the 
intrinsic nature and risk of IP. This is not true for the higher discount rate applied when using IP as 
security. The high discount rate used when valuing IP to be taken as security could be lowered if there 
was greater legal certainty. At the moment, any deal using IP as security is doing to have a higher rate 
which reflects the legal uncertainty. IP valuations already apply a high discount rate which lowers the 
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value of IP rates. Since the discount rate is already high because of the nature of IP, the discount rate 
when using IP in security is even higher. This negatively impacts the way that IP can be used in 
finance. The higher discount rate used because IP is being used as security is direct, quantitative 
evidence of how the legal conflict between IP law and secured finance law hinders the IP-Finance 
Growth Cycle. If legal uncertainty were taken away from the use of IP as security, then at least one 
factor in the problem of IP valuation could be ameliorated.  In that case, an overall lower discount rate 
could be used. This is turn would help debtors receive the correct value for their IP under beneficial 
terms.  Only after the necessary legal conflicts have been resolved, will the IP-Finance Growth Spiral 













CHAPTER 4: SECURITY INTERESTS IN IP IN THE UK 
 1. Introduction  
This Chapter will focus on the legal problems in creating security in IP rights in the UK. As stated in 
Chapter 1, the UK is made up of several legal jurisdictions. The IP laws referred to are in force 
throughout the UK. The same is true for the Companies Act, which is also in force throughout the UK 
although specific sections are relevant only to certain jurisdictions within the UK. Despite the fact that 
the IP Acts and the Companies Act are UK wide, they have incomplete provisions on priority and 
notice. In these areas, national laws must be applied. 
 The first section of the Chapter discusses the laws of secured lending in relation to England and 
Wales. The second section explores the laws of perfection, registration, and priority in the registered 
IP Acts. It will show that the registered IP Acts conflict with the Companies Act in these specific 
areas. It will then consider the Copyright Act, to contrast taking security in registered IP as opposed to 
unregistered IP. Additionally, it will show the legal problems created when taking mortgages in both 
registered IP and Copyright.  Section 3 discusses the laws of taking security in Scotland and the 
conflict between UK and Scottish law.  Finally, the Chapter will draw conclusions on how the conflict 
between secured financing laws and IP laws in the UK could be alleviated. 
2.  UK Law Applicable to England and Wales 
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The legal concept of perfection in England and Wales is quite different from the US.  In the US, 
registration of security interest perfects it and also provides the relevant date to determine priority. In 
England and Wales, the date of priority is determined largely by the common law and equity.183  In 
the cases of a company charge in a registered IP right, the relevant IP Act governs the priority of 
conflicting interests.  Nevertheless, principles of the common law are used to determine priority 
because the Companies Act and to some extent, the registered IP Acts, are incomplete in some area of 
priority. A brief discussion of the relevant principles of common law and equity on priority and notice 
will be given below.  
a. Common law 
Mortgages, charges, and liens are the most commonly used security interests in English law.184 Legal 
Mortgages, liens, and pledges have emerged from common law. Equity has produced a variation of 
the mortgage and the charge. Security interests are perfected in one of three ways: through a transfer 
of possession, a transfer of title or as an equitable interest.185 A legal interest is created through the 
transfer of either possession of the asset or transfer of the title to the possession. Additionally, the 
transfer must meet any other formalities such as registration of the transfer of title. A mortgage can be 
taken in a registered IP right by a transfer of title which is recorded at the UK Intellectual Property 
Office (“UKIPO”).186  
A security interest may be equitable for a number of reasons. Some of these include: (1) it relates to 
future property. (2) there is no transfer or agreement to transfer at all, (3) there is not present transfer 
merely an agreement for transfer or a declaration for trust by the debtor, (4) the transfer has not met 
the formal requirements for transfer of legal title.187 Equitable security does not require a transfer of 
either possession or ownership and is not contingent on formalities. Equitable security operates in a 
different way altogether. An equitable interest represents an agreement between a creditor and a 
debtor. In this agreement an asset or a class of assets is appropriated so that in case that the debtor is 
unable to pay a debt, the creditor will be able to take the proceeds from the sale of that asset to satisfy 
the debt. The creditor will have priority over other unsecured creditors. In this regard, an equitable 
security interest casts a shadow over ownership of the asset rather than taking a property interest in 
it.188 Charges are perfected through notice. If the subsequent holder of a charge has knowledge of a 
prior charge, then the prior charge has priority. Priority through notice has been incorporated into 
some statutory registration schemes like the registered IP Act.189 It should be noted, that charges are 
the most commonly used form of a security interest to take security in a registered IP right. To gain 
priority over subsequent security interests, the creditor must register the charge at the UKIPO, to give 
other creditors notice of the charge.  
It is not possible to use possessory forms of security interests like liens or pledges to secure IP or any 
type on intangible property. Surprisingly, this point was tested recently in the case of Your Response 
Ltd v. Datateam Business Media Ltd.190 In this case the claimant, a database management company, 
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had maintained subscribers’ records for the defendant, a publishing company. The claimant refused to 
transfer the records to the defendant because the defendant owed outstanding fees. In the decision by 
the District Court, the judge ruled that claimant was allowed to withhold the electronic data until the 
outstanding fees had been paid. The defendant appealed the decision arguing that it is impossible to 
exercise a lien on intangible property. The appellate court overruled the decision of the district court 
and found that “the claimant was unable to identify any case in which the right to exercise a lien over 
intangible property has been recognised.191 The reason is not difficult to find: whereas it is possible to 
transfer physical possession of the tangible property by simple delivery, it is not possible to deal with 
intangible property in the same way. Although it is now possible by virtue of statutory provisions to 
transfer the legal title to choses in action, it is not possible to transfer them in any physical sense.192 
In another recent case, In Re Lehman Brothers International, 193 the Court stated that possessory 
security mechanisms were not suitable for capturing intangible assets: “It was common ground that 
rights properly classified in English Law as a general lien were capable of application to anything 
other than tangibles and old fashioned certified securities.”194 Lady Hale gave a dissenting view in this 
case and expressed that it may be time “to consider whether the time might have come for English law 
to take a broader view of the matter,” but this was not the dominant view in the decision. 
The judgements in these cases also rejected the theory that a possessory interest in intangible objects 
could be taken even when a party controls the physical embodiment of the intangible right, i.e. an 
electronic database. The appellate decision in Your Response,195 makes the important observation that 
“It is true that practical control goes hand and hand with possession but in my view the two are not the 
same. Possession is concerned with the physical control of tangible objects; practical control is a 
broader concept, capable of extending to intangible assets.”196 
Although, both cases were concerned with non-consensual possessory security rights, the decisions in 
the cases did not distinguish between the two. The judgements rejected outright that of pledges or 
liens could be used to secure anything other than tangible property and paper securities.  The two 
cases affirmed the already established principle that only mortgages and charges can be used to secure 
intangibles including intellectual property.197 
Goode has described the perfection requirement as the requirement to provide public notice.198 For 
intellectual property, the perfection requirement is met through either the transfer of title (in the case 
of legal mortgages) or through the registration of the interest at the UKIPO. It should be noted that 
security interests in registered IP rights may be filed at the UKIPO. If the owner of the IP right is also 
a registered company then an additional filing has to made in the company register. A full discussion 
of the applicability of the Companies Act to security in IP is set out below.199 Also, in the Patents Act, 
the Trade Marks Act and probably in the Registered Designs Act registration is not mandatory. Any 
security interests which are not registered will not be enforced in equity and will be given a lower 
priority point than registered interests. Registering the security interest is important in determining 
priority. In fact perfection and priority are closely related. As Goode points out “The concept of 
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perfection needs to be kept distinct from priority, but there is considerable overlap between methods 
of giving public notice and methods of obtaining priority.” 200 
The rules on determining priority in the common law of England and Wales are quite complex. The 
basic priority rule in English law is that the earliest created security interest has the highest priority 
This provision comes from the legal maxim, nemo dat quod non habet, meaning no one can give what 
he doesn’t have201. The other legal maxim, qui prior est tempore potiro est jure, or first in time first in 
right.  The English system varies greatly in this rule from many countries, such as the US, where the 
priority date comes from the date of creation and not the date of perfection.  
The second applicable rule is that a legal interest acquired for value and without notice has priority 
over an equitable notice. In cases of security in an IP right this means that a security interest which is 
registered without notice will have higher priority than unregistered prior security interests. It is 
important to note that the priority schemes in the registered IP Acts are a slight variation to the 
common law rule. As mentioned above, the common law rule is that a legal interest has higher 
priority than an equitable one unless there is knowledge of the prior equitable notice. In the IP Acts, 
the registered interest has priority over all other registered interests unless the creditor registered the 
interest with knowledge of the prior interests. In the registered IP Acts, the categorisation of the prior 
interest as legal, statutory or equitable is irrelevant. This can cause uncertainty in cases where the 
owner of the IP is a registered company so the security interest must be registered according to the 
Companies Act as well as the registered IP Acts. This will be fully discussed below.  
Priority is also determined by whether a charge is fixed or floating.  A fixed charge is subject to the 
rules above for determining priority. A floating charge is prioritised through a different set of 
principles. Fixed charges will have priority over a floating charge unless it has crystallised. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, crystallisation is the process whereby a floating charge converts into a fixed 
charge. A floating charge will crystallise upon appointment of a receiver or upon the commencement 
of liquidation.202  This is a very limited definition of floating charges because the topic can be 
complex especially in relation to priority. However, a floating charge can be taken in a registered IP 
right by virtue of the Companies Act. The problems associated with this will be discussed below in 
Section 4. A more substantive discussion on the general nature of floating charges is outside the scope 
of this thesis.  
b. Registered IP Acts 
The three registered IP Act share three similar problems when taking a security interest in each 
respective IP right. The first problem is that registration scheme is problematic for the purposes of 
both perfection and priority. In the Patents Act and the Trade Marks Act registration is not mandatory 
to perfect the interest. For the Registered Designs Act it is not clear if it is mandatory. Most scholars 
believe that it is not but the point has not been settled.203 Also, the registration schemes in each Act 
provide a priority point but do not necessarily perfect the interest.  As Townend states “ Registration 
would seem to offer, for the potential lender, a one-stop opportunity to examine the title over the 
property and the risks involved in offering security over the intellectual property, since the register 
contains both information concerning the intellectual property itself and the property interests which 
encircle it. However, the registration schemes, because they are primarily concerned with the creation 
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of interests and not a widespread dealing with the interests after their creation, do not offer a one-stop 
system.” 
The next problem is that taking a mortgage in a registered IP right creates problems when enforcing 
the IP right. In the case of trade marks, the transfer of ownership also raises concerns on the use 
provisions in Section 46 of the Trade Marks Act. It will also be shown below that mortgages can raise 
other concerns in the rights and responsibilities of the debtor and creditor in relation to the IP right.  
Finally, the last problem is that the Companies Act also has additional filing requirements to perfect a 
security interest in a registered IP right. In this case, the creditor will have to file at least twice. Also, 
it is uncertain how priority will be determined in cases of conflict of the priority scheme in the 
applicable registered IP Act and the Companies Act.  It will be shown how multiple registrations 
complicate the determination of priority. 
i. Patents Act 
In the Patents Act, registration perfects the interest and also gives a priority point. A registered 
interest will have priority over a prior unregistered interest if there is no knowledge of the interest, the 
transaction or the event.204 If the subsequent interest holder had actual knowledge of a loan but not the 
interest itself it could be possible that this could mean that they have lower priority than the 
unregistered interest.  The Patents Act does not set out what actual knowledge.   
The Act stipulates at section 33(1), that anyone acquiring property in a patent “by virtue of any 
transaction, instrument or event” takes free of any prior registered right in the property if the prior 
right was unregistered at the time of any subsequent transaction and if the subsequent rights holder 
has no knowledge of the prior right. The Act goes on to stipulate at 33(2) that a right in a patent that is 
obtained shall be taken freely of any prior registered right where the “prior registered right is 
incompatible with any such right acquired under the earlier transaction, instrument or event if the 
rights holder did not know of the earlier transaction. The final part of the section, 33(3), defines a 
“transaction, instrument or transaction” to include an assignment of the patent or right under it and 
also by a mortgage of a patent or application granting a security over it.   
There is no statutory obligation to register an interest in a patent, although failure to register could 
result in the loss of priority to the holder. The Act incentivises the registration and makes any 
unregistered interests more vulnerable to defeat through subsequent creditors. It is important to note 
that 33(1)(c),  does not allow any registration to defeat all other unregistered interests but only has a 
notice provision. Subsequent interest holders could not gain priority through registration if they had 
actual notice of any previous interests. It is difficult to determine if the knowledge required must be 
actual or if it could be merely constructive. The Patents Act does not define knowledge or give a 
further explanation of what constitutes knowledge. Most commentators believe that the standard is not 
what the reasonable person would have notice of but instead is assessed by what information was 
known to the subsequent creditor. 205Requiring only a low level of actual knowledge or constructive 
knowledge would lower the incentive to register interest in IP. It would also make determining 
priority more difficult as the court in each case would have to interpret priority from a larger number 
of facts. Additionally, there are questions about whether charges in patents which are registered at 
Companies House constitute either actual notice or constructive notice. This will be discussed in 
greater detail in below. 
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There also additional complications which occur when using a floating charge in a patent. Since the 
floating charge will not attach to the patent until a crystallising event has occurred it is questionable 
what effect of registration will have. Theoretically, the floating charge will not attach or perfect in the 
patent just because it is registered. The charge will not attach to the patent until crystallisation occurs. 
Under the common law, subsequent fixed charges would prevail over a prior floating charge is they 
were created prior to the crystallisation of the floating charge. In the Patents Act, there is no 
distinction between the effect of registration on floating charges as opposed to fixed charges.206 The 
wording is only that a registered interest will prevail over an earlier unregistered notice unless the 
holder of the subsequent interest had notice of the earlier interest. This makes it unclear what would 
occur in cases where a floating interest in a patent is registered followed by the registration of a fixed 
interest before the prior to the crystallisation of the prior floating charge. 
In terms of the Patents Act, it is difficult to ascertain what effect knowledge of the floating charge 
would have on the priority between the two charges. Would knowledge of a crystallisation event 
change the priority and what level of knowledge to change the priority of the two registered charges? 
There are also numerous problems in determining priority when the floating charge has already been 
registered at Companies House. The conflict with the scheme in the Companies Act will be discussed 
in detail below. 
Since registration does not perfect an interest in a mortgage, determining priority between mortgages 
in patents is more complicated. As stated above, a registered interest in a patent does not have priority 
when the holder of the subsequent interest had knowledge of an earlier unregistered interest.  At 
common law, a legal interest acquired for value and without prior notice has priority over any 
equitable interests. This means that a registered mortgage will only have priority of if the holder took 
the mortgage without notice. That leaves the question of what would happen to the assignment given 
to create the mortgage if it is determined that the mortgage holder of the patent had previous 
knowledge of an unregistered charge. The assignment required to create a mortgage in a patent also 
causes other problems. Patents ownership is needed to enforce and exploit the patent right. In this 
case, there is a disconnect between the creditor that legally owns the patent and the debtor which 
exercises the rights in the patent. For this reason, it is said that a mortgage in a patent “cripple the 
property.” 207   Despite the fact legal ownership has been transferred to the creditor, certain obligations 
and rights should remain with the original title holder, so that the IPR is better maintained. 208 The 
debtor, who can use the IP as part of its business, rather than the creditor (who is likely to be a 
financier who has no expertise in their area of business) is in a better position to do this. 
One important ownership right for patents is the right to sue third parties for infringement. If 
ownership has transferred to a creditor as a result of a mortgage, then the question arises as to whether 
the debtor or creditor has the right to sue third parties for infringement. This issue was addressed in 
the case of Van Gelder, Apsimon and Co Ltd. V. The Sowerby Bridge Flour Society Ltd.209 In this 
case, the Court of Appeal decided the question of whether a plaintiff patent holder still had the right to 
bring an infringement proceeding after having transferred the patent in a mortgage. The defendant in 
the case asserted that the claimant could not sue for infringement since they did not have title and that 
amounted to a lack of ownership. Evidence, in this case, showed that at the Patent Office, the registrar 
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distinguished assignees whom have been given title by regular transfer from mortgagees. 210  The later 
were registered as mortgagees and not as assignees.  
The Court agreed with the practice citing that at equity there is no rule which considers the mortgagee 
to be the proprietor of what is comprised in his mortgage.211  The Court ruled that if the debtor were 
unable to protect his property, it would put him “in a worse position that the mortgagor of any other 
property.” 212 The Court also addressed the issue of whether the creditor is required to join in any 
action. and concluded that this was not in fact a condition with similar attributes like when there is a 
partial owner of a patent. The Court ruled finally that the key factor in bringing an action for 
infringement is proprietorship and that the fact that some of those rights are to some extent vested in 
someone else is irrelevant. 
There are still many questions regarding the role of a creditor who has been assigned a patent by 
virtue of a mortgage. For example, the question still remains whether either party is obligated to bring 
infringement cases against third parties in order to maintain the patent. Another question is which 
party is obligated to participate in an invalidation proceeding. If the creditor is the named owner but 
choses not to contest the proceeding can the debtor intervene or hold the creditor responsible if the 
patent is invalidated? These questions are not answered in the Act itself and no case law has addressed 
the point. 
As shown above, the main problem for creditors when taking a security interest in a patent under the 
Patents Act is that the creditor will not be certain if the interest has perfected and what priority it will 
be given.  This is due in part to the fact that registration is not mandatory. Instead, an interest will only 
perfect the interest if the creditor did not have knowledge of previous unregistered interests.  In this 
regard, the Patents Act does not have clear provisions to determine priority and whether a subsequent 
rights holder has notice over prior interests. Under the Patents Act, registration does not perfect the 
interest but it does give a priority date in some circumstances.  The provisions in the Act actually 
create more questions than they answer. The incomplete scheme causes much uncertainty to creditors 
who will be uncertain of how priority will be determined in cases of insolvency. The biggest area of 
uncertainty comes from the concept of “knowledge” within this section of the Act. Assessing the 
knowledge of an interest holder will be up to the court that will have to assess a large number of facts. 
This is likely to increase the amount of legal costs. Additionally, the ultimate result of such court 
assessments is difficult to predict at the time when the security in a patent is given. As a result, the 
creditor faces a great deal of uncertainty when taking an interest in a patent which will impact the 
financial terms offered to the patent holder in the loan agreement. There is also uncertainty on what 
effect a mortgage in a patent will have on the rights of the parties. Because of the uncertainty, the 
patent will either be valued lower because of a larger risk factor or the patent holder will have to pay 
an increased amount for the credit through the interest rate or repayments. The registration of security 
is supposed to decrease uncertainty for creditors. The provisions of the Patents Act do not decrease 
uncertainty but instead increase it.  
The other problem with the scheme under the Patents Acts is that it does not allow a single filing to 
perfect or even give notice for multiple patents. Since each patent is treated as a separate right, the 
creditor will have to file notice for each and every patent that is being used in security. This does not 
provide the same flexibility that the Companies Act affords to charges. Under the Companies Act, one 
registration will perfect the charge in a number of assets. Under the Patents Act, that is not possible 
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and the credit must file notice for each patent. This is a cumbersome task if the debtor holds a large 
patent portfolio.   
This also causes a problem with after-acquired patents under a floating charge. It was mentioned 
above that floating charges in patents created problems in determining priority. It is also possible 
when there is a floating charge in an after-acquired patent that the creditor will have to file the charge 
on the patent as soon as the patent is acquired. Since it is not clear what effect a floating charge has on 
the priority the creditor may have to make continuous filings at the UKIPO to ensure that an interest is 
registered in each patent acquired after the initial filing in order to maintain priority. This will increase 
the costs and efforts to continue to make filings when the initial floating charge should have perfected 
the interest in all property of the debtor.  
The registration scheme also means that a creditor will have much more due diligence if the debtor 
holds a patent portfolio. Because a creditor will have to make multiple filings it also means that each 
patent will have to be searched and assessed.  This is often at odds with the security agreement which 
might state that the security interest is in “all general intangibles.” If this is the case, the debtor may 
not even have provided details of all individual patents. The creditor will have to ensure that the entire 
patent register is searched for all patents owned by the debtor and ensure that each entry on the 
register is checked for any previously registered interests.  
The registration scheme in the Patents Act is not well suited for security interests. In the Act, it refers 
to transfers of ownership and transfers of title but not to transfers of lesser rights.  The scheme is well 
placed for such absolute transfers. As shown above,  the scheme does not provide a clear guidance on 
perfecting an interest and then the priority of the interest. Also, the scheme is not well suited to 
security interest because it requires multiple filings both initially and then continually in cases of 
floating charges. 
ii. Trade Marks 
The Trade Marks Act contains a limited registration scheme for security interests in a trade mark.213  
Prior to the 1994 Act, security interests could only be taken by a charge as mortgages in trade marks 
was forbidden. In the 1938 Act, mortgages were prohibited as they were construed to be a form of 
trafficking.214 The reason why trafficking was prohibited was based on the principle of trade marks as 
a form of consumer protection.  It was assumed that if  the owner of the mark was able best able to 
control the trade mark and the quality of goods or services associated with it.  The theory is that 
mortgages would take that control from the owner of the mark and would cause the mark to be 
abused. By the time the 1994 Act was introduced, it was no longer believed that this was the case so 
the prohibition against mortgages in trade marks was removed.. 
In the Act, notice of a security interest in a trade mark can be registered at the UKIPO. In fact, Section 
25 stipulates that the Registrar has the duty to register the details of registrable transactions. 
Registrable transactions are defined to include assignments, licenses or any security interest: “any 
security interest (fixed or floating) over the registered trade mark or any right in or under it.” 
Furthermore, the Act emphasises the negative consequences of not registering the interest: “until an 
application has been made for registration of the prescribed particulars of a registrable transaction – 
(a) the transaction is ineffective as against a person acquiring a conflicting interest in or under the 
registered trade mark in ignorance of it.” As with patents, an interest registered on the trade mark 
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registry will only be defeated if the later interest holder had actual notice of the prior interest. In this 
regard, registration perfects the interest but to a limited extent.  
The language of the Act is unclear on whether registration is actually compulsory or permissive. It 
states that “(a) the transaction is ineffective as against a person acquiring a conflicting interest in or 
under the registered trade mark in ignorance of it.” 215 This wording is stronger than the equivalent 
wording in the Patents Act but it does not rise to compulsory registration. The Patents Act focuses on 
lower priority for unregistered rights. The Trade Marks Act goes so far as to say that an unregistered 
interest is ineffective against subsequent registered interests without notice. It is unclear whether this 
means that the holders of unregistered rights will be considered to unsecured creditors in priority or if 
an unregistered interest holder will just have lower priority to registered interest holders.  
Also, the Act is unclear what effect the registration date will have on determining priority in many 
different circumstances. The provisions on “ignorance” are particularly unclear. As with the Patents 
Act, the Trade Marks Act does not define what “ignorance” means. Does ignorance equivalent to 
lacking actual knowledge? It is also not clear what would occur if the subsequent interest holder’s 
ignorance was wilful. This could occur if the subsequent right holder should have known about the 
prior unregistered notice but did not do so. For example, this could occur if the prior interest was 
recorded on the Companies Register but not the at the UKIPO and the subsequent interest holder did 
not search the Companies House registry even though a reasonable creditor would do so. In that case 
the subsequent interest holder could argue that they did not search and therefore were ignorant of the 
previous charge.  If ignorance means a lack of actual knowledge then creditors would be 
disincentivised from making appropriate and reasonable due diligence checks. In such cases, creditors 
would have to make the difficult choice of risking lower priority upon discovering unregistered 
interests or not fully understanding the financial risk in giving the loan. As with the Patents Act, it is 
unclear whether actual or constructive knowledge is required before the subsequent registered interest 
holder has a lower priority than an unregistered prior notice. The common law cannot provide the 
answer to this question as the registration requirements in the Act could possibility inflict with the 
common law. Additionally intent of the Act itself will have to be ascertained before it can be 
supplemented by law outside the Act.216 A further and more complete discussion on the interpretation 
of statutory instruments will be given below. 
There are additional complications in perfection and priority when taking a mortgage in a trade mark. 
To take a mortgage in a trade mark, ownership must be transferred from the debtor to the creditor. 
One would assume that the transfer of ownership to create the mortgage in the trade mark and the 
recordation of the transfer would perfect the mortgagee’s interest. This is not the case due to the 
knowledge exceptions in the Act.  Since registration in the trade marks act is not perfection, there is 
still the possibility that a mortgage holder will have lower priority if they had knowledge or should 
have had knowledge of a previous interest in the trade mark. It is not clear if the assignment would be 
considered void or would just have lower priority. Once again the uncertainty over what constitutes 
“ignorance” creates many legal problems in determining the priority of a registered mortgage if the 
mortgage holder knew of prior unregistered interests. 
The creation of a mortgage on a trade mark causes additional legal problems. One of the causes of 
these problems is from the provisions on registration discussed above. As with patents, it is unclear 
what rights and obligations each party would have in relation to the trade mark after it has been 
assigned to the credit by virtue of creating the mortgage.  The  Van Gelder decision has not been 
extended to registered trade marks, so it is unclear whether the debtor can bring or even participate in 
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infringement proceedings.217 There is also the even bigger problem of whether trade marks are used 
being used and policed when they have been transferred because of a mortgage. 
The first problem is that in the case, the creditor owns the trade mark but is often not actually using it. 
In many cases, the debtor will still be using the mark and not the creditor. This could be problematic 
under Section 46 of the Act, which states that a trade mark may be revoked if “the mark is being used 
in a way that misleads the public, or if there has been a failure to use the mark ).” 218 
If the debtor has assigned the trade mark to the creditor as part of the mortgage yet continues to use 
the mark in trade, it is possible that the trade mark could be for revoked. In this case, the trade mark is 
being used by a party other than the trademark owner which could be considered misleading219.  The 
trade mark could also be revoked for non-use in certain situations. If the debtor continues to use the 
trade mark, after the mark has been assigned, such use could be considered infringement unless the 
creditor has licenced the use of the trade mark back to them. On the other hand, if the debtor does not 
have a licence to use the trade mark and ceases to use it, this could be considered non-use and grounds 
for revocation.In either situation, it is not clear how an assignment by virtue of a mortgage would 
affect the rights of use in regards to grounds for revocation.220  
Additionally, in general, the rights and obligations of the debtor and creditor, when there has been an 
assignment due to a mortgage, have not been clarified. For example, one such question is which party 
is responsible for policing the mark and to ensure it is being used correctly on the right type of 
products in order to satisfy the use requirements in the Act. So far the question of the rights of the 
parties in mortgages in trademarks has not been answered by any courts and the courts in questioned 
declined to extend reasoning from similar patent cases.221 Townend has argued that some of these 
problems are vestiges left over from the prohibition of using mortgages in the earlier Act; although it 
has been removed some of the philosophy still remains.222 
The problem with severing the goodwill from the trade mark is a covert problem. The 1994 Act 
clearly allows a trade mark to be transferred separately from its goodwill. This is unlike in US la 
where a transfer of a trademark without the accompanying goodwill will destroy the trade mark. 
However, even though the Act allows for the separation of the goodwill and the trade mark, it is 
uncertain to what extent it can be done without making the mark subject to revocation under Section 
46. 
The registration scheme for trade marks has similar problems like the one in the Patents Act in that 
both required a separate filing for each trade mark. Like with all registered IP rights, trade marks are 
registered individual. In the UK, there is the allowance for a series of trade marks but that is allowed 
only when there are small variations in the mark.  Since each trade mark has a separate registration the 
creditor must file notice for every mark she is taking security in. This is counter to the scheme under 
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the Companies Act, which allows for a single filing to perfect a security interest in multiple assets. 
This is also problematic as an IP portfolio often contains more than just trade marks. Every IP right 
taken will require a separate filing. This task is cumbersome and expensive for the creditor in cases 
where the debtor has a large and varied IP portfolio. 
As with patents, floating charges complicate priority and perfection in the Trade Marks Act. The 
floating charge will not attach to a trade mark until a crystallising event has occurred. It is 
questionable how the creditor must record the floating charge at the UKIPO. The question is whether 
the creditor can register the charge on the trade mark after crystallisation and what effect that 
registration will have on priority.  The Trade Marks Act does not distinguish between fixed and 
floating interests. That means it is unclear whether an earlier floating interest would have priority over 
a subsequent fixed charge if the fixed charge was filed prior to the crystallisation of the floating 
charge. The priority scheme is unclear on these points. 
Additionally, floating charges cause further registration difficulties in the Trade Marks Act for the 
after-acquired property. If a debtor acquires an additional trade mark after the initial filing has been 
made then, the creditor will have to file again to gain priority in the new trade mark. In many cases, 
the creditor may not know when the debtor has a new trade mark. This is particularly true in cases of 
floating charges. One of the benefits of a floating charge is that the debtor may increase or decrease 
their assets as part of their ongoing business and that the creditor does not have to monitor it. The 
creditor, in this case, will have to ensure that they monitor the trade mark portfolio of the debtor and 
ensure that a filing is made for each new trade mark that is registered or otherwise acquired.  
iii. Registered Designs 
The Registered Designs Act’s provisions on the registration of security interests differ from the 
equivalents found in the Patents Act and Trade Mark Act. Section 19 of the Registered Designs Act 
states that any person who obtains a security interest in a design right or interest: “shall apply to the 
Registrar in the prescribed matter for the registration of his interest.” Subsection 3 goes on to state 
that the right is created by an instrument which has been received by the Registrar which gives 
satisfactory proof of the validity of the interest. When the proof of a valid interest has been filed the 
registrar shall “enter in that registrar, notice of the interest, with the particulars of the instrument (if 
any) creating it.” 223 It is difficult to determine the effect of registration under the Act. It states that: “ 
(registration) subjects to any rights vested in any other person of which notice is entered in the register 
of designs, the person or persons registered as proprietor of a registered design shall have power to 
assign, grant licenses under, or otherwise deal with a design, and to give effectual receipts for any 
consideration for any such assignment, licence or dealing: provided that any equities in respect of the 
design may be enforced in like manner as in respect of any other personal property.”224 
The wording is ambiguous as to whether registration is compulsory or not.  The wording could be 
interpreted to mean that registration is compulsory. The wording “the assignment of choses in 
actions” which are subject to “equities” is particularly complicated.225 This has been interpreted to 
mean that the inaction of one party cannot be used to destroy the interests of a third party.226 This 
could mean this section of the Act requires registration of a security interest in order to perfect it. It is 
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not clear whether if registration perfects the interest and whether the perfection will be a priority 
point. 
Other scholars interpret this section to mean registration is not compulsory227.  It could be interpreted 
that notice is construed to be given through registration but such notice will not be the only way to 
determine priority.228 The use of the term “equities” could mean any interest created at equity. Since 
equitable interests are not registered, they could have priority over subsequent registered interest if the 
subsequent interest holder had no knowledge of the prior notice. Either interpretation still leaves a 
great deal of legal uncertainty on whether security interests in registered designs are compulsory. 
The Registered Designs Act has no other provisions which relate to priority. The lack of the clarity in 
the registration scheme makes it extremely difficult to determine priority. The question of the whether 
registration is mandatory is not the only concern. There is also little guidance in the scheme as to how 
registration affects priority. If registration is mandatory, it is still not clear whether registration 
provides perfection and a priority date or just perfection. If registration is not mandatory, then the Act 
is still unclear on how priority is determined. Reference to “equities” could mean registration provides 
notice but there is also knowledge based prioritisation as well. The scheme is unclear in most areas 
regarding perfection and priority.  
As with the other registered IP rights, a security interest in more than one registered design requires 
multiple filings to gain priority for each design. As mentioned previously, this could be a cumbersome 
process which adds additional expenses. There are also the same concerns on floating charges in 
registered designs as there are for the other types of registered IP. It is uncertain when a floating 
charge needs to be registered for a registered design and what effect the registration will have on 
priority. It is likely that when a debtor acquires a registered design after the perfection of the floating 
charge, the creditor will have to file again to gain priority for the new design.  
 Floating charges also raise additional questions on priority. This is particularly true if the registration 
scheme is mandatory. In that case, it is not clear whether the floating charge must be registered upon 
creation to perfect the interest or if it must be registered upon crystallisation in order to preserve 
priority. If registration is not mandatory, it is also uncertain when the floating charge should be 
registered for the purposes of maintaining priority.  
The taking of security in a registered design is the most uncertain of any registered IP right. Since it is 
not clear whether the registration scheme is mandatory, it is even more difficult to determine the 
priority of competing interests. Along with the increased uncertainty, there are also the same problems 
in taking security in a registered design that are found when taking security in patents and trade 
marks. For example, it is uncertain how to register floating charges in registered designs or even if 
floating charge in a registered IP right is possible. It is also unclear how the transfer of title to create a 
mortgage in a registered design affects ownership rights. All of the problems create a great deal of 
uncertainty for creditors.  
c. Registered IP Acts conflict with the Companies Act 
When the debtor/ IP owner is a registered company, there is a conflict between the relevant IP statute 
and the Companies Act. When the creditor seeks to perfect a security interest in the registered IP right 
of a registered company they will have to follow the requirements under the Companies Act as well as 
under the relevant IP statute. The conflict of laws also creates conflicting rules on priority.  
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 The Companies Act governs the perfection and registration of security interests in the assets of 
companies registered in the UK.229 Part 25 of the Companies Act requires charges to be registered on 
the Companies Registry. In fact, the Companies Act requires that “A company that creates a charge to 
which this section applies must deliver the prescribed particulars of the charge, together with the 
instrument (if any) by which the charge is created or evidenced, to the registrar for registration before 
the end of the period allowed for registration. “230 The registry keeps all records of charges on each 
registered company. The Act goes on to state that the register requires the following information:  
(4)In the case of any other charge, the registrar shall enter in the 
register the following particulars— 
(a)if it is a charge created by a company, the date of its creation 
and, if it is a charge which was existing on property acquired by 
the company, the date of the acquisition, 
(b)the amount secured by the charge, 
(c)short particulars of the property charged, and 
(d)the persons entitled to the charge. 231 
 
Registration under the Companies Act is mandatory and must be registered within 21 days of 
creation of the charge.232 Charges which are not registered within that time frame are void.233 
Unregistered charges are not given lower priority but are simply considered void. If a creditor fails to 
properly register the charge then he will be considered an unsecured creditor upon insolvency.234 So 
in this regard, the charge would not be valid under the Companies Act but the creditor may still have 
contractual rights against the debtor. However, registration of the security interest is the only way to 
perfect it under the Companies Act. It is not clear if registration in the Companies Act constitutes 
notice under the registered IP Acts. The general opinion is that the creditors will have to make 
additional filings for each and every registered IP right in order to gain priority under the scheme.  
Registration of the security interest in the Companies House perfects the interest but does not give it 
a priority date. 235 Priority is determined by application of the common law rules and security 
interests are ranked according to their creation date.236 This creates a lacuna of time where a creditor 
may not have visibility of other interests created around the same time.  It also means that a security 
interest which is registered first may have lower priority than an interest that was subsequently 
registered but created before the prior registered interest.  One commentator has stated that 
problematic nature of this: “there is a technical flaw contained within the company registration 
provisions. Once again there is no provision for a certified search of the register which would grant a 
priority period over any charges placed upon the register within the priority period. Thus, again the 
arguments apply concerning the creation of a blind-spot, wherein priority can be gained against a 
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charge by supervening registrations between creating the charge and its appearance on the register.” 
237 
Also, this priority scheme, in the Companies Act, conflicts with the priority schemes in the registered 
IP Acts. In them, registration of an interest gives higher priority as long as the creditor did not 
register with knowledge of prior unregistered interests. The problem with priority based on 
knowledge is discussed above in regards to each registered IP right. In the Acts, priority is 
determined by registration and knowledge. The date of creation of the interest does not factor into 
the determination. This is in direct conflict with the scheme in the Companies Act. The conflict of 
these two laws makes it unclear which scheme will determine the priority of the security interest in 
the IP right. One possibility is that the priority scheme in the relevant IP Act will determine the 
priority of that particular right but the priority of the interest in any other assets will be determined 
by the Companies Act. This makes for a very complex system. In addition, the creditor has a  limited 
ability to anticipate their priority. This is especially true in cases where the creditor has a fixed 
charge in all of the debtor’s intangibles or when the creditor holds a floating charge over all of the 
debtor’s assets. The problem would be even more complex if the debtor held different types of 
registered IP. In that case, the priority of the interest may have to be determined in regard to each IP 
Act. For example, if the debtor held a patent and a trade mark, the priority of the interest in those 
rights would be separately determined by the Patents Act and the Trade Marks Act for their 
respective IP rights. 
Also, it is unclear under the law, which Act will prevail in a conflict. There is still a question as to 
whether the Companies Act pre-empts the registered IP Acts for determining the priority of security 
interests in registered IP. The principles of statutory interpretation would be relevant in cases of this 
conflict. A detailed discussion of the principles of statutory interpretation is outside the scope of this 
thesis but it is important to note that several could apply in this situation. In Bennion on Statutory 
Interpretation, he points out that the court should avoid interpreting statutes in a way that would 
produce an absurd result because it is unlikely that such interpretation had been the intent of 
Parliament.238 Lord Millet noted in one case that “The courts will presume that Parliament did not 
intend a statute to have consequences which are objectionable or undesirable; or absurd; or 
unworkable or impractical; or merely inconvenient; or anomalous or illogical; or futile or 
pointless.”239 
In particular, the construction of a statute can be considered absurd if it is unworkable or 
impracticable or even inconvenient to business. Bennion shows the avoidance of interpreting statutes 
in a way that causes inconvenience is a principle already established in the common law.240 The long 
established maxim has been argumentum ab incovenienti plurimum valet in leg (translated as an 
argument based on inconvenience is of great weight).241 Based on this principle, in cases of conflict 
between a registered IP act and the Companies Act, the court could not interpret the statutes in a way 
that would lead to an inconvenient or illogical result. The conflict between statutes is not as simple as 
in the US where the doctrine of pre-emption determines that one statute governs the issue and 
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provisions in the other statute are disregarded.242 Instead in England and Wales, the law must be read 
in its entirety. 243 This means that each court will interpret the law as a whole and apply it to the 
situation.  Unfortunately, it is uncertain how a court will rule in the case of conflict between a 
registered IP act and the Companies Act. This fact also adds to the uncertainty in taking security in an 
IP right as it is difficult for a creditor to guess what would happen in court of law. Only statutory 
intervention would provide answers on how a creditor takes security in a registered IP right and how 
priority is determined between conflicting interests.  
d. Conclusions on Registered IP 
The registered IP Statutes are not suited for governing security interests. The provisions which control 
the taking of security in a registered IP right are mainly concerned with transfers of title and 
ownership. When they are adapted for security interests which are not complete transfers of the IP 
right, the result is for confusing rules on registration and priority. 
One of the goals of secured finance is to allow the creditor to take and perfect their interest with 
limited formalities. The Companies Act achieves this by requiring a single filing which attaches to 
multiple assets. The IP Acts do not and would require multiple filings for each IP right. This is a 
cumbersome and expensive process for the creditor. Because of that fact, the debtor is going to have a 
higher cost for their credit. Also, there is the additional problem that when the creditor takes security 
over the assets of a company, he may not realise that IP rights are included in that security and that 
additional filings need to be made. The filing problem is also found in regards to floating interests and 
after-acquired property which may require the creditor to make additional filings after crystallisation 
or after the IP right has been registered or acquired.  
The problems with the registration schemes in the Patents Act and the Trade Marks Act are also 
exacerbated because registration is not compulsory. Even worse, it is not clear whether registration is 
compulsory under the Registered Designs Act or not, so that makes the effect of registration even 
more complex. Non-compulsory registration causes two problems. The first is that it makes the 
process of perfecting the interest unclear. Registration provides a notice point as long as the creditor 
did not have knowledge of prior unregistered rights but this cannot be said to give a perfection point. 
In reality, this makes registration a kind of quasi-perfection point. The fact that the schemes are not 
mandatory also makes the process of determining priority complex and even convoluted. As 
mentioned, the schemes allow a registered interest to have priority than an unregistered one if the 
creditor of the registered interest had knowledge. It is not clear in the Acts, what consistutes 
knowledge of prior interests. This makes the process of perfecting the interest and assuring priority 
difficult for the creditor. 
The other important problem with the schemes in the registered IP Acts is that they conflict with the 
Companies Act. As mentioned above, security interests in a registered IP right are required to be filed 
at the Companies House. The interest also needs to be filed for each IP right at the UKIPO. It is not 
clear how the laws interact with each other. It is not clear how a charge perfected at Companies House 
will be prioritised under the respective IP Act if it is not registered at the IPO. In other words, does 
registration at Companies House give knowledge under the registered IP Acts? It is also unclear how 
priority will be determined in cases of conflict between IP law and the Companies Act.  
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Although copyright is an unregistered right, it is included in this chapter as a comparison with 
registered IP. It is also included because the Copyright Act causes serious problems in the perfection 
and priority of security interests in copyrights. Copyright is governed by the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988 (the “Copyright Act”).  It has few provisions on using copyright as collateral for 
security interests. The Act says that in regards to an assignment that copyright is described as 
“personal or movable property.”244 This categorization means that security interests over copyright 
can only be registered at the Companies House if the owner of the copyright is a registered company. 
If the owner of the copyright is not a registered company, then there is no register for it.   
There are two other relevant provisions in the Copyright Act. The first is that the Copyright Act 
allows for assignment of the whole copyright or just a portion of it.245 The second is that the 
Copyright Act also makes an explicit allowance for the assignment of future copyrights.246 This could 
mean that a mortgage may be created over such future rights. The provision is particularly useful to 
the film industry as this allows a film company to get financing by mortgaging the future film and the 
copyright in the subject. Charges which are created in equity and are always available to capture 
future property can be used in regards to future copyright. However, mortgages are a creation of 
common law it would not be possible to take a future copyright as collateral without the specific 
mechanism in the statute.  
There are, however, no provisions in the Copyright Act which govern the perfection and the priority 
of a security interest in a copyright. If the copyright holder is a registered company, this is actually not 
a problem because the Companies Act will govern. This is in direct contrast with the registered IP 
Acts which conflict with the Companies Act.247 The lack of relevant provisions is beneficial in some 
ways for creditors in cases where the copyright owner is a registered company because the Companies 
Act will govern. It is highly problematic for creditors when the copyright is owned by the individual. 
Copyright owned by individuals is common in some areas of the creative industries. In such cases, the 
creditor will find it extremely difficult to perfect the interest and to have a clear understanding of the 
priority of that interest. Also, it is reported that this causes problems in the software industry. To 
combat the problem, when security is being taken in the copyright of software, the security agreement 
often contains lengthy escrow requirements to ensure that the creditor will have access to the source 
code in cases of default.  
The biggest problem is that there is no register to file in to perfect the interest.248 There is no register 
of copyrights in England so the creditor cannot file the security interest in the copyright register. 
Additionally, there is no IP specific register for security interests. Any security interest in IP rights 
can only be filed on a registered IP right.249 The creditor cannot file the interest at Companies House if 
the debtor is not a registered company. The possibility of perfecting a security interest in a copyright 
by following the Bill of Sales has been suggested but most scholars do not believe this is actually 
possible250. The lack of a register also means that the creditor will have a harder time performing due 
diligence in determining their priority. Creditors taking security in a copyright also have the problem 
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that there are no documents which establish title in a copyright. This is because copyright arises 
automatically and does not arise upon creation like in the case of the registered IP rights. Townend 
notes that “the opportunities for fraud, or indeed simple mistake and blindness towards various rights 
having priority over the security, are legion.”251 
The registration problem is not easily solved. Many solutions have been proposed but none of them 
solve all of the problems. The first suggestion proposed is to use unregistered land principles to take 
security in a copyright. It recommends that when the copyright is assigned as part of a commercial 
deal that the assignment document serves as a quasi-title document. This assignment document can be 
used to give security in the copyright. When the assignee wants to use the copyright as security, they 
could transfer the assignment document to the creditor. The transfer of the document would give 
notice to future creditors because they would want evidence of the original assignment. One major 
problem with  the theory is that it would not work in cases where the original owner continues to 
exploit the copyright. This practice is common in the film and publishing industries but it is doubtful 
that it would be useful beyond that. 
Another proposed solution is to create a copyright register. The copyright register was abolished in 
England in 1911.  Despite the abolition of the formal register, there are a number of voluntary 
registers in the UK. One such example is the register of professional songwriters. It is run by a 
professional body and helps songwriters establish ownership of their work. However, establishing a 
formal register is not a good solution overall. This is because even though some problems would be 
alleviated, new ones would be introduced. One problem is that registration of copyright is no longer 
mandatory under the Berne Convention, of which the UK is a signatory. This would give the same 
problems with priority and perfection that are found in relation to the registered IP rights. Also, the 
introduction of a copyright register would cause enormous problems for copyright law in general. It 
would be like applying a tourniquet to a wound when a plaster may serve the same purpose. 
The next proposed solution is to introduce a register in the UKIPO which is used solely to record 
security interests in copyright. This would be problematic as it may require additional filings for 
creditors when taking a charge in multiple types of IP rights. Also, it would have to be ensured that 
any provisions on filing and notice for the copyright specific register did not conflict with the 
Companies Act.  
The last solution is to create a separate register for security interests in all IP rights at the UKIPO. 
Under this regime security taken in any and all IP rights could be registered with a single filing. This 
will be discussed further, below in Section 5. 
3. National Security Interests in UK wide Rights 
Since there are multiple jurisdictions within the UK, there can be cross-border problems when taking 
a security right that is only jurisdiction-wide on a UK right.  Despite the fact that IP law is 
harmonized throughout the UK the same is not true for security interests. Although all registered 
companies in the UK are governed by the Companies Act and charges in their assets are registered at 
the Companies House, there are several instances when local law will govern. This can result in a 
conflict of laws over the UK wide IP right. Scotland in particular has its own on secured finance 
which conflict with English law. Scotland is especially problematic since it is a civil code as opposed 
to common law like the rest of the UK.  
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This section will discuss the laws of security interests in Scotland and their applicability to UK wide 
IP rights. It will also examine circumstance when a valid security interest in one jurisdiction, e.g. 
England, may not be valid in another jurisdiction in the UK, e.g. England. Additionally, the problems 
of enforcing a security interest cross-border in the UK will be discussed.  
a. Scottish law and UK IP 
There are several major differences between English law and Scottish law in regards to security 
interests. In Scots law, which is a civil law system rather than common law, IPR’s are considered to 
be incorporeal movable property. Security can be taken in IP rights through assignation or by way of a 
floating charge over a company.252 Although IP is categorised as incorporeal movable property, it is 
considered to be an atypical form of it.  
An assignation is the first type of security which can be taken in an IP right.253 Assignations can take 
one of two forms. One is called ex facie absolute which is the form of an unqualified transfer of the 
property which has been expressly stated to be transfer.254 The other is an assignation in security 
which is a transfer of the asset only as a type of security. It is not an absolute transfer. It is similar in 
many ways to a mortgage under English law. In order to be valid, the assignment must be in writing 
and is only effective when the transfer document has been delivered from the grantor or debtor to the 
assignee or creditor.255  Delivery of the transfer document does not perfect the interest but only makes 
it valid between the two parties. If the security is to become enforceable against third parties than it 
must be perfected by being “made real.”, 256  The process of making the interest real is done by 
registration of by  intimated to the debtor. In regards to unregistered right such as copyright, a real 
right is created through delivery of the assignation alone. In the case of registered rights, it is made 
real by registration of the assignation.257  
For the creditor, obtaining a real right or registering the assignation is of the utmost importance. This 
is demonstrated in the case of Sharp v Thomson, wherein assignation for the sale of a house was not 
registered before the debtor went insolvent. Although the case is on the registration of land, it 
highlights the mechanism of assignations which are also applicable to registered IP.258 In the case the 
disposition of the property was delivered to the purchasers who only held a personal right (as opposed 
to a real right) in regards to the house. A real right could only be obtained after the disposition was 
recorded at the Register. In this case, although the disposition was granted, it was not recorded before 
the original owner went insolvent259. The question arose to whether the original owner still owned all 
rights in the house or whether the unregistered assignation had any effect. In Sharp, the Court held 
that the buyer would only get a real right upon registration so the ownership of the house had not 
transferred to the buyer. All rights in the house vested in the receiver of the insolvency estate.260 This 
shows the importance of registration as an act of perfection and the severe penalties which arise when 
an assignation is not registered or made real.  
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 Like the common law equivalent, mortgages, assignations can be problematic when used to secure 
registered IP rights. According to most scholars, the effect of an assignation is that the creditor has 
obtained a real right and not just a security: “an assignation has the effect of divesting the cedent of 
the property and vesting it in the assignee.”261 This means that the rights and responsibilities of the 
debtor to the IP can be unclear because the real rights in the IP have transferred to the creditor. It 
could be the case that any use of the IP right by the original IP owner will be considered as an 
infringement. The same problem was shown above in England and Wales, where mortgages caused 
confusion as to the rights of the original IP owner. With assignations, the assignation of the IP right to 
the creditor is particularly problematic for trademarks. This is because trade marks have use 
requirements that are not found with other types of registered IP. With assignation, the trade mark 
could be made void under Section 46 (b) and (c). In this section, a trade mark may be revoked if the 
mark misleads the public or if there has been a failure to use the mark.  As with mortgages above, 
Section 46 (b) and (c) cause two problems in assignation of a trade mark. If the debtor continues to 
use the trade mark, it could be viewed that such use is misleading. This is because the creditor is the 
registered owner of the trade mark yet the debtor continues to use this. Most of the time, this problem 
is solved by a licence-back to the debtor but it still exists. The bigger problem is the use requirement 
in part (c). If the debtor continues to use the trade mark without a licence from the creditor than such 
use could be construed as trade mark infringement. Conversely, if the debtor does not continue to use 
the mark it could be revoked for no use under section (c).This could also be problematic for the 
creditor as it would be difficult to force the debtor to use the trade mark and may not have the right to 
licence the mark to third parties. Also, the creditor is usually not in position to use the mark himself. 
In this case, the creditor would have little control over having the trade mark revoked for non-use. 
Because of these problems, the usual practice is to create and deliver an assignation but have its 
registration be a condition precedent in the loan agreement. For example, the creditor will not register 
the assignation until or unless the debtor has defaulted or is likely to default262. This is risky in some 
ways because the creditor may get lower priority by registering the interest late. However, this 
practice allows the debtor to continue to deal in the IP rights. In fact, fully perfected assignations in IP 
are rare in Scotland because they are considered “uncommercial.”263 
There are also other problems when using an assignation in an IP right in Scotland similar to the one 
in England and Wales. Making the assignation real will often require numerous filings. The 
assignation will have to be filed for each IP right in order to gain priority for that specific right. If the 
owner of the IP right is a company, an additional company filing is required. This is discussed in 
greater detail below. As with common law security interests, filing notice of the assignation for each 
IP right can be cumbersome and expensive. Also, there are serious concerns of how each priority 
scheme in the registered IP acts interact with Scottish law. This will be discussed in turn. 
There are several ways that assignations differ when security each type of registered IP. Surprisingly, 
patents from Scotland have several separate provisions than patents from elsewhere in the UK.264 In 
the Patents Act Section 31, has provisions on taking a security interest in a Scottish IP right. The 
Section states: “ 
(1)Section 30 above shall not extend to Scotland, but instead, the following provisions of 
this section shall apply there. 
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(2)Any patent or application for a patent, and any right in or under any patent or any such 
application, is incorporeal moveable property, and the provisions of the following sub-
sections and of section 36(3) below shall apply to any grant of licences, assignations and 
securities in relation to such property. 
(3)Any patent or any such application, or any right in it, may be assigned and security may 
be granted over a patent or any such application or right. 
(4)A licence may be granted, under any patent or any application for a patent, for working 
the invention which is the subject of the patent or the application. 
(5)To the extent that any licence granted under subsection (4) above so provides, a sub-
licence may be granted under any such licence and any such licence or sub-licence may be 
assigned and security may be granted over it. 
(6)Any assignation or grant of security under this section may be carried out only by writing  
(7)An assignation of a patent or application for a patent or a share in it, and an exclusive 
licence granted under any patent or any such application, may confer on the assignee or 
licensee the right of the assignor or licensor to bring proceedings by virtue of section 61 or 
69 below for a previous infringement or to bring proceedings under section 58 below for a 
previous act.”265 
One problem with this Section is that it does not define “a patent in Scotland.” Does this mean that the 
owner of the patent is Scottish? Also, it does not clarify how this categorisation will affect the patent’s 
ability to function as a UK wide patent. Another uncertainty is in regards to taking security in a patent 
application. Section 31 allows a creditor to take security in a patent application but it is unclear 
happens or must be done when the patent application changes to a registered patent.  In this Section, it 
is clear that security in Scottish patents is governed by Scottish law, however, the formalities and 
practicalities in this regard are uncertain. Additionally, it is uncertain what effect the notice provisions 
in the Patents Act would have in Scottish law. Under the Patents Act, a subsequent registered interest 
will have priority over an earlier unregistered interest as long as the registered creditor did not have 
notice of the prior one. The basic rule in Scottish law is that priority is ranked in order that the interest 
was constituted or made real. Notice does not affect the ranking of security interest. It is unclear 
whether Scottish law would prevail over the rules of the Patents Act, especially when the Act refers 
directly to assignations. This makes it unclear whether the rules of priority on assignations are also 
included in the Act as well.  
The Trade Marks Act also has a specific provision for taking a Scottish security in a trade mark. 
Section 24 (5) states: “A registered trade mark may be the subject of a charge (in Scotland, security) 
in the same way as other personal or moveable property.” This is a slightly different approach than 
that taken in the Patents Act because the security interest is categorised as being “Scottish” instead of 
the IP right. This provision makes it clear that trade marks may be taken as security under Scottish 
law or indeed under any UK jurisdiction’s laws. Under the Trade Marks Act, an assignation or 
company charge can be taken in a trade mark. It is assumed that the registration provisions of the Act 
are the same regardless of the form of the security. It is unclear whether an assignation, which is 
closer to a mortgage, is subject to the provisions on transferring title. There is also the issue of 
whether the rules of priority in the Trade Marks Act apply to assignations of Scottish trade marks. As 
mentioned above with patents, notice does not affect priority in Scottish law. Therefore, it is uncertain 
whether the notice based priority provisions apply to assignations in Scottish trade marks.  




The Registered Designs Act does not have any specific references to Scottish law. It is assumed that 
Section 19 applies to all security interests including assignations even though it does not mention 
them directly. The Section specifically names mortgages, assignments, and licensees but does not 
mention any other security interest, Scottish or otherwise. This means that assignations can be 
registered at the UKIPO in order to gain priority for the security interest. Since the Registered Designs 
Act does not contain provisions for determining priority, it is assumed that the rules under Scottish 
law are applicable. This could lead to cross-border enforcement concerns if the creditor seeks to 
enforce the interest in England. This will be discussed in greater depth below. 
The main problem for an assignation in copyright is that there is no register for them. The same is true 
for all of the UK. This also means that making an assignation real, or perfecting it, is unclear under 
Scottish law. In Scotland, assignations in copyright are often considered “uncommercial.”266 
b. Companies Act 
The Companies Act also applies to companies registered in Scotland. 267  That means that company 
charges can be used to secure IP under Scottish law. As mentioned above, in some areas the 
Companies Act defers to the local law. This is especially true in priority. One difference between 
Scottish law and the common law is that automatic crystallisation is not recognised under Scottish law 
in the same way. A floating charge will not crystallise into a fixed charge until a receiver is appointed 
or the company begins the winding up procedure. There are also other differences in priority in 
Scottish law. The basic rule is that they are ranked in the order they are constituted. Constituting a 
security is the process of making it real as discussed above. This is similar to perfection.  This 
contrasts with the English rule that interests are ranked from the date of their creation. In Scottish law, 
the date of registration at Companies House may be irrelevant in determining priority.268 This is true 
for security in registered IP rights. Under Scottish law, registration at the UKIPO perfects the interest. 
This could lead to a conflict of laws between the Companies Act, the relevant registered IP Act as 
well as Scottish law. 
Cross-border Problems 
The interaction between Scottish law and UK law is extremely complicated and raises numerous 
questions in private international law. Specifically, there is often the question of which set of laws is 
applicable in any given legal situation. In this regard, the problem is similar to the problem of pre-
emption in the US which will be discussed fully in Chapter 5. Since IP is an intangible or incorporeal 
property right, conflicts of law cannot be resolved by the traditional rules of lex situs. 269  
The case of Campbell Connelly & Co Ltd. V Noble, considered jurisdictional issues in the assignment 
of a copyright.270 In this case, the court held that the assignability of copyright should be governed by 
the law of the place where the right exists.271 In the case, a US copyright was assigned in a contract 
governed by English law. The court held that despite the controlling law of the agreement, the transfer 
of any IP right must be valid under the laws of the jurisdiction where the IP right exists. The courts 
often use lex situs to decide such matters. The problem with this ruling in this case and the lex situs 
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approach is that IP is a UK wide right (or even European-wide). In the case of Scotland and England, 
the right is not first recognised in one country and then extended to another through treaty law. Since 
the IP right exists throughout the country, either law could be perfectly applicable to it.  
There are also cases in the UK where the lex situs may conflict with the lex actus.272  There can easily 
be a situation where a Scottish company that holds a registered UK IP right wants to use the IP as 
security for a loan from an English bank. In this situation, the lex situs is not readily apparent. There is 
the question of whether the lex situs of the IP right is in Scotland or England or whether it exists 
simultaneously in both England and Scotland? There is also the question of whether a security interest 
can be validly created in both England and Scotland simultaneously over the same asset. Additionally, 
it is problematic that the security interest may not be valid across the border because each jurisdiction 
has its very own specific rules and mechanisms for creating such an interest.273 
To fully outline the potential problems of lex situs and lex actus, it is useful to assess the following 
scenarios in relation to security interests in IP. The first scenario is simple in terms of cross-border 
law. In this case, a Scottish lender takes security in the registered IP right of a Scottish company.274 
The Companies Act would govern the registration of the charge to perfect the charge. There would be 
the usual problems when applying Scottish law to the priority schemes in the registered IP Acts but it 
is not problematic for cross-border purposes. 
The next scenario is slightly trickier. In this case, an English company with an operating base in 
Scotland grants a securityy interest to a Scottish lender.275 In this case, arguably the correct security 
interest is an assignation which is recorded at Companies House. However, it could be just as likely 
that the Scottish lender would prefer a security interest under Scottish law. A Scottish security interest 
would be more valuable for the purposes of enforcement if the majority of the company’s assets are in 
Scotland. Either security interest would probably be equally valid. The lex actus could be used to 
determine which set of laws governs the security interest. 
The third scenario is when a company operates throughout the UK, and grants security over a 
registered, UK IP right. The provisions on notice and priority could be from either English or Scottish 
law as the security interest could arise from any jurisdiction in the UK.276 The true legal problem 
would come when conflicting interests arise out of different jurisdictions. When enforcing that 
particular security interest, it would be uncertain which jurisdiction would govern the interest 
particularly if one lender is in England and the other in Scotland. The English court and the Scottish 
court deciding on the matter could have very different rulings. One such problem would be if the 
Scottish court ruled that the English security interest is enforceable over Scottish interests which will 
discussed in further detail below. 
The last situation occurs when a Scottish company takes a loan from an English lender and uses their 
IP right as security. In this situation, there is a question as to whether the English company can create 
an equitable charge over the IP right in Scotland and what effect the charge would have in 
determining priority and giving notice. Theoretically, the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act of 1990 
could be applicable, but it is not entirely clear. In England and Scotland alike, security interests are 
considered to be part of property law and not merely the laws of contracts. This is a situation where 
there is great deal of uncertainty.  Despite the fact that the Companies Act governs some of the 
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aspects of taking a charge, as mentioned previously, the Companies Act’s provisions on notice and 
priority must be supplemented by other law. In the case above, it is not clear whether the English 
common law or Scottish law would govern in areas on perfection and priority. 
There is an alternative legal theory that suggests that IP rights should be considered situs between the 
jurisdictions of the UK.277  The Scottish case of Scottish Provident Institution v Cohen & Co supports 
the theory of ad situs rights, but not to IP rights.278 In the case, security was taken in a life insurance 
policy issued in Scotland. Moneylenders in Newcastle, England held the policy document as an 
equitable charge. After the borrower had died, a Scottish court had to determine whether the equitable 
charge was valid. The question arose as to who had priority on the claim; the trustee in bankruptcy or 
the creditor. The lex situs of the policy was Scotland but the security interest, an equitable charge, was 
created in England.279 An equitable charge is not recognised in Scottish law because it does not meet 
the same requirements needed to create a written assignation. Despite this fact, the court ruled that the 
creditor’s claim was better than the claim of the trustee. The Court distinguished the laws governing 
the creation of the policy and the laws governing the assignment of the interest in the policy. The 
court found that the two actions form two separate and distinct contracts which are governed by the 
law from where they were created. In other words, the insurance policy and the assignment of the 
policy had two separate leges actus. The decision stated that the validity of a security interest is 
therefore determined by the lex loci contractus. Despite the age of the decision, the ruling suggests 
that a Scottish court may accept an English security interest created in Scottish property in certain 
situations. It is also possible that the decision could also be extended to cross-border interests in IP. 
This point has been addressed more recently in the case of Bankhaus H Aufhausen v Scotboard, In 
this case, the court stated in the case notes that an assignation should be governed by the laws of 
where it was created.280 This statement could suggest that a contractual right may prevail over any 
rights of lex situs of property in the UK. It is not clear if this would be correct in cases where 
contractual rights compete with real rights. In such conflicts, there could be policy objection of a 
fundamental nature to allow the contractual right prevail over the real right.281  
Based on these two cases, it would seem that it is possible for a lender to enforce an English security 
interest in Scotland. However, this is some doubt as to whether this security interest would be 
effective against a liquidator or receiver in cases of insolvency. The case of Tay Valley Joinery Ltd. v 
C.F. Financial Services Ltd, indicates that this a security interest in IP would be valid in this 
situation.282 In this case, there was an agreement by a Scottish company to transfer all of its book 
debts to an English company. The Court ruled that this transfer amounted to an equitable assignment 
which would be effective against English debtors. However, the case did not address whether the 
security interest could be enforced against Scottish debtors. Generally, an English security interest 
would not be effective if it were over Scottish property so if an IP right was characterized as being 
Scottish than the English security instrument would not be effective.283 However, due to the fact that 
UK IP has never been characterized as being either Scottish or English in either jurisdiction; there 
could be an exception to this strict rule. This is unclear though, and the point has yet to be decided. 
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The combination of the problems found in the two jurisdictions of England and Scotland makes 
obtaining a security interest in an IP right in the UK uncertain. The jurisdictional problems mentioned 
also casts a shadow on the process. One solution is for the UK to implement similar provisions to 
those found in the Community Trade Mark Directive. 
In Section 4 of the Community Trade Mark Directive is entitled “Community Trade Marks as Objects 
of Property” and states that “unless Articles 17 to 24 provide otherwise, a Community trade mark as 
an object of property shall be dealt with in its entirety, and for the whole area of the Community, as a 
national trade mark registered in the Member State in which, according to the Register of Community 
trade marks: (a) the proprietor has his seat or his domicile on the relevant date; (b) where point (a) 
does not apply, the proprietor has an establishment on the relevant date. 2. In cases which are not 
provided for by paragraph 1, the Member State referred to in that paragraph shall be the Member State 
in which the seat of the Office is situated.”284 
It has been commented that “Article 16 therefore contains a conflicts rule which, lacking a protecting 
state, positions the IP right with the domicile of the proprietor and identifies in this manner the 
national law applicable to such matters pertaining to the proprietary rights over the IP right which are 
not directly governed by the CTMR. If we observe this provision more closely, we find that, firstly, 
the law governing proprietary rights in a Community trade mark may vary over time and space, either 
due to the transfer of the registered office of the proprietor or to the transfer of the Community IP 
right to a party domiciled in a state other than the state where the prior proprietor was located. 
Secondly, although the proprietor of a Community trade mark may be domiciled or have an 
establishment in a non-EU country, the EU IP right as object of property may be located only within 
the EU, or in an area subject to the application of the CTMR, in order to guarantee that the substantive 
rules set out therein apply: it would clearly be unreasonable if it were possible to apply the law of a 
third country which would not have within its legal order any substantive provisions concerning the 
Community trade mark since it would not be bound by the CTMR.”285 
Under the Section 4, trade marks are effectively localised, and security may be taken in them in 
accordance to the lex domicilii. This approach could be applied to the conflicts of laws in the UK. The 
governing the creation of a security interest in an IP right would be the lex domicilii rather than the lex 
actus. There are several problems with this approach, though. One problem is that it would not 
alleviate any of the underlying tension when a Scottish Company takes an assignation in a registered 
IP right. As mentioned previously, there is a conflict between the Companies Act, Scottish law and 
the registered IP Acts on priority, perfection, and notice. Using the principle of lex actus would only 
solve cross-border issues but would not solve the conflict between Scottish and UK law. 
Another suggestion is to include IP rights in recent reforms on moveable property in Scotland. Such 
reforms have been ongoing since the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (formerly the 
Department of Trade and Industry) released a paper on the reformation of moveable property law in 
Scotland in 1999.286 The interest in reform has continued and in 2012, the Scottish Law Commission 
also released recommendations for reform. 287 As of the writing of this thesis, it is unclear whether 
they will be adopted. One notable feature of the proposed reforms is that Scottish law on security 
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interests would be closer to the US’s Article 9. If intellectual property were considered specifically in 
the reforms, it could be useful. However, it is likely that several problems will remain: “First, how 
would priority conflicts between different registers be resolved? Under the new system a lender taking 
security, for example, over a patent from a company would have to register in three different registers, 
each with its own rules about when a real right arises. If a subsequent security interests were granted 
over the same patent and that obtained a real right under one register while the first security obtained 
a real right under another, how would that conflict be resolved? Or is it simply the case that a real 
right would only in fact be obtained after registration in all three? Second, the problem of 
transforming a security over a patent or trade mark application into a security over a patent or trade 
mark would remain. Third, given the fact that an acquirer without awareness of the security obtains a 
good title, how strong will the security be and will lenders prefer to use existing forms? Finally, the 
remedies of the security holder in the form of recovery of possession of property are in terms more 
suitable to corporeal than to incorporeal property. 
There is not an easy solution to the problems of taking a national security interest in a UK-wide right. 
Several possible solutions will be discussed below.  
4. Reform 
Before discussing any solutions, previous attempts to reform secured finance for England and also for 
the UK should be mentioned. It should be noted that legal reform has been proposed by many 
academics and even government organizations for the last forty years, but it has yet to be realized. In 
fact despite numerous government proposals for reform have been issued for the last thirty-five years, 
no significant legislative changes have been made.288  
In general, reform has been suggested on two levels: (i) reform of the general laws of secured 
transactions or (ii) reform of the IP Acts in specific areas. Also, changes have been suggested at the 
national level and at the UK-wide level. The reform process has focused on promoting a system of 
secured finance where security is granted at a lower cost and ensuring accurate information is 
available about the assets at issue, whether future or present. An ideal of the system is also to give 
creditors the ability to enforce their credit as cheaply and as easily as possible.289 The English system 
has often been compared to the US UCC Article 9.290 Many have viewed the US system as an 
effective replacement to “inefficient common law.”291 Some academics such as Roy Goode292 have 
been strong supporters of adopting a system similar to Article 9 in England. Others have argued that 
England should not adopt an Article 9 style system as it is too broad to deal with the nuances of 
secured finance.293 They also note the many problems inherent when transplanting “foreign law.” 
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Aside from the debate over whether England or even the UK should adopt Article 9 style system of 
secured finance, many scholars argue that there should be a general legislative reform of security 
interests294.  This new statute may be completely different from Article 9, but the argument is that 
reformation must come from legislative efforts. Aside from academics, some government agencies 
have also argued for the codification of security interests in English law.295 Both, the Crowther and 
the Diamond report, assessed whether an Article 9 style system would be appropriate in England.296 
The more recent Law Commission report also considered the issue as well.297 The reports all differ on 
their view of adopting Article 9 style law, but they all agree that some legislative statutory reform is 
needed. It is a shame in some ways that so much of the debate over statutory reform is narrowed to 
discussions on adoption of Article 9 rather than the bigger issue of how statutory reform could be used 
to remedy some of the problems found in English secured finance laws. 
In regards to security interests in IP, the Crowther, the Cork and the Diamond reports do not mention 
the problem. The most recent government-sponsored report was issued in 2005 by the Law 
Commission.  The report did not detail the problems in a substantive way, but it did mention it. 
Previous government reports did not acknowledge the issue at all, so the report by the Law 
Commission shows some progress. The Law Commission recommended preserving the IP registers as 
they were and that the IP Act should govern any special issues with security interests in IP. It did not 
mention some of the inherent problems with the scheme in the registered IP Acts or the register. They 
recommended that the law of IP remained unchanged but proposed substantial reform to the laws of 
secured transactions. One of the recommendations was for significant changes to be made to the 
Companies Act so that there would be harmonisation throughout the UK. As of yet these proposals 
have yet to be adopted into legislation. 
Academics have also made recommendations on how the law should be reformed specifically in 
regards to taking security in IP. Townend has suggested the creation of a register using the principles 
of land registration.298 An advantage is that the law regarding land registration could be used as 
precedent, and these rules are extensive and well tested. It also would make it cheaper to implement 
since it would be the replication of an existing system. The other advantage would be that it will help 
harmonize the laws of the UK in regards to property registration bringing the rules of IP in line with 
other forms of property. The rules of land registration could be transplanted into the creation of an IP 
registry and corresponding registration formalities which would eliminate some of the uncertainty 
found at the moment.  
Davies has a slightly different approach. His proposal is to overhaul the system with a simple 
principle of first to file and notice299. This borrows from the tenets already found in both secured 
lending and IP laws. It has been said that this would be “characterized by a behavioural agnosticism: a 
creditor’s knowledge of pre-existing unregistered interests would be irrelevant, priority being 
determined solely by the date of filing.”300 This system would allow for the creation of several 
security interests whether future or existing at the same time and would not long require the on-going 
filing required. His proposal is similar to the type of system found in the US and Canada which has 
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“bright line rules.” The rules would give less uncertainty and would lower credit costs. The cost 
would also be lowered as the expense of multiple filings would be diminished. This system would be 
a particular advantage to companies which have a vast portfolio of IP but have a need for a continuous 
line of credit. This proposal is not met with universal approval. Some argue that it would cause greater 
inefficiency and would conflict with security interest law. Also, the problem with his approach is that 
this approach has been proposed numerous times in the past and has never been implemented. When 
suggestions have been made for the significant reformation of the laws of secured financing, they 
have always been met with great opposition.  
As mentioned previously there are also ongoing reforms in Scotland to the laws of taking security in 
movable property. Part of the reform has also discussed harmonisation of all UK law for security 
interest, but there has yet to be any legislative reform introduced.  In fact, it is unlikely that 
comprehensive reform will be made to the UK’s law on secured financing. This is also true for 
common law rules found in England and Wales. Solving the problems of taking security in an IP right 
is only likely to be done through specific legislative changes. The suggested form that these should 
take is discussed below. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
As shown above, the main problems when taking a security interest in a registered IP right in England 
and Wales comes from unclear provision on notice and priority. In fact, the perfection and priority 
schemes within the Acts are unnecessarily complicated. There is also the problem of having to 
register the security interest in each and every IP right the security interest is taken in. The problem of 
determining priority is further exacerbated when the owner of the registered IP right is a registered 
company as the interest will also have to be registered by complying with the requirements of the 
Companies Act. Furthermore, there is a conflict of priority schemes in the registered IP Acts and the 
Companies Act. Then there is the overall problem of taking a national interest in a UK IP right which 
can lead to a conflict between laws. As shown above, it is unlikely that there will be a complete 
reformation of the laws of secured lending in England and Wales or in the UK as a whole. Therefore, 
three specific legislative changes should be made instead.  
The first change is that the Companies Act should govern all security taken in IP owned by a 
registered company. The change should be made by specific legislation and not through case law. 
This would alleviate the complications created by the conflict between the Companies Act and the 
Registered IP Acts. It would also clarify the process of perfecting an interest and the prioritisation of 
conflicting interests. If all charges in IP owned by registered companies were filed at the companies, 
register it would eliminate the need for multiple filings at the UKIPO. Also, the Companies Register 
is better adapted for the recording of security interests. Creditors can search and file with much 
greater ease than they can at the UKIPO. This would significantly reduce the costs for taking security 
in a registered IP right. The Companies Act also has better mechanisms for perfecting a security 
interest especially in cases of floating charges and after-acquired IP rights. The registered IP acts do 
not contain specific provisions on these points so they must be stretched to try to accommodate them. 
Also, the Companies Act has clearer provisions on perfection and priority. One of the drawbacks of 
the Companies Act is the twenty-one day period between the creation and perfection of the interest. 
However, creditors can anticipate this risk and will already be familiar with it. The schemes on 
priority in the registered IP acts are complex and untested. Creditors would have greater certainty of 
the amount of risk in taking security in the registered IP if the Companies Act governed. 
The second change should be the creation of a register specifically for security interests in IP. In 
cases, where the owner of the IP right is not a registered company, the security interest should be 
registered at the UKIPO.  The register should be indexed by the owner and not by the IP right. At the 
moment, it is difficult in practice to search the register for security interests and then to file the 
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registration of the security. Creation of a new register specifically for security interests in IP rights 
would give creditors greater ease in searching and filing. Instead of having to file multiple times for 
multiple rights, a creditor would only need to file once. The creation of a unified register would also 
alleviate the problem of the lack of a register for security interests in copyrights and other 
unregistered rights. At the moment, there is no register of security interests in unregistered IP owned 
by individuals. The register at the UKIPO for all security interests in all types of IP would alleviate 
this problem. The creation of such a register would also leave the current IP registers unaltered. They 
are suited to show the parameters of every right but not for interests in rights. A register of security 
interests would not conflict with this. Also, it was shown in the Van Gelder case that the UKIPO 
already has this practice in place.301  However, to create the new register, new laws are needed. 
The final change is that new laws should be made to simplify the use of IP as security.  In addition, to 
the creation of a register of security interests in IP, other legislative reforms are needed. There are 
many problems with the schemes in the registered IP acts and the Copyright Act. The first is that that 
there are not harmonised rules for taking security in all IP right. This is particularly true of the 
prioritisation schemes in each Act. For example, in the Patents Acts priority is based on knowledge 
whereas in the Trade Marks Act it is based on ignorance. The difference seems subtle but since the 
terms are undefined in their respective acts, there could be big differences in how courts interpret each 
term.   Another problem is that in all three acts, security interests are treated as a type of transfer of 
the IP right. Security interests should not be treated as such since they are not the complete and 
absolute transfer of the right. This is even true of mortgages which are a transfer of title but not an 
absolute transfer of ownership. Even the transfer of title cannot be considered absolute since all 
mortgages contain the right of redemption for the debtor. In this regard, security interests are the 
possibility of a future, absolute transfer of ownership. Also, in the Registered Designs Act and the 
Copyright Act, there are few provisions at all. In the Registered Designs Act, it is not even clear 
whether the registration of an interest is mandatory or not. In the Copyright Act, there are no 
provisions on how to perfect an interest or on how to determine priority between conflicting interests. 
The final problem is that mortgages create problems because the creditor becomes the legal owner of 
the IP right. For patents, case law has determined that the original owner still has the right to sue third 
parties for infringement. Unfortunately, the case law has not been extended to other types of IP. Also, 
with all types of registered IP, the role of the parties after assignment of the right is unclear.  
In order to harmonise IP law, legislation should be introduced that provide one scheme for taking 
security in IP rights owned by individuals. Highly specific legislation would ensure that IP law is not 
altered save for security interests in IP.  Like the register, such legislation should govern all IP rights, 
registered or unregistered. In order to ensure conformity with the rest of the law, the legislation should 
incorporate the principles found in the Companies Act. As mentioned above, the schemes on 
perfection are much clearer than those found in the registered IP acts. It would abolish the complex 
priority schemes which rely on registration and notice. Instead, creditors would be required to file 
within twenty-one days after the creation of the interest to perfect it. This does create a short period of 
time where creditors do not have sight of other conflicting interests, but creditors can mitigate this 
risk. It is also an area of law where there is a considerable amount of case law unlike the schemes in 
the registered IP acts. The legislation should ensure that registration of the interest perfects it and that 
the transfer of title has no effect on perfection or priority. This has two benefits. The first is that the 
provisions on transfers of IP rights are left intact. In the legislation, the transfer of an IP right to create 
a mortgage would not have any effect on perfection or priority of the security interest. The second 
benefit is that there would be no conflict with the transfer provisions in the registered IP Acts.  
                                                          




The rules of determining the priority of conflicting interests in IP should also follow the rules which 
apply to company charges. The date of creation would determine priority for conflicting registered 
interests. If a security interest in an IP right is not filed within twenty-one days, then it would be void. 
Failure to register the security interests severely penalises the creditor who will be considered an 
unsecured creditor if the debtor becomes insolvent. This is not the best priority scheme, and it is 
clearer to have priority determined by filing dates. However, since this is the approach taken by the 
Companies Act, it is better to ensure congruity in the law than transplanting the law of another 
jurisdiction. 
The last set of provisions in the legislation should be to codify the principles of the Van Gelder case 
for all IP rights.302 Also, Van Gelder should be extended to give a debtor the continuing use of and 
responsibility for their IP rights.303 The debtor is in far better position to act in third party 
infringement cases. He is also in better position to ensure that the IP right is maintained. For trade 
marks, it should be ensured that the creation of a mortgage does not conflict with the use requirements 
of Section 25.304 It should be clear that a debtor has the right to continue to use the trade mark and that 
such use is not misleading. 
The suggested changes above will also help the problems with taking a national security interest in a 
UK-wide right. The first recommendation to allow Companies Act govern security interests in the IP 
of registered companies would be beneficial. It also is not radically different than what is already 
occurring. Courts in any of the UK’s jurisdictions are familiar with company charges. The only 
difficulty would be in areas of priority where the law of the applicable jurisdiction is applied. It is 
unlikely that Scottish law and English law will be harmonized as previous attempts in the past have 
failed. There will be conflicts which cause uncertainty.  Therefore, this is not the best solution when it 
comes to secured finance law, but it may be the best when it comes to democratic freedoms. If the 
laws cannot be harmonized, then there should be at least be special provisions for security interest 
over UK wide assets. A conflicts of law provision could be added to determine which jurisdiction’s 
laws will prevail. In such cases, the lex domicilii of the owner whether a registered company or an 
individual should be applied. For example, if the company has a registered address in Surrey then 
English law should apply. If the company has a registered address in Inverness, then Scottish law will 
apply. The same would be true for IP owned by individuals.  
This approach, however, will not work in cases where the IP right is owned from outside of the UK. 
In those cases, the law of England and Wales should apply because that is the lex situs of the UKIPO. 
However, it should be mentioned that in cases of European IP rights the situation will be more 
complicated. In this regard, the conflict of laws provision in the Community Trade Marks Directive 
should be used to determine where such security interests should be filed. This may lead to the 
conclusion that security interests in the community right should have been created and perfected in 
another country. A more detailed discussion in outside the scope of this thesis because the focus in 
this chapter is security interests in the UK. 
The same benefits are found in regards to the second and third recommendations. Also, the same 
drawbacks are found. All security interests in IP owned by individuals are registered at the UKIPO. 
Registration perfects the interest so there would be no conflicting provisions on perfection from 
national laws. The main problem would be found when determining the priority of conflicting 
interests. However, just as above, the lex domicilii of the IP owner would be used to determine 
priority. This would provide clearer rules for all creditors to follow. A creditor would know that in 
cases where the IP right has a Scottish owner they must follow the laws of Scotland to determine 
priority.  
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The current state of laws in the UK limits the potential of the IP-Finance Growth Spiral. Uncertainty 
on the perfection and prioritisation of security in IP rights limits the ability of IP owners obtain 
financing for their IP. In the case of copyright owned by an individual the IP-Finance Growth Spiral is 
almost destroyed.  Unfortunately, there is not one issue alone that harms the growth spiral but instead 
it is rather a case of “death by a thousand cuts” damaging the relationship. This means that there will 
need to be a number of reforms in a number of areas before the true potential can be realised. If the 
UK wants to continue to be an important global power, it is going to have to ensure that it can fully 
participate in the new digital economy. The laws must be reformed to allow the potential of the IP-


































CHAPTER 5: SECURITY INTERESTS IN IP IN THE UNITED STATES 
1. Introduction 
In the US, a conflict between registered IP law and the laws of secured finance creates a legal obstacle 
to taking a security interest in an IP right. In particular, the conflict creates uncertainty on the practical 
the procedures to follow to perfect a security interest in an IP right. A creditor cannot be certain where 
to register the security interest in an IP right.  There are two options: a state registry or an IP registry. 
Then the creditor faces the next practical issue on what degree of detail is needed to describe the IP 
right in the filing statement. The conflict causes two legal problems on the adequacy of the 
description. The first problem is that the laws conflict on how to describe IP in the financing 
statement so that the security interest in that IP can be perfected.  The security interest will not be 
perfected in the IP if the description is not sufficient. In IP law, the description of the IP must be 
highly specific and refer to each separate IP right. In secured finance law, the description of the asset 
can be general and describe multiple types of assets including multiple IP rights. In either set of laws, 
perfection will not occur if the description is insufficient. The second problem is how to perfect a 
security interest in IP that is obtained or created after filing. The uncertainty in all three of these areas 
on how and if a security interest perfects in an IP right prevents the IP-Finance Growth Cycle from 
functioning properly. 
Three different federal laws govern registered IP: The Patent Act, the Lanham Act, and the Copyright 
Act.305 Security interests are governed by Article 9 of the Commercial Code, which is adopted by each 
state and functions as state law.306 The general rule is that federal law pre-empts state law.307 There 
are several important exceptions to this rule which may be applicable under these circumstances. The 
law has not established whether federal IP law pre-empts Article 9, so it is uncertain which set of law 
governs security interests taken in registered IP rights. This Chapter will show that the question of 
whether IP law pre-empts Article 9 causes the most amount of legal uncertainty when taking a 
security interest in registered IP. It will also be argued in this Chapter that security interests in IP 
should be governed by Article 9 and not IP law.  
2. Article 9, Federal Pre-emption and Stare Decisis 
a. Pre-emption 
The laws of federal pre-emption are at the centre of the conflict between Article 9 and registered IP 
law because Article 9 is a creature of state law and registered IP law is federally regulated. Article 9 is 
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part of the Uniform Commercial Code which governs the creation and perfection of consensual 
security interests.308  Each state has incorporated the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) into 
their own state laws through ratification. The UCC was first published in 1952. Since then the UCC 
has been enacted and ratified in all 50 states as well as in most US territories.  The purpose of the 
UCC was to provide uniformity, efficiency and predictability for commercial laws between the states 
as before its creation, commercial laws widely differed between the states.  
Article 9 specifically governs security interests in “personal property,” which includes the category of 
general intangibles.309 The Official Comments expressly states that general intangible includes “all 
categories of intellectual property.”310 Based on the inclusion of intellectual property within the 
definitions, it can be assumed that Article 9 intends to govern security taken in all types of intellectual 
property. The three IP statutes are not as clear.  None of the Acts definitively govern security interest 
taken in their respective IP right. The question of whether the acts pre-empt Article begin from the 
lack of clarification.  
In the Constitution, individual states have powers to make their own laws. Despite state’s 
constitutional powers, federal law can pre-empt Article 9 in some circumstances. This is true even for 
Article 9 and the rest of the Commercial Code, despite the fact that the states have unanimously 
adoption it.  Because Article 9 is a creature of state law, federal law can pre-empt it. The Supremacy 
Clause of the US Constitution dictates that federal law pre-empt state laws that interfere with or are 
contrary to the federal law.311 The drafters of Article 9 were aware of the possibility that federal law 
could pre-empt it, so they included several provisions to limit the possibility of wide federal pre-
emption. The provisions, called, the “Step-Back Provisions,”312  allow federal law to specifically pre-
empt Article 9 when there is a conflict with the applicable federal law but only in very narrow 
circumstances.313 The Step Back Provisions factor heavily in court decisions in deciding whether the 
Federal IP statutes pre-empt Article 9. The problem with the Step-Back Provisions is that they do not 
solely determine whether federal pre-emption occurs. Federal case law also has its own criteria for 
deciding whether the applicable federal law pre-empts Article 9. Most courts analyse both the federal 
criteria and the Step-Back Provisions to determine whether federal law pre-empts Article 9. 
The first Step-Back Provision is broad in nature.314. The provision states that Article 9 is generally 
inapplicable when “"a statute, regulation or treaty of the United States pre-empts this Article."315 The 
wording of this provision would seem to suggest that Article 9 is easily pre-empted when the security 
interest involves a federally regulated property rights or a matter of federal interest.  However, the 
Official Comments to Article 9 state that pre-emption should only occur in limited circumstances 
where it is clearly mandated.316  The courts have agreed with the limitations stated in the Official 
Comments and have seldom ruled that Article 9 allows for pre-emption due to this Step Back 
Provision. 
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The next Step-Back Provision is much narrower than the first one. It is solely in relation to the filing 
of the financing statement to perfecting the security interest. The provision states that financing 
statements must be filed in accordance with the procedures set out in Article 9 unless the property 
being used as collateral is subject to federal law. In such cases, the requirement can be exempted if the 
property is "subject to a statute, regulation or treaty as described in Section 9-311(a)."317 The next 
section, Section 9-311(b) defines the precise laws as “"a statute, regulation or treaty of the United 
States whose requirements for a security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor 
with respect to the property pre-empt Section 9-310(a)." The interpretation of this Step Back 
provision is one of the factors in determining whether a financing statement should be filed at the 
relevant state office or the relevant IP registry.318 The case law is less settled on whether the second 
Step-Back Provision allows the IP Acts to pre-empt Article 9 in relation to the filing of security 
interests in order to perfect them. 
The Step-Back Provisions are not the only factors in determining whether the registered IP laws pre-
empt Article 9. It has been pointed out that Step-Back Provisions are technical superfluous in that “the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution independently serves to invalidate any state laws that 
interfere with or are contrary to federal law” and that federal law can pre-empt state laws regardless of 
any clauses or comments that Article 9 may contain. The leading Supreme Court case on the 
Supremacy Clause and the pre-emption of state law held that federal law does not broadly pre-empt 
state law just because there is a system of federal regulations on a matter: “No intent to pre-empt may 
be inferred from the comprehensiveness of the federal regulations.”319 Courts have held that implicit 
federal pre-emption occurs only in three circumstances: (1)  field pre-emption, when the scheme of 
federal law and regulation is so pervasive as to make the reasonable inference that Congress left no 
room for the states to supplement it; (2) conflict pre-emption, when there is a conflict between federal 
and state regulations, rendering compliance with both federal and state regulations a physical 
impossibility; and (3) obstacle pre-emption, when ‘state law impedes the achievement of a federal 
objective.”320  
The states adopted a revised version of the UCC in 2001. Changes to the Official Comments raise 
new uncertainty on when federal law can pre-empt Article 9. 321  For example, one Official Comment 
to the first Step Back Provision states that Article 9 only allows federal law to pre-empt it in narrow 
situations when a federal law specifically and explicitly pre-empts Article 9.322  Few federal statutes 
state that they pre-empt Article 9 and no pending or proposed federal legislation is pending or 
contains that provisions. 323 In practice, under this Official Comment, federal law can almost never 
pre-empt Article 9. Other changes to the Official Comments are similar and give less deference to 
federal law than in previous versions.324 Courts have not yet determined whether the changes in the 
Official Comments will result in federal law being less likely to pre-empt Article 9.  
                                                          
317 UCC s 9-310. 
318 The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) or the Copyright Office found at the Library of 
Congress. 
319 Hillsborough County, Fla. V. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985). 
320 RF v Abbott Laboratories, 162 N.J. 596, 745 A.2d 1174 (2000). 
321 Barbieri Montgomery, ‘Security Interests in Intellectual Property’ (2007) SM088 American Law Institute-
American Bar Association 23. 
322 UCC s 9-109, Official Comment 8. 
323 XT Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, (2007) 42(1)  Georgia Law Review 22. 
324 Barbieri Montgomery, ‘Security Interests in Intellectual Property’ (2007) SM088 American Law Institute 
American Bar Association 23, 25. 
73 
 
Despite the fact that there are some cases which have addressed whether federal IP law pre-empts 
Article 9, the matter has not been completely resolved.325 In fact, the interplay between Article 9 and 
the IP Acts is unclear on many points. 326 For example, not all of the cases discuss whether the Step-
Back Provisions allow for the IP Acts to pre-empt Article 9. Instead, some cases only discuss whether 
implicit federal pre-emption law allows for the IP Acts to pre-empt Article. Few cases discuss both. 
Unfortunately, most cases do not explicitly address the issue and instead focus on whether the IP Acts 
contain any provisions for security interests in IP. The problem of inconsistent case law is exacerbated 
by the low precedential value of the few cases. 
 
b. Stare Decsisis 
The principle of stare decisis creates greater uncertainty as to whether the IP Acts pre-empt Article 9. 
Bankruptcy courts or low-level district courts have decided the majority of the case law. Therefore, 
the decisions have little precedential value and do not have to be followed by other courts. Courts in 
other states or districts do not have to follow the ruling and furthermore neither do the courts in the 
same district or state. 
As with other common law countries, the US legal system operates on a system of stare decisis, 327 
which can be horizontal or vertical. Vertical stare decisis is the principle that a lower court must adopt 
the decisions of courts which have supervisory jurisdiction over them. Horizontal stare decisis is the 
principle that the lower courts should adopt the decisions of other courts on the same level (even if not 
obligated to do so) to ensure conformity. The main problem with the cases in this chapter is that 
because of the principles of Horizontal stare decisis other courts are not obligated and do not follow 
them. 
Decisions from the bankruptcy courts have no precedential value because they lack both forms of 
stare decisis. The bankruptcy courts function as units attached to the federal district courts. 
Bankruptcy courts have limited jurisdiction and may only rule in matters of bankruptcy.328  Decisions 
from the bankruptcy courts are appealed to federal district courts which have original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over any cases that arise under the Federal Bankruptcy Code.329 Appeals from the 
bankruptcy courts go to the district court because bankruptcy courts do not have an appellate or 
supervisory function. Because of their position of bankruptcy courts in the federal court structure, 
decisions from bankruptcy courts are not binding on any other court. Under the principles of 
horizontal stare decisis, bankruptcy courts are not even bound by the decisions of other bankruptcy 
courts (even if they are in the same district). Under the principle of vertical stare decisis, district 
courts (whether in the same district or not) do not have to follow the decision of the bankruptcy 
courts.  
The decisions of a district court have low precedential value as well.  District court decisions are 
binding on bankruptcy courts if the initial case was appealed from the attached bankruptcy court and 
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in that appealed case only.330 Under the principles of either horizontal or vertical stare decisis,  
decisions from district courts have low precedential value and only have persuasive value to other 
courts. The courts do not have vertical stare decisis because their position is at the bottom of the 
federal court structure. That position also prevents them from having horizontal stare decisis331 as 
other district courts in the same district are not bound to one another’s decisions. There is no 
horizontal stare decisis between the federal districts either. So the courts in one district are not bound 
to follow the decisions of a court in another district332  
 District courts and bankruptcy in various states and circuits have decided the relevant case law on 
whether federal IP law pre-empts Article 9. Since the decisions have low or no precedential value, 
there is a lack of uniformity and finality on the issue. The decisions show a lack uniformity between 
the types of IP and also between the circuits. The situation causes uncertainty for creditors trying to 
perfect their interest in a registered IP right as they do not know how any individual court will decide 
the matter of what registry they should file in and what information to include in the filing.  
c. The problem 
The pre-emption issue also creates several problems in other procedural matters in perfecting a 
security interest in an IP right. The first problem is in regards to what constitutes an adequate 
description of the asset in order to perfect the interest. In Article 9, the information required in 
financing statements to perfect the interest is minimal: "(1) provide the name of the debtor; (2) 
provide the name of the secured party or representative of the secured party and (3) indicate the 
collateral covered by the financing statement."333 The third requirement causes problems when 
registered IP is the collateral being described.  Under this requirement, the description can be general 
or even vague. The term “general intangibles” is often used to describe IP in a financing statement.  
Under the rules of Article 9, this description would be sufficient to perfect the security interest in all 
of the debtor’s IP rights.  In IP law, this description must be detailed as the laws regarding IP 
ownership and transfers of ownership are asset specific and require the exact right to be identified.334 
In some cases, the argument has been made that if the description of the IP being used as collateral is 
inadequate, then the security interest was not perfected for that IPR. So far most courts have held that 
the description “general intangibles” is an adequate for perfection to occur for IP.335 In the leading 
case336, a debtor had given a security interest to a creditor of all of his business assets which included 
patents, trademarks, and copyright.337 The financing statement used the term “general intangibles” to 
describe all IP rights. The question before the court was whether that term was a sufficient description 
of the IP rights to perfect the security interest in the IP. The court held that the description was, in 
fact, sufficient and Article 9 rules controlled the perfection of the security interest. Subsequent courts 
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have followed this holding but several have not.338 There has yet to be a decision on the adequacy of a 
description of IP under the Revised Article 9, but hopefully, it will follow the majority of decisions 
made in reference to the earlier version.339 The problem though is that all of these decisions are not 
binding precedent, and a court can easily find in the alternative.340 
The last procedural problem is called the after-acquired property problem, and it is related to the 
adequate description discussed above.  After-acquired property is property which was acquired or 
created after the security interest has been perfected. This property is also intended to be captured and 
perfected as part of the collateral even though the debtor does not own the collateral or the collateral 
does not exist at the time perfection occurs. Article 9 allows the possibility of perfecting a security 
interest in after-acquired property: “a security agreement may create or provide for a security interest 
in after-acquired collateral.” 341 The only limitation found in this subsection is that the collateral at 
issue cannot be consumer goods, commercial tort claims and only as provided in the security 
agreement.342  
In this regard, Article 9 allows the creation of a security interest similar to the English floating charge. 
Under this provision a security interest is not considered invalid just because the debtor can use the 
collateral, dispose of the collateral, change the collateral or co-mingle the collateral.343 This flexibility 
is desirable in situations when the debtor has a frequently changing asset pool, for example, a large 
business with inventory with frequent turnover.344  Under these two provisions, a creditor can take 
security in the whole business of the debtor or even just a class of assets while the debtor continues to 
use them as part of his business. The need to make continuous filings is avoided and the creditor only 
needs to file one financial statement with generic descriptions to perfect the security interest. That 
single filing will capture all general assets, including future assets into the security interest. This 
eliminates the need to list assets specifically in the financing statement especially when the debtor 
may not even own them at the time the agreement is made.345  In a related issue, some courts have 
been hostile to the concept of the use of IP as after-acquired property.  IP statutes are generally not 
geared to concepts of after-acquired property.346 The problem depends on the type of IP at issue and 
will is discussed below.  
3. Perfection under Article 9 
Before discussing how Article 9 conflicts with each IP statute, the basic mechanisms of Article 9 must 
be explained. Under Article 9, there are three key areas for taking a security interest are attachment, 
perfection, and priority.347  Although attachment is not the focus of this chapter, an understanding of 
attachment is needed to understand priority. In Article 9, the security interest attaches to the collateral 
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after the written agreement is concluded between two parties. The agreement creates the security 
interest: “a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or 
fixture by contract.” 348 Article 9 does not require title or ownership to be transferred in order for the 
security interest to attach to the collateral. In fact, Article 9 states that “the provisions of this article 
with regards to rights and obligations apply whether title to collateral is in the secured party or the 
debtor.349” This is a specific rejection of security mechanisms found in the early common law which 
requires the debtor to transfer possession, title or ownership of an asset before attachment can occur. 
Article 9 allows transfers of possession, title or ownership but does not require them. In Article 9, 
when the security agreement becomes effective between the parties, attachment of the security interest 
to the asset is deemed to have occurred.350 Article 9 states that a security agreement is valid if: “1. 
value has been given; 2. the Debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in 
collateral to a secured party; or (3.)The debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a 
description of the collateral.” 351  Security agreements are the most common way for an interest to 
attach to an asset. After an interest has attached to the collateral, the security interest is enforceable 
between the two parties. If either party wants to make the interest binding on third parties, it must take 
additional steps to perfect the interest.   
Under Article 9, a security interest is usually perfected by filing a financing statement at the 
applicable state registry: “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Section 9-312(b) a 
financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests and agricultural liens.” 352  The only 
prerequisite to perfection is that the security interest must have already attached to the collateral.353 
The rest of the provisions on perfection describe the practicalities of filing a financing statement in the 
applicable state registry. 
Since Article 9 is state law, it requires the creditor to file a financing statement, called the UCC-1, in 
the correct registry. The creditor must file a financing statement is either the location of the debtor or 
the location of the collateral to perfect the interest.354  The laws of that jurisdiction and its adopted 
form of Article 9 govern whether perfection has been deemed to have occurred.  Despite having 
different adopted forms of Article 9, all states require the filing of the UCC-1 financing statement to 
perfect the interest. The procedure for processing the financing state is the same in each state as well. 
When the creditor files the financing statement, the security interest is recorded in the registry under 
the debtor’s name. When the financing statement has been filed and registered the security interest is 
perfected.355  
The date of perfection determines the priority of the security interest against competing interests in the 
same collateral356. The rules for determining priority are as follows: “(1) Conflicting perfected 
security interests and agricultural liens rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection. 
Priority dates from the earlier of the time a filing covering the collateral is first made or the security 
interest is first perfected, if there is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection. (2) 
A perfected security interest or agricultural lien has priority over a conflicting unperfected security 
interest. (3) The first security interest…to attach or become effective has priority if conflicting 
security interests…are unperfected.” 
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The basic rule is that the security interest with the earliest date of perfection has priority over all 
subsequent interests. This departs from the common law rule, still found in England, where the date of 
attachment determines priority357. Under Article 9, the date of attachment determines priority only in 
cases where two conflicting interests were perfected at the same time. In such cases, the security 
interest with a date of earlier attachment will have priority.  
One of the goals of Article 9 was to provide simple mechanisms for the creation, perfection, and 
prioritisation of security interest358.  When a security interest in IP is taken, much of the simplicity 
found in Article 9 is undermined. The conflict between Article 9 and each IP Act is described and 
analysed below. 
(4) Conflict with Registered IP Law 
As mentioned above registered IP is governed by three separate statutes: the Patent Act, the Lanham 
Act, and the Copyright Act.359 None of the Acts contain adequate provisions on taking a security 
interest in its respective type of IP right.360 Additionally, none of the three Acts addresses its 
relationship to Article 9 or even make a reference to it.361 Because of the lack of statutory guidance, 
the courts have been left to determine whether each particular IP statute has relevant provisions on 
security interests and then whether this allows it to pre-empt Article 9. Overall, this situation creates 
an overall lack of guidance and uncertainty in how to create and perfect a security interest in an IPR. 
As discussed above, creditors are uncertain on where to file a financing statement to perfect their 
security interest. IP law does not give them any rules and it is unclear if Article 9 does.  
When a creditor decides to file at an IP registry to perfect the security interest, they also face another 
problem. The IP registers themselves are inadequate for putting third parties on notice of security 
interests. As Angie Raymond points out “The intellectual property registration schemes which exist 
are mainly concerned with documenting the creation of intellectual property rights and not those 
security interests which arise by way of subsequent dealing with intellectual property as economic 
assets.362” It will be shown below that neither the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the 
“USPTO”) nor the US Copyright Office was designed to be a registry for security interests. Neither 
office has the capability in terms of budget and capacity to handle a large number of financing 
statements. Also, the registers themselves were not designed to give third parties notice of economic 
encumbrances on an IP right. The USPTO and the Copyright Office are each inadequate in their own 
way. Also, each IP statute conflicts with Article 9 in its own particular way which will be discussed in 
turn below. 
a. Patents 
i. The Patent Act 
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Patents are governed by the Patent Act, Title 35 of the United States Code.   Article 9 categorises 
patents as a type of personal property in the category of general intangibles.363  The Patent Act also 
provides that “patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”364  Despite the fact that both 
categorise patents in the same way, the two sets of law have a “superficial conflict” when it comes to 
perfecting a security interest in a patent.365  
According to the Patent Act, certain transactions must be registered at the USPTO. It is unclear 
whether these transactions include security interests. The Patent Act states in Section 261 that:  
“Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in 
writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and 
convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified 
part of the United States… An assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against any 
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded 
in the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) within three months from its date or prior to the date of 
such subsequent purchase or mortgage.”366  
The most common reading of Section 261 is that only transfers of substantial ownership rights need to 
be registered at the USPTO. In this reading, if the security interest does not include an outright, 
immediate assignment of the patent then it does not need to be registered at the USPTO. Subsequent 
procedural law of the PTO supports this interpretation of Section 261 and provides that only 
assignments must be recorded with the PTO and that any other documents which impact ownership 
and title are only recorded at the discretion of the Commissioner of the USPTO.367   
A stricter reading of Section 261 gives a different meaning and would require that transfers of any 
ownership interest, whether in the future or immediate, must be registered. The stricter reading of 
Section 261 would mean that security interests are required to be registered at the USPTO. The 
argument in favour of this reading is that the Congressional intent behind Section 261 was to prevent 
a patent monopoly being made from the rights of a patent being divided among several different 
persons in order to allow “fraudulent impositions upon persons who desired to purchase the use of the 
improvement and would subject a party under mistake as to his rights, use the without the authority to 
be harassed by a multiplicity of suits instead of one.”368 However, the practice of the USPTO conflicts 
with this stricter reading of Section 261. 
Regardless of the true legislative intent, it is unclear whether Section 261 includes security interests as 
one of the types of transaction that must be registered at the USPTO. This point has not been 
satisfactorily answered in the courts and is not currently the subject of any judicial reform. The issue 
is likely to remain open for the foreseeable future. 
In current PTO procedural law, assignments of patents are the only transaction required to be filed. It 
can be assumed from the procedural law, that security interests in patents are not required to be 
recorded at the USPTO to perfect the interest. If this is the case, filing a financing statement at the 
applicable state office, according to Article 9, would perfect the interest in the patent. Strangely 
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enough, the Official Comment to the previous version of Article 9 suggested that filing at the USPTO 
is both necessary and sufficient to achieve perfection, and such filing should be made in place of a 
state filing.369 In the Revised Article 9, its position is not as clear as the previous Comment was 
replaced by the term that federal law can only apply to the extent that it must without any guidance on 
filing at the USPTO to perfect an interest in a patent.370  
The interpretation of Section 261 is decisive in determining whether the Patent Act pre-empts Article 
9 through the laws of implicit federal pre-emption. For this to occur, one of the following 
circumstances must occur.371  The first circumstance in which the Patent Act could pre-empt Article 9 
is if there were a case of field pre-emption where the Patent Act is found to be so pervasive that there 
is no room left for state law to supplement it. If Section 261 was found to include security interests, 
then it could be found that the Patent Act is so pervasive Article 9 cannot be used to supplement it. 
Courts could find this because Section 261 does contain rules that govern priority between competing 
assignments. Also, the fact that the Constitution gives Congress the right to legislate on all matters 
related to patents supports this argument.372 If Section 261 does not include security interests pre-
emption on this ground is unlikely.  In this case, the Patent Act does not contain any rules governing 
security interests and the procedures of Article 9 would be needed to perfect the security interest in a 
patent. 
Implicit federal pre-emption would occur if it were found that the Patent Act and Article 9 conflict to 
the degree that following both would be a physical impossibility. If security interests are deemed to be 
included in Section 261, then there is a conflict between the Patent Act and Article 9. However, even 
if that were the case following both laws would not be a physical impossibility. Registering the 
interest at two registries causes uncertainty and complications, but it is not a physical impossibility. 
Dual registration would lead to questions as to when perfection occurs and in what registry but this 
would not create an impossible situation. Because of these reasons, it is unlikely that the second 
circumstance is applicable for implicit federal pre-emption to occur.  
The third circumstance where implicit federal pre-emption occurs is for obstacle pre-emption or if a 
state law impedes a federal objective.  This would be applicable if it were determined that Article 9 
impedes the objectives of federal IP law. Patent law has been specifically determined to be in the 
domain of federal law. Pre-emption is more likely to occur if a court determined that Section 261 
includes security interests. In that case, it could be strongly argued that Article 9 impinges the 
objectives of federal law which is to govern all transactions involving patents. If the reverse were 
found, that Section 261 does not include security interests, the court could determine that no federal 
objective is impeded. The Patent Act would have included specific rules for security interests if there 
was a specific objective to do so and therefore Article 9 does not impede the objectives of the Patent 
Act. 
It is not clear whether implicit pre-emption allows for the Patent Act to pre-empt Article 9. The 
interpretation of Section 261 is an important facet in determining whether any of the three situations 
are relevant but other questions are also still outstanding. Courts which have addressed the pre-
emption issue have primarily found that none of the three criteria are relevant and do not allow for 
pre-emption. The difficulty is that the analysis of the courts so far has been very subjective and even 
vague.  Because of this decisions are likely to have even lower precedential value than usual. 
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The step back provisions in Article 9 do not provide much clarity on the pre-emption issue either. In 
order for the first Step-Back Provision to be applicable, it would have to be determined that the Patent 
Act expressly states that it pre-empts Article 9.373  The Patent Act does not contain any provisions to 
the effect that it pre-empts Article 9, so the first Step-Back Provision is unlikely to allow for pre-
emption.  
The interpretation of the second step-back provision has been more likely to allow for pre-emption 
even though at face value it seems like its requirements are harder to meet. Courts interpreted it to 
lead to opposite conclusions: that perfection of a security interest in a patent occurs through filing at 
the USPTO or perfection of security interest in a patent occurs through filing at the applicable state 
registry374. The interpretation of Section 261 is also critical in assessing whether pre-emption occurs 
through the second Step Back Provision. If it is determined that Section 261 includes security 
interests, then it can also be determined that Section 261 includes provisions which determine how the 
holder of a security interest gains priority over a lien creditor. This interpretation would mean that the 
second Step-Back Provision is applicable, and the Patent Act pre-empts Article 9. If it is determined 
that Section 261 does not include security interests, then the Patent Act does not contain provisions on 
the priority of security interests over lien creditors and pre-emption does not occur.  
It is also theoretically possible for a third interpretation of the second Step Back Provision 
applicability to Article 9.  A court could find that Section 261 does include security interests but does 
not include provisions on how a security interest holder gains priority over a lien creditor. Since 
Section 261 allows for a three-month grace period for filing an assignment it could be held that the 
provisions on priority are insufficient to determine the priority between conflicting security interests 
perfected during the grace period. Also, it could be held that Patent Act insufficient provisions priority 
because its scheme of prioritisation does not include partial assignments or future assignments. A 
court could hold that the Patent Act had insufficient provisions on priority because of any of the 
reasons listed above, which would mean that the second Step Back Provision would not allow for the 
Patent Act to pre-empt Article 9.  
ii. Case Law 
Largely, the courts have ruled that the Patent Act does not pre-empt Article 9. Some courts have 
reached this decision by applying the laws of implicit federal pre-emption, some by applying the Step 
Back provisions and some have applied both. The main issue in most of the cases is which register a 
security interest should be filed in order to perfect it: at the USPTO or at the applicable state registry. 
Most of the time, registered patents are the collateral in question, but patent applications and related 
documentation are at issue as well. The pre-emption has also been raised in relation to the adequacy 
of the asset description in the filing and also has been raised in relation to after-acquired patents.  
There are several cases on the issue of security interests in patents which arose before the introduction 
of Article 9 but which contribute to the development of the current case law. One of the first is the 
1891 case of Waterman v. Mackenzie, where a mortgage had been taken in a patent regarding 
improvements to fountain pens. 375 As part of the mortgage, the title in a patent was assigned to the 
mortgagors and was recorded in the patent office. Another party argued that the mortgage was not 
valid because the transfer of possession had not occurred. The court discussed the problem of 
transferring possession of intangible assets and contrasted a mortgage in a patent to a mortgage in 
other types of tangible property.376 Before this decision, transfer of possession of the patent to the 
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mortgagor was required to perfect the interest in the patent.  In the past, a mortgagee usually 
transferred possession of a patent by giving the mortgagor the patent registration document. 
Waterman was the first to reject the requirement to transfer possession and instead ruled that the 
registration of the mortgage at the patent office had the same effect as transferring possession to the 
mortgagor.377 Until the codification of Article 9, other courts relied on the Waterman decision to 
provide the standard for taking a mortgage in a patent. Most courts, after this decision but prior to the 
introduction of Article 9, have required that the mortgagor record the mortgage at the USPTO to make 
it effective. 
Holt v US was the first case to address the relationship between the Patent Act and Article 9 and 
moved the case law beyond the Waterman decision.378 In the case, the US government had sold the 
assets of a bankrupt defendant, Copyright Composer Corporation (‘CCC’) to a third party. The sale 
included intangible assets consisting of patent applications and papers relating to engineering and 
programming. Holt was a creditor of CCC’s before their declaration of bankruptcy and claimed to 
hold a perfected security interest in the patent applications and accompanying documentation. Holt 
had filed a financing statement following the rules of Article 9 to perfect his interest long before CCC 
applied for bankruptcy. The US government argued that a security interest in a patent be perfected 
only through a written assignment of the patent transferred to the mortgagor and recorded at the 
Patent Office.379 It argued that since Holt had not recorded an assignment at the USPTO his security 
interest had not been perfected. The district court rejected the government’s argument and ruled that a 
security interest in a patent was not and should not be the equivalent of an assignment. The court ruled 
that Section 261 of the Patent Act is not applicable to security interests because a security interest 
does not pass title to the patent, and therefore Article 9 governs security interest in patents.380 The 
decision did not mention implicit federal pre-emption or the Step Back Provisions. An interesting 
aspect of the decision is that the court did not distinguish between a patent, a patent application or the 
accompanying documentation. The case is particularly important because the court’s decision moved 
away from the rules set out in Waterman and instead began interpreting Article 9 in regards to patents. 
The next important case came in 1985: In re Transportation Design and Technology.381 In the case, 
the Mitsui Bank had loaned money to Transportation Design and Technology (“TDT”) under a 
security agreement where general intangibles, including after-acquired general intangibles, were 
pledged as security. Mitsui perfected the security interest by filing a UCC-1 financing statement with 
the California Secretary of State but not with the USPTO.382 A year later TDT filed for bankruptcy. 
Several months after that, the USPTO granted a patent to two former employees of TDT. That patent 
became the subject of this litigation. Mitsui argued that their earlier filing had perfected their security 
interest in the post-petition patent of the two employees. The trustee of the TDT bankruptcy estate 
refused to recognise Mistuis’s security interest in any of the patents, including the post-petition 
patents, arguing that the interest had not been perfected because the security interest had not been 
registered at the USPTO. They specifically argued that Section 261 of the Patent Act required that 
security interests in patents have to be registered at the USPTO. They also argued that the Patent Act 
pre-empted Article 9.  
The Court rejected Mitsui’s argument and instead held that the Patent Act pre-empts Article 9 only in 
cases of subsequent purchasers and mortgagors. Firstly, they rejected the Waterman case stating that 
“the grant of a security interest is not a conveyance of a present ownership right in the patent, that like 
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the creation of some other lesser rights in a patent (such as licenses) is not required to be recorded in 
the Patent Office. It is no longer necessary to create a security interest by assignment or transfer of 
title as was done in Waterman.” 383 In this respect, their assessment is similar to that of the Holt court. 
Controversially, the court ruled that a creditor must register a security interest in two registers to 
perfect the interest against the two types of subsequent creditors. The court distinguished between 
subsequent lien creditors and subsequent purchasers and mortgagors. They found that the Patent Act 
pre-empts Article 9 in regards to priority over subsequent purchasers and mortgagors so one filing 
must be made at the USPTO.  Then they found that the creditor must also file at the applicable state 
registry in order to be protected against subsequent lien creditors because the USPTO filing only 
protects against subsequent transactions where the title is transferred. So using their reasoning, the 
Patent Act only pre-empts Article 9 for security interests which requires a transfer of title but does not 
pre-empt Article 9 for other types of security interests.  
The Transportation ruling is problematic for many reasons. Firstly, the designation of creditors into 
two different groups is artificial and not entirely accurate as some lien creditors can also be 
mortgagees. The court’s decision is erroneously based on loose theories of debtor/ creditor law which 
had already been supplanted by Article 9. The decision even admitted that “this holding leaves a fairly 
narrow area remaining for state regulation, however state law will still be required to resolve disputes 
and determine the relative rights of secured creditors and judgement liens… In the absence of any 
overriding federal policy against it, the Uniform Commercial Code should continue to apply to the 
resolution of such matters.” 384 
This statement is contradictory. The court had just held that security interests in patents are not 
assignments, but they must be registered at the USPTO nonetheless. Then despite being registered at 
the Patent Office, they must also be registered at the appropriate Article 9 register as well. In this 
regime, Article 9 will govern the resolution of any conflicts between secured creditors and subsequent 
rights holders which were not contemplated by Article 9. The decision gives a messy and confusing 
rule for creditors to follow if they want to perfect their security interest against all subsequent rights 
holders. Instead, the court should have evaluated instead whether the Patent Act pre-empts Article 9 
through implicit federal pre-emption or through the Step Back Provisions. The decision would then at 
least have been based on relevant legal principles rather than older common law rules which had been 
overturned. 
The court ultimately held that Matsui held a valid security interest in the patents which had been 
registered at the time of the filing.385 They ruled that Matsui had a perfected security interest because 
the bankruptcy estate is a lien creditor, so only a state filing is needed.  However, the court ruled that 
security interest in the post-petition patent had not been perfected.  This was not because Matsui had 
only filed at the state registry but rather because they could not produce evidence of a security 
agreement in after-acquired intangibles which would survive the petition for bankruptcy by the 
debtor. The court stated that the general rule upon bankruptcy is that any property acquired by the 
bankruptcy estate or by the debtor is not subject to a lien from a security agreement entered into 
before the declaration of bankruptcy.386 According to the court, the only exception to this rule is when 
the property in the pre- petition security agreement is specifically described as proceeds. Patents were 
included within that definition of the proceeds so were exempt from the rule.  The court was not 
hostile to the notion of a security interest in an after-acquired patent but rather to an after-acquired 
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patent in this case. Interestingly the court viewed the post-petition patent as an asset that only came 
into being after it was registered and not when it was an application.387 In the previous Holt case, the 
court viewed a patent application as an asset in its own right prior to registration.388 The court in 
Transportation did not discuss the possibility that a security interest in the patent application could 
have been perfected and then convert to a security interest in a registered patent. 
In the next case of City Bank and Trust Company v Otto Fabric Inc, the district court (on appeal from 
a bankruptcy court) found that filing at the USPTO is not required to perfect security interests in 
patents.389 City Bank rejected the reasoning of Transportation and instead discussed implicit federal 
pre-emption laws and the Step Back Provisions.390 Also, the district court overturned the decision of 
the bankruptcy court which had held that the perfection of a security interest in a patent occurs 
through filing at the USPTO.   
The first notable part of the decision is its interpretation of implicit federal pre-emption law and the 
Step Back Provisions. The bankruptcy court had ruled that the second Step Back Provision allowed 
the Patent Act to pre-empt Article 9 for pre-emption by the Patent Act.391 The district court disagreed 
with this finding and used this to segue into their discussion on pre-emption: “Firstly the federal 
statute [the Patent Act] does not expressly state that one must file an assignment with the Patent and 
Trademark Office to perfect a security interest. The statute has been amended since the advent of 
modern commercial law. If Congress intended to pre-empt the field of filing, it could have said so. 
Second the federal statute appears to leave open the area of protection against the interests of lien 
creditors… But assuming the federal statute completely pre-empted the field of filing, the failure of 
the statute to mention protection against lien creditors suggests that it is unnecessary to record an 
assignment or other conveyance with the Patent Office to protect the appellant’s security interest 
against the trustee.” 
The court then pointed out: “Finally to require a federal filing and thus a collateral assignment to 
perfect a security interest in patents seems inconsistent with the modern notion that a grant of security 
interest need not include the conveyance of title or ownership right.” 392 They went on further to 
conclude that if a federal filing were required “the single system would in effect, reinstitute a ‘title 
theory’ of security interests and thereby diminish the potential of patents as collateral. This is contrary 
to the functional goals of the U.C.C.” 393 
The City Bank decision is noteworthy for highlighting the inconstancies in the Transportation 
decision and then analysing the intended objectives of Article 9 to make its decision. The decision 
explicitly rejects a title theory of security interests. Subsequent courts have found City Bank’s 
thorough discussion of the step-back provisions of Article 9 and implicit federal pre-emption law to 
be useful and ultimately persuasive.  
The 1999 case of In re Cybernetic Services, Inc. is the leading case in this area. In Cybernetics, the 
court assessed whether the Patent Act or Article 9, as adopted by California, governed the perfection 
of a security interest in a patent394. In the case, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate sought to set aside 
a security interest in a patent concerned with a data recorder for video technology.395 The creditor had 
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perfected the security interest by filing a UCC-1 financing statement with the California Secretary of 
State but did not file at the USPTO. The lower bankruptcy court had found in favour of the creditor 
ruling that their security interest had been perfected by filing according to Article 9. The trustee 
appealed the decision arguing that the security interest in the patent was not perfected because the 
creditor did not file notice of the interest at the USPTO. 
One of the reasons that this case is so widely cited is because the decision gives a comprehensive 
analysis of the step back provisions, implicit federal pre-emption and their applicability to the Patent 
Act and Article 9 which expands on the decision in City Bank. The court first ruled that although the 
Patent Act clearly governs assignments, security interests are not a form of assignment so therefore 
they are not governed by the Patent Act.  As security interests do not require a transfer of title, the 
hallmark of an assignment, they cannot be categorised as an assignment. According to the court, 
previous cases which discussed the creation of security interest in a patent through the transfer of title 
were irrelevant. 
The court rejected that implicit federal pre-emption could occur as the relationship between the Patent 
Act, and Article 9 did not fit any of the three circumstances where it can.396  To come to this 
conclusion the court first examined the administrative rules governing recording procedures at the 
USPTO and found that the definition of ’transfers of title’ did not describe security interests.397  The 
rules define recordable transfers as when a party assigns all or part of its right, title and interest in a 
patent or patent application.398 Furthermore, the rules include security interests among the types of 
documents which may be recorded by the Patent Office on a discretionary basis only. Although the 
rules do not have the same force of law as the Patent Act, they are still evidence that the USPTO does 
not consider security interests to be a type of assignment. Cybernetics relied on the USPTO’s 
categorisation of security interests to rule against federal implicit pre-emption. The court found that 
the Patent Act itself did not have sufficient provisions on security interests to allow pre-emption to 
occur because of implicit federal pre-emption: “given the limited focus and skeletal nature of the 
Patent Act and its lack of reference to the creation and perfection of security interests, we conclude 
that the Patent Act does not pre-empt state regulation of the perfection of security interests in 
patents.”399  
The court also found that neither of the Step Back Provisions allows the Patent Act to pre-empt 
Article 9.400 In particular, the court discussed the second Step Back Provision and whether the Patent 
Act contained an adequate filing system. The decision noted that the second Step-Back Provision had 
allowed Article 9 to be pre-empted in several rare cases which were in relation to copyrights, aircraft, 
and railroads.401  In those rare case, each property type of property was the subject of a comprehensive 
system of filing interests within in an applicable federal statute equivalent to Article 9’s. The court 
concluded that patents should not be included with these other assets as the Patent Act is not 
“sufficiently comprehensive to exclude state methods of perfecting security interests in patents.” 402 
They highlighted that although the Patent Act contains a filing system, it is not sufficient enough to be 
equivalent to that found in Article 9. The court held that sufficiency not existence determines whether 
a federal filing system pre-empts Article 9 This point has often been cited in subsequent case law. 
                                                          
396 See page 10. 
397 Manuel of Patent Examination Procedure published by the USPTO. 
398 In Re Cybernetics 239 B.R. 917 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) 
399 Ibid at 925. 
400 Ibid. 
401 Ibid at 927. 
402 Ibid at 930. 
85 
 
The next case of note, Coldwave Systems, ruled on the opposite set of facts as to those found in 
Cybernetics. 403  The manufacturer of a type of freezing technology was indebted to a business which 
leased insulated shipping containers (“Gateway”). Gateway had installed the manufacturers patented 
technology into their shipping containers. The manufacturer had signed a finance lease with Gateway, 
which provided “a lien and security interest in the collateral (the patent).” Gateway filed a notice of 
the security interest at the USPTO and then almost a year later filed a UCC-1 financing statement with 
the Massachusetts Secretary of State and also with the Washington DC, Recorder of Deeds. Gateway 
had told the debtor that it was in default of its obligations under the finance lease and that they would 
exercise the security interest. They also notified them that they were going to accelerate the amount 
due. Just after they notified the debtor, they filed a transfer statement with the USPTO to have the 
patent transferred to them. The debtor filed for bankruptcy protection four months later.  
Both of the parties agreed that the debtor was insolvent as of the 1st of December 2004.404 This was on 
the same day that Gateway filed the UCC-1 financing statements. From a bankruptcy perspective, the 
court had to assess whether Gateway received more value from the transfer of the Patent then it would 
have received in a distribution from the bankruptcy estate. The more important legal question raised 
in this case was when and if Gateway had perfected the security interest in the patent.  
Gateway argued that filing with the USPTO perfected the security interest in the patent and that they 
properly foreclosed on the patent on the 24th of November, which was prior to the insolvency of the 
debtor.405 The trustee of the bankruptcy estate argued that the security interest in the patent was not 
perfected from the filing at the USPTO and that the UCC-1 filings would not have been perfected 
until the 2nd of December which was after the date of bankruptcy.  
 The court discussed the relationship between Article 9 and the Patent Act to assess whether the 
security interest had been perfected.406 The court noted that the facts in the case were opposite to the 
ones in Cybernetics as the issue was not what rights the trustee had against a secured party who did 
not file with the USPTO but rather what rights a secured party had against a bankruptcy trustee when 
they filed at the USPTO.407 The court followed the ruling in the case of In re Pasteurized Egg, a case 
also from the same district. 408 In the earlier case, the court had ruled that security interests were not a 
type of assignment under the Patent Act. Following from this reasoning the Cybernetics court held 
that as the Patent Act only has provisions on assignments and not security interests. Therefore, the 
court held that Article 9 governs security interests in patents and the Patent Act does not. 
The UCC-1 filings did not entitle Gateway to the patent either. Both UCC-1 financing statements 
were filed 89 and 90 days before the date of bankruptcy, so neither were enforceable against the 
bankruptcy estate. Under the Bankruptcy Code, these transactions fall into a preference period which 
begins 90 days before the debtor enters bankruptcy. The preference period allows the trustee to avoid 
a transaction made before bankruptcy that benefits a single creditor by allowing that creditor to 
recover more than it would have through a distribution by the bankruptcy estate. The Court ruled that 
the UCC-1 filings were preferential transaction and therefore voidable. 
Gateway also argued that they had rights to the patent as they had perfected their security interest 
through possession of the patent. This was the first time that the possession argument had been made 
in regards to patents since the adoption of Article 9. The court pointed out that even before the 
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introduction of Article 9 in the early case of Waterman it was held that “a patent right is incorporeal 
property not susceptible of actual delivery or possession.”409 The Court also pointed out that nothing 
in Article 9 exempts general intangibles from the requirement of filing a financing statement in order 
to perfect an interest.410 They also stressed that one of the purposes of Article 9 was to remove 
formalistic procedures such as transfers of title and possession.  
The Coldwave decision is important because it establishes that filing notice of a security interest at the 
USPTO does not perfect it and does not give the creditor priority against a bankruptcy trustee. When 
read together with Cybernetics, it can be concluded that a creditor can only perfect a security interest 
by following the filing procedures of Article 9. It should be noted that no cases have addressed 
whether a security interest perfected under Article 9 will have priority against competing interest 
holders or against subsequent purchasers for value so the conclusion as a whole may be subject to 
exclusions. 
The last case is relevant because it addressed the issue of adequate collateral descriptions of patents in 
financing statements. In 2007, the court in Phoenix Systems v. First State Bank,411 ruled on whether 
the term “general intangibles” was sufficient to grant and perfect a security interest in a patent. In the 
case, the defendant had a security agreement from 2003 which included the following collateral: “All 
Inventory, Chattel Paper, Accounts, Equipment and General Intangibles.”412  In 2004 and 2006 
additional security agreements were agreed using the same descriptions for the collateral. In the 2006 
agreement additional wording was added to the description: “a patent on a concrete forming system 
with brace ties, U.S. Letters Patent NO. 6,378,260 issued April 30, 2002, Docket 2751.” 
The Defendant filed UCC-1 financing statements for both security interests with the Nebraska 
Secretary of State and also filed notice of the 2006 interest at the USPTO. The Plaintiff filed for 
bankruptcy protection five months later in 2006 still owing the defendant substantial amounts of 
money. The Plaintiff wanted to set aside the security interests arguing that the 2006 agreement had 
only perfected the security interest in one specific patent but not in any other patents or intellectual 
property rights as the other security interests had an insufficient description of the patent. The 
Defendant argued that they had a perfected security interest in all intellectual property since the 2004 
agreement. The case turned on whether the term “General Intangibles” was sufficient to capture all 
patents especially in light of the fact that the later agreement included references to a specific patent in 
addition to general intangibles. 
The court held that the term “general intangibles” was sufficient to create and perfect an interest in the 
patents and in the other intellectual property as well. The added reference to the single patent in the 
security agreement did not affect whether the security interest had been perfected in the other patents 
or IP rights. The court first examined the wording of Article 9 (as adopted by Nebraska) and found 
that the definition of “general intangibles” included patents and other forms of intellectual property. 
The court cited the case of in re Topsy’s Shopps, which had held that the term “general intangibles” 
includes trademarks, trade names as well as other forms of intellectual property.413 The court also 
cited Cybernetics to support their ruling that the description “general intangibles” is sufficient to 
allow a security interest in a patent to perfect.  
iii. Conclusions on Patent Law 
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The majority of courts have ruled that the Patent Act does not pre-empt Article 9. Most decisions have 
ruled that security interests in patents are perfected by filing according to the rules of Article 9. Courts 
have also ruled that Article 9 governs issues of the sufficiency of the asset description in filing 
statements. Some courts have suggested that security interests can be perfected in after-acquired 
patents by filing according to the rules of Article 9, but there has never been a ruling on that point. 
Overall, the case law indicates that the Patent Act does not pre-empt Article 9, but it is a mistake to 
think future courts will follow suit.  The court decisions, though often cited, actually have low 
precedential value as discussed above414.The decisions are from bankruptcy courts or appeals from a 
bankruptcy court to a district court and therefore do not have to be followed even by courts within the 
same state415. Because of the rules of judicial precedence, there is no finality on the matter of whether 
the Patent Act pre-empts Article 9. Case law cannot grant any certainty to creditors in this regard, and 
so a higher level of risk will have to be assumed for security interests in patents. 
Contributing to uncertainty is the fact that there are a number of pre-emption issues which the courts 
have not addressed. The most difficult one is in regards to subsequent purchasers of an encumbered 
patent. The Patent Act contains a limited priority rule for subsequent purchasers or mortgagees who 
have given valuable consideration.416 This leads to a question of whether subsequent purchasers of the 
patent would be bound by a security interest perfected according to Article 9. It is uncertain whether 
filing the financing statement in a state registry would constitute giving adequate notice to a 
subsequent buyer. No courts have addressed this scenario yet, so the question remains unsettled. As 
mentioned above, most practitioners will file their interest at the relevant state registry to meet the 
requirements of Article 9 as well and also file at the USPTO to avoid the possibility that case law will 
change to try to decrease uncertainty. 
The practice of dual filing, or any USPTO filing, does not decrease any uncertainty and actually 
causes greater uncertainty for several reasons. First, there is still uncertainty in cases of multiple 
patents whether a separate filing must be made for each. It is also unclear what information should be 
included in a filing statement if a single filing can be made to perfect an interest in multiple patents. 
As mentioned previously, the USPTO only takes documents unrelated to assignment at their 
discretion.417  Because a notice of a security interest would be a discretionary document at the 
USPTO, there is little to no guidance as to what form the document should take or what information 
must be included in it.418  
The current practice with dual filing is to file first at the relevant Article 9 register. Then the creditor 
will file at the USPTO with a confirmation of the security interest, coupled with a copy of proof of 
registration at the proper state registry. It is not clear what the benefit is of including proof of a state 
registration since the two registries exist independently of each other.  It is unclear whether it is 
beneficial to file first at a state register in order to include proof of the filing at the USPTO. If it is 
beneficial, then it is also unclear how or why it is. The point is not addressed in the law or the 
procedural rules of the USPTO, so any perceived benefits are only speculative.  
Dual filing also brings up the question of how the two filings will affect priority. If both filings perfect 
the security interest, then how would their priority date be determined against conflicting interests. 
The outcome is still uncertain.419 Under Article 9, the time of perfection is calculated differently than 
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how the Patent Act calculates the time when an assignment is effective. In Section 261 of the Patent 
Act, there is a three-month grace period between the submission of a document, whether discretionary 
or compulsory and when it is recorded in the registry. It is uncertain when the security interest would 
be perfected in light of that grace period. The question remains whether a security interest is perfected 
when the notice is filed or when the notice is entered into the register. If the grace period is taken into 
consideration, this would mean that the security interest is not perfected at the time of the filing but 
only when the security interest appears on the registry which can be months later. During the grace 
period, other creditors will have no visibility of the interest so it is possible that additional creditors 
could also take an interest in the patent during that time. Subsequent creditors would not have 
adequate notice so the determination of priority amongst them would be difficult. The situation is 
even more complicated when considering the additional state filing. With dual filing, it is unclear 
whether perfection occurred when the state filing was made, when the USPTO filing was made or 
only when both have been made visible to the public.420 Although the courts have determined that 
filing at a state office can perfect a security interest, they have not determined whether a security 
interest perfected through filing at a state register will have priority over a security interest perfected 
by filing at the USPTO. The courts have also not determined which creditor has priority when there is 
a conflict between a filing at the USPTO and one at a state registry. These reasons are why dual filing 
not help a creditor gain more certainty on what priority they will have against competing creditors. 
Aside from the problem of competing registries, the problem of taking a security interest in the patent 
as an after-acquired asset remains. Before a patent has been granted, the invention in the application 
would be protected by trade secret law and it is possible to take security over a trade secret. When the 
trade secret is converted into a patent application, a complication arises. It is unclear if the eventual 
patent would be captured by the security interest as an after-acquired asset if the trade secret had been 
captured at the time of perfection. If a security interest cannot be perfected in the patent prior to its 
registration, then the creditor will have to make an additional filing.  In this case, it would be 
impossible to perfect the interest in the patent at the same time as the rest of the assets because the 
patent does not exist yet. Even if the patent has been applied for but not yet granted it is not clear if 
the security interest over the patent application could be registered at the USPTO. The Patent Act does 
not have any contingencies for that possibility. Although Article 9 contains mechanisms for after-
acquired property it is unlikely that this mechanism could attach to patents that were applied for after 
the filing of the security interest if registration is governed by patent law.421 This is because patent law 
considers each patent as its own separate right. In patent law, it would be impossible to take a security 
interest in something that does exist yet.  The concept of a “floating lien”  does not exist in patent 
law.422 However, if the Patent Act does not pre-empt Article 9 then it would be possible to take a 
security interest over a trade secret which in the future converts into a security interest in a registered 
patent.  The concept of a floating lien would be useful in this regard. The question of whether the 
Patent Act pre-empts Article 9 will be fundamental in determining whether a security interest can be 
perfected in an after-acquired patent.  
Others have recommended far for more detailed solutions which would alleviate any doubt as to the 
perfection of the security interest:  
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“To address this problem, an instrument may be prepared by which the debtor in fact 
assigns its patents to the secured party (explicitly for purposes of collateral security) and 
receives back an exclusive licence to make, use, sell, offer to sell and import into the 
U.S. the inventions disclosed and claimed in the patents; the licence remains in effect as 
long as the debtor does not default, and the secured party is bound to re- assign the 
patents to the debtor upon satisfaction of the debtor's obligations. This assignment-and-
licence-back is then filed with the PTO. This type of recordation, while not as 
problematic for patents as it is for trademarks, reduces the flexibility of patents and 
patent applications. A borrower might be unwilling to transfer title to its patents since, 
among other things; it could be left with nothing to license and would be unable to show 
the prerequisite ownership for bringing an infringement action. Waterman v. 
MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891). This type of filing thus requires a licence back from 
the secured party to the borrower plus a cooperation agreement between the secured 
party and the borrower regarding patent maintenance, prosecution, and exploitation 
during the borrowing. However, few secured parties are willing and able to carry out 
effectively these responsibilities. Alternatively, a conditional assignment may be 
prepared and filed with the PTO, whereby the secured party takes an assignment of the 
debtor's patents subject to the condition subsequent, of an event of default. On the one 
hand, such a conditional assignment, in as much as it is not a present transfer of title, is 
arguably not an "assignment, grant or conveyance" for purposes of Section 261. On the 
other hand, the PTO has taken the position that "assignments made conditional on the 
performance of certain acts or events . . if recorded in the [PTO] are regarded as 
absolute assignments for PTO purposes until cancelled with the written consent of both 
parties or by the decree of a competent court." 37 C.F.R. s3.56. This places the assignee 
in position of responsibility for renewals and other PTO correspondence related to the 
patent.”423 
Whether a mechanism as complex as this is needed is still uncertain though and for the most part, 
practitioners are satisfied filing the discretionary document with limited information if they bother 
filing at all.424Regardless, the intent of any filing at the PTO should be to give any subsequent 
purchasers or creditors notice. The scheme mentioned above will give more chances of creditors 
having notice of the security interest as the PTO is required to file any records of assignments. The 
problem with this scheme is that it requires creditors to take extra precautions, and this imposes extra 
burdens and costs.  
The real issue should be a change in the law and not increasingly convoluted procedures in order to 
ensure that a security interest is perfected and valid. The purpose of Article 9 was to simplify the law 
of security interests by abolishing any provisions that require the transfer of ownership, title or 
possession. Unless legislative changes are made which clarify whether the Patent Act pre-empts 
Article 9, the stated goals of Article 9 cannot be met. 
b. Copyright 
i. The Copyright Act 
The conflict between the Copyright Act and Article 9 is similar to the conflict between Article 9 and 
the Patent Act. The biggest area of uncertainty in the conflict is around perfecting a security interest in 
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copyright. As with patents, the issue of whether the Copyright Act pre-empts Article 9 has not been 
clearly settled.  Copyright law is federally regulated by a statutory act. 425  The Copyright Act contains 
a registration scheme and a register which makes it unusual. The owner of a copyright must register 
the work at the Copyright Office within the Library of Congress before enforcing it against third 
parties.426  US copyright law also differs from many other jurisdictions in this regard, where 
registration is not required to obtain copyright protection. The Berne Convention harmonised the law 
in this area, and after many jurisdictions had implemented the convention, they abolished their 
respective copyright registries. Although the US is a signatory to the Berne Convention, the US 
copyright registry remains and copyright is considered a form of registered IP in US law.427  
The copyright registration system is important in the question of whether the Copyright Act pre-empts 
Article 9. The Copyright Office manages all registration formalities and copyright is the only form of 
registered IP, which is not managed by the USPTO.428 There are two steps to register a work for 
copyright protection. Firstly a description of the work and its legal owner must be submitted to the 
Copyright Office along with a fee.429 Then a copy of the work must be deposited in the Library of 
Congress430 The Copyright Office will review the application and then issue a certificate of 
registration if the work meets the perquisites such as the work being capable of registration. The issue 
of whether a copyright has been registered can be critical in assessing whether the Copyright Act pre-
empts Article 9. 
Under the Copyright Act, the owner must register the work in order to enforce it.431 There are no 
penalties from the Copyright Office for the failure to register by the end of the three months after 
creation, but the Library of Congress can demand a copy of the work.432 This provision is seldom 
enforced though so there is no real penalisation for not filling and the owner can still register the work 
throughout the life of the copyright. In many instances, filing for registration is delayed until the 
owner wants to actually enforce the copyright against a third party. 
The Copyright Act contains a comprehensive system for recording and prioritising transfers of 
copyright.  The provisions of the Copyright Act are considered to be the most detailed recording 
system of any of the federal IP laws. There are several reasons why it is unclear whether the 
Copyright Act applies to security interests. The first problem is from the wording of Section 205(a), 
which states that “any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining to a copyright 
may be recorded in the Copyright Office.”  A transfer is defined in the Act as “an assignment, 
mortgage, exclusive licence or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of 
any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, where it is limited in time or place of effect, but 
not including a nonexclusive licence.” The Copyright Act pre-dates Article 9 and uses terms 
associated with earlier laws of security interests. In particular, the terms “mortgage” and 
“hypothecation” are seldom used in relation to security in personal property. This makes it unclear 
whether other types of security interests are considered a type of transfer under the Act. 
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The other problem is that Section 205(a) states that a transaction “may” be recorded. This suggests 
that registering the transaction is not compulsory.  The rest of Section 205 further complicates the 
matter. 205(b) states that “recordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons 
constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document.” This would suggest that a security 
interest in a copyright could be perfected by recordation of a document in the Copyright Office, but 
that is not the sole way to perfect the interest. 
The system for prioritising competing transfers in Section 205(d) is problematic in regards to security 
interests. 205(d) states that “As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it 
is recorded, in the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c), within one month 
after its execution in the United States or within two months after its execution outside the United 
States, or at any time before recordation in such manner of the later transfer. Otherwise, the later 
transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if taken in good faith, for valuable consideration 
or on the basis of a binding promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer.” It is 
particularly surprising that the date of creation controls the prioritisation between conflicting transfers 
of registered copyright. This is very different from Article 9 where the priority is determined from the 
date of perfection. Instead, the priority scheme in the Copyright Act is similar to the common law 
where the date of creation also determines priority.433 Also, the scheme in the Copyright Act and the 
common law, both have exceptions when a subsequent rights holder has knowledge of the prior 
unregistered right. Article 9 does not have a knowledge exception for perfected security interests. 
Another problem with the priority scheme in the Copyright Act is that there is either a one or two-
month grace period to file notice of the transfer.434 During the grace period, creditors will not have 
visibility of security interests filed during it. Even if they take the interest without knowledge, they 
will still have lower priority through no fault of their own. The grace period increases the amount of 
risk for the creditor which will result in the debtor will face increased costs when using a copyright as 
security. Additionally, it is unclear how competing security interests would be prioritised if they are 
not a considered to be a type of transfer under the Copyright Act. If the Copyright Act pre-empts 
Article 9 despite the fact that security interests are not considered as a type of transfer, then there is no 
scheme for prioritisation.  
All of the above issues are particularly problematic because it is unclear whether the Copyright Act 
pre-empts Article 9. It is also unclear through which legal means pre-emption would occur: implicit 
federal pre-emption law or through the Step Back Provisions. As discussed above435, federal law can 
pre-empt state law in one of three circumstances. The Copyright Act is most likely pre-empt Article 9 
because of field pre-emption. The Copyright Act abolished all common law copyright and all possible 
mechanisms of copyright protection available at state law.436 This fact is a strong argument that 
Congress intended that any law related to copyright should be in the domain of the federal 
government and not the state. The question of whether a security interest is considered a transfer of 
copyright is an important factor in determining whether field pre-emption is applicable. If a security 
interest is a type of transfer of copyright, then pre-emption is more likely to occur. In particular, if 
security interests are governed by Section 205, the recordation system in this section could be 
considered so pervasive that it could be interpreted that the Congress did not intend for any state law 
to supplement it. Some courts have agreed with this interpretation and found that the Copyright Act 
does pre-empt Article 9 for this reason.437 However, the absence of a priority system for documents 
other than transfers could also show that the Copyright Act is not so pervasive to create a field pre-
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emption for state law. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that the recordation system is 
not compulsory. The courts will have to ultimately decide this matter as the issue is not clear cut.  
It is unlikely that the Copyright Act could pre-empt Article 9 due to an actual conflict. To be 
considered an actual conflict it would have to be a physical impossibility to comply with both the 
Copyright Act and Article 9. Even if it were determined that security interests in copyrights are 
perfected by filing at the Copyright Office, the rest of Article 9 could still be followed. In that case 
following both sets of laws is not a physical impossibility, so there is not an actual conflict. Even in 
the worst case scenario where a creditor has to make dual filings, following the rules of both laws is 
not a physical impossibility.  Also, there is additional evidence that there is not an actual conflict. The 
wording in Section 205 which states that transfers and documents may be recorded with the Copyright 
Office and that their submission is not compulsory. Filing at the applicable state register is 
compulsory, so there is only an artificial conflict which does not amount to physical impossibility. 
This is true regardless whether filing at the Copyright Office is required to perfect a security interest. 
Following both laws would create uncertainty in many areas but it would not be physically 
impossible, and therefore, the Copyright Act and Article 9 do not create an actual conflict. So far the 
case law has not allowed for pre-emption due to an actual conflict between the two sets of laws. 
The third circumstance which would allow for implicit pre-emption would be if Article 9 was found 
to impedes a federal objective (the conflict creates an obstacle to the federal objective). It can be 
argued that Article 9 is an obstacle to Congress’s intent for documents related to copyright to be filed 
in the copyright office. The fact that the Copyright Act abolished all state copyright law could be 
evidence of this intent. In this respect, it could be found that the recordation of any document related 
to a copyright outside of the Copyright Office could be an impediment to the objectives of the 
Copyright Act and its recordation system. However, it is difficult to determine whether registering a 
security interest by following Article 9 is truly an obstacle to congressional intent. There are many 
arguments against this. One persuasive one is that if Congress wanted security interests in copyright 
to be governed by the Copyright Act, then surely it would have included explicit provisions on 
security interests within the Act.   Court decisions have not been overly detailed on implicit pre-
emption so it is difficult to predict what any one court will decide on the matter.  
The Courts have not widely discussed the Step Back Provisions in regards to the Copyright Act and 
Article 9. The first Step-Back Provision will not allow for pre-emption because the Copyright Act 
does not clearly state that it does. It is more difficult to determine whether the second Step-Back 
Provision is applicable.  As with implicit pre-emption, additionally, it is difficult to determine whether 
the second Step-Back Provision applies without having certainty on whether a security interest is 
considered a transfer under the Copyright Act. However, the second Step-Back Provision is unlikely 
to allow for pre-emption regardless of whether a security interest is a transfer under the Copyright Act 
or not. The Step-Back Provision does not allow for pre-emption because there is no scheme for 
recording and prioritising partial and possible transfers of ownership in the Copyright Act. In the 
alternative, even if a security interest is a type of transfer, the recordation, and prioritisation scheme in 
the Copyright Act is not equivalent to Article 9. The scheme in the Copyright Act does not contain a 
scheme to prioritise partial or possible transfers against a complete transfer of ownership. For this 
reason, the second Step-Back Provision would not allow for the Copyright Act to pre-empt Article 9 
for issues of perfection and prioritisation. 
The best argument for pre-emption due to the second Step Back Provision is that the Copyright Act 
has comprehensive provisions on creating, recording and prioritising transfers. If security interests are 
a type of transfer, then the scheme in the Copyright Act is equal to that found in Article 9. In that 
case, the second Step-Back Provision allows the Copyright Act to pre-empt Article 9 on issues of 
registration and priority. Several courts have accepted this argument but none have addressed the fact 
that a security interest is not a complete and absolute transfer of copyright. 
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ii. Case Law 
Several courts have addressed the issue of pre-emption of Article 9 by the Copyright Act. These 
decisions are complex and do not always fully explain the reasons why pre-emption does or does not 
occur.438 They also do not always discuss their application of implicit pre-emption law or the Step-
Back Provisions in their decision. The key issue in all of the cases has been whether a “transfer” in 
Section 205 includes security interests as an “assignment, mortgage, alienation or hypothecation.” The 
key cases are as follows: 
The earliest case on the issue is439, In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., where the Court reviewed a 
debtor’s attempt to avoid a security interest in a library of film copyrights.440  The question before the 
district court was whether a security interest in a copyright is perfected by filing at the Copyright 
Office or by filing UCC-1 financing statement at the relevant state registry. The debtor was an 
entertainment company (“NPI”) whose principal assets were a library of copyrights, film distribution 
rights, and licenses. A bank had extended secured financing to the debtor’s predecessor before a 
merger which gave them a security interest in the debtor’s film library. The bank perfected the 
security interest by filing of UCC-1 financing statements in California, Colorado, and Utah but not at 
the Copyright Office.  Several years later, NPI filed for bankruptcy. As part of their bankruptcy 
petition, they filed a complaint against the lender asserting that the copyrights to the film library and 
the royalties which generated from the film library were unperfected and that the security interest 
should be avoided. NPI claimed that as debtor in possession it had a judicial lien on all assets in the 
bankruptcy estate. NPI also claimed that it owned all of the copyrights as part of the estate because the 
security interest had not been properly perfected at the Copyright Office. In order to assess the claim, 
the court analysed both the Copyright Act and Article 9.  
The court found that security interests are included in the recordation scheme in Section 205 and 
argued that security interests should be recorded at the Copyright Office because: “A recordation 
scheme best serves its purpose where interested parties can obtain notice of all encumbrances by 
referring to a single, precisely defined recordation system. The availability of parallel state 
recordation systems that could put parties on constructive notice as to encumbrances on copyrights 
would surely conflict with the effectiveness of the federal recordation system. Given the virtual 
absence of dual recordation schemes in our legal system, Congress cannot be presumed to have 
contemplated such a result.”441 Based on this reasoning, they held that security interests in copyright 
are perfected by filing at the Copyright Office only and that the Copyright Act does pre-empt Article 
9. They did not specifically mention the laws of federal pre-emption, but they did hold that Congress 
intended for security interests in copyright to be perfected by filing at the Copyright Office. 
The biggest problem in the Peregrine is that the court’s decision does not take account that security 
interests are often in multiple assets. A security interest is seldom only in one copyright. In this case, 
for example, the security interest was in a library of films and each film had a separate copyright. The 
Copyright Act does not clearly state whether notice must be filed in relation to each separate 
copyright protected work or if one filing can cover multiple copyrights. If the former is the case, then 
the creditor will have to make multiple filings at the Copyright Office in order to perfect the security 
interest in each copyright. Additionally, security is often taken in multiple types of assets. If a 
copyright is only one asset among others being taken as collateral, then the creditor would have to file 
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in at least two registries to perfect the same interest.  Under Peregrine, the creditor would have to 
make a separate filing at the Copyright Office and then also file at the state register to perfect the 
interest in the other assets. The court in Peregrine did not take these possibilities into account in their 
decision. In this regard, the decision does not achieve the goal of creating a single, non-conflicting 
registration scheme. 
An interesting part of the Peregrine decision is its ruling on the applicable Article 9 step back 
provisions. The court found that the second Step-Back Provisions allowed for pre-emption because 
the registration and priority scheme in the Copyright was equal to the scheme in Article 9. 442 The 
decision argued that the scheme in the Copyright Act was sufficient to provide constructive notice to 
third parties of the security interest. The court compared the mechanisms for registration in the 
Copyright Act with those in Article 9 and decided the two had identical mechanisms. They did note, 
however, that the organisation of the two registers differed greatly as the Copyright register is 
organised by the title of the work as opposed to Article registries which are organised by the identity 
of the debtor. This fact did not change their decision, and they held that the second Step- Back 
provision allowed for pre-emption of Article 9 in this case. 
In support of their ruling, the court drew parallels with the Federal Aviation Act, which has also been 
held to pre-empt Article 9 through the second step back provision. The Federal Aviation Act was held 
to be closer to the Copyright Act than the Patent Act. The court rejected any case law where the 
Patent Act was found not to pre-empt Article 9 because of the incongruity between the Patent Act and 
the Copyright Act.443The court was even hostile to the decision in Transportation Design and 
Technology stating “These cases misconstrue the plain language of UCC Section 9-104, which 
provides for the voluntary step back of Article 9’s provision ‘to the extent federal law governs the 
rights of the parties.”444 The court also rejected two decisions where the Lanham Act was found not to 
pre-empt Article 9445. They distinguished security interests in trademarks from security interests in 
copyrights, arguing that the Lanham Act has only a limited recordation scheme only for assignments 
whereas the Copyright Act has an expanded recordation scheme for all transfers including mortgages.   
The court then applied their legal holding to the facts of the case. Since the bank had not filed its 
security interest at the Copyright Office, they had an unperfected security interest. NPI was a lien 
creditor but had filed notice of the lien at the Copyright Office. The court concluded that NPI’s lien 
was considered a transfer under Section 205 of the Copyright Act and had been perfected by their 
filing at the Copyright Office. Using the priority rules in Section 205, the court determined that NPI’s 
lien prevailed because it had been recorded first. Thus the bank’s unperfected interest in the 
copyrights and receivables446 from those copyrights had lower priority than NPI’s judicial lien. NPI 
was, therefore, able to avoid the security interest and preserve the copyright and receivables for the 
bankruptcy estate.  
Later courts have often cited Peregrine. Some have agreed with the decision’s reasoning on the 
determination that the Copyright Act pre-empts Article 9. Others have been critical of how the court 
distinguished copyright right from the other forms of registered IP.  The Peregrine case changed the 
presumption that security interests in IP could be perfected through filing at the relevant state registry. 
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It was after this case that dual filings became more common and led other courts to question 
practitioners who would file in only one registry. 
Six years after the decision in Peregrine, a film company sued a law firm for malpractice case 
accusing them of failing to properly perfect a security interest taken over the copyright on three films 
in the case of MCEG Sterling, Inc. v. Phillips et al.447 The facts in the case are complicated, and this 
was a malpractice case and not a direct case on security interests. A film production company had 
taken a secured loan from a bank in 1989 and then repaid the loan in 1990. In 1989, the film company 
executed a security agreement with the bank which included a Copyright Mortgage and Assignment 
document. Later that year, the film company assigned the copyright to the three films to Viacom as 
part of a distribution agreement. The bank filed a financing statement in California according to 
Article 9. In 1992, the film company’s successor in interest sued the bank for the money they had 
repaid on the loan. The grounds for the action were that the bank had not properly perfected the 
security interest. A court did not decide on this case but instead the bank settled the claim and 
assigned any claims against the film company to another party. The plaintiff in the malpractice case 
asserted that the law firm representing the bank should have perfected the security interest by 
recording it at the Copyright Office as had been held in the Peregrine case. The court found for the 
law firm. It questioned the decision in the Peregrine case calling the holding “questionable with 
regard to intangibles relating to copyrights but in addition, it did not exist at the time of the loan in 
question.”448 Additionally, the court said that filing for perfection at the New York Secretary of State 
rather than at the Copyright Office was not negligent. Although this decision has little precedential 
value because of it was a malpractice case, it shows how the Peregrine decision introduced a great 
deal of legal uncertainty into perfecting security interests in copyright.  
The next case of note came in 1997, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hirsch where the court assessed 
whether a federal tax lien takes priority over unrecorded assignments of royalty payments from 
copyrighted work449. Although this case is about copyright royalties, it is still relevant because it 
discusses what constitutes a transfer under section 205 of the Copyright Act. The case concerned a 
songwriter who assigned royalty payments from BMI to his creditors. Before the royalties satisfied his 
debt, the IRS took a tax lien against his royalty income. The issue was which transfer had priority. 
The IRS tax lien was perfected upon assessment and did not have to be recorded to be valid.450 The 
case had been appealed from a district court which ruled that (1) a tax lien is a transfer under Section 
205 of the Copyright Act; (2) assignments to the defendants were subject to the Section 205 
recordation rules; and (3) the defendants failed to perfect their interests because they did not file at the 
Copyright Office.  The court ruled that the IRS had priority because of these reasons.    
The first question addressed by the court was whether the assignments to the defendants were 
considered transfers under section 205 and if so whether they were subject to the recordation rules of 
the Copyright Act. Interestingly, the government had argued that the assignments were a security 
interest in the copyright which required recordal at the Copyright Office. This is interesting because 
the assignment was not of the actual copyright but rather only of the exclusive right to all future 
royalties. The court in Broadcast Music overruled the decision of the lower court and held that 
transfers of royalties were not the same as the transfer or assignment of the actual copyright. The 
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ruling contrasts with the Peregrine court which did not distinguish between the copyright itself and 
the royalty streams generated from it.451 
The court then assessed whether the royalty assignment should be classified as “other documents 
pertaining to a copyright” under Section 205 which can be recorded at the Copyright Office.  The 
regulations of the Copyright Office define such as document as one that “has a direct or indirect 
relationship to the existence, scope, duration or identification of a copyright or to the ownership, 
division, allocation, licensing, transfer or exercise of rights under a copyright.” The court held that the 
right to receive royalties has no relation to a “related document” under the Copyright Act. Since the 
royalty assignment is not a transfer or a related document, then it did not require recordation under 
section 205. The court also held that the royalty assignment was not a security interest and therefore 
was not required to be recorded under Section 205. It refused to discuss the issue of pre-emption 
between the Copyright Act and Article 9 and whether security interests must be recorded at the 
Copyright Office because it did not believe that the issue was relevant to royalty assignments. 
In another case that same year,  In re. Avalon, a bankrupt software company, tried to set aside a 
security interest in their subscription accounts.452 The debtor had taken a loan secured by personal 
property, accounts, general intangibles, equipment, inventory, and proceeds. In order to perfect the 
security interest, the bank filed a UCC-1 financing statement with the Arizona secretary of state. 
However, they did not file with the Copyright Office. The software company had not registered all of 
the copyrights in the software created before 1991, and also did not register the copyrights for any that 
had been created afterwards.453 The court divided the case into six main issues: “(1) Is the bank’s 
security interest perfected in the copyrighted software454 and its proceeds; (2) Is the bank’s security 
interest perfected in updates, modification, amendments, or enhancements to the copyrighted 
software; (3) Is the bank’s security interest perfected in the non-copyrighted software and its 
proceeds; (4) Is the bank’s security interest perfected in updates, modifications, amendments, or 
enhancements to the non-copyrighted software and its proceeds; (5) Is the bank’s security interest 
perfected in the accounts receivables from service and maintenance agreements; and (6) Is the bank’s 
security interest perfected in the equipment and inventory?”455 
The court automatically assumed that security interests fall within transfers in Section 205 of the 
Copyright Act and that the security interest in the registered copyright was not properly perfected 
because it was not filed at the Copyright Office. This issue was not assessed any further. The court 
briefly mentioned the Step-Back Provisions and found that they allow the Copyright Act to pre-empt 
Arizona’s version of Article 9.456 They also found that the Copyright Act pre-empts Article 9 in 
regards to both registered and unregistered copyright. The court did not discuss the issue of pre-
emption in any greater detail. 
They then held that the creditor did not have a perfected security interest in any of the derivative 
works of the registered or unregistered copyright.457 They also decided that any distinction between 
derivative works and underlying copyright was not material to the case. One of the most interesting 
aspects of the case was the court’s discussion on the perfection of a security interest in the after-
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acquired property. As discussed previously, under the rules of Article 9, property that is not in 
possession of the debtor at the time of the security agreement can still be captured within a security 
interest if it was contemplated by the original security agreement. Through this provision, the creditor 
can file the UCC-1 once without the need to make additional filings for future property. The court 
rejected this principle and instead stated that additional filings needed to be made at the Copyright 
Office for derivative works: “If Imperial Bank had merely done what the law requires –that is to 
record evidence of the security interest in the U.S. Office of Copyright – and it had made sure that the 
after-acquired property had been registered, it would have been found to be perfected. All it had to do 
was determine what the collateral consisted of, consult the law and perfect its interest. It failed to take 
that simple steps, and it is now unperfected as a result.”458 Interestingly what the decision calls 
“simple steps” actually amounts to filing at least three times in two different registrars in order to 
perfect the security interest in all of the software, its derivative works and accompany materials. Also, 
it is interesting that the court places the burden in registering the copyright on the creditor and not the 
owner of the copyright. 
The decision ultimately held that a security interest in registered and unregistered copyright, the 
derivative works of the copyright (registered or not) and all royalties related to the copyright must be 
perfected at the Copyright Office and not at the relevant secretary of state. The court did rule that the 
bank held a perfected interest in the maintenance contracts and the equipment but the creditor but not 
any other assets. 
The Avalon decision is problematic in many ways. The first is that it does not distinguish between the 
actual copyright and the other assets which are only related to copyrights.  Even if security interests 
are a type of transfer included in Section 205, the provision only applies to transfers of copyright. The 
law does not include any royalties or other related rights. When the court failure to distinguish 
between these rights, they misconstrued the meaning of Section 205. The Avalon decision is the 
complete opposite of the holding in BMI.459 
The next problem is that the court did not distinguish between registered and unregistered copyright. 
If a copyright is not registered then, a creditor cannot file notice to perfect a security interest in that 
copyright. The creditor is also not able to file for copyright registration because he does not own the 
copyright but only holds the possibility of later assignment. Under Avalon, the creditor has nowhere to 
perfect the security interest as filing at the Copyright Office would be an impossibility. The decision 
also places a greater burden on the copyright owner to register the copyright. If the owner does not 
register then, the copyright will have less value as a debtor may not be able to perfect a security 
interest it. Also, as mentioned previously, the Copyright Act only requires registration of a work in a 
few situations.460 The Act does not state that a copyright must be registered before it can be used as 
collateral. By adding this requirement, the Avalon court is assuming Congressional intent where there 
had been none.  
The last main problem with Avalon, also found with Peregrine, is that the court states that it wants a 
streamlined registration process but then introduces procedures which make perfection even more 
complicated. Along with complicating security interests in unregistered copyright, the court 
overlooked the issue that copyright is seldom the only asset used as collateral. Under the rules of 
perfection given in Avalon, a creditor would have had to perfect the security interest in the copyright 
and related income at the Copyright Office, ensure that the copyright owner registers all of the 
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previously unregistered copyright and then also perfected a security interest in the other assets by 
filing with the Arizona Secretary of State. The creditor would then have to keep ensuring that the 
copyright in any derivative works or updates are also registered and would have to make a new filing 
at the Copyright Office to perfect the interest in the derivative works and updates. That is not 
simplifying perfection but instead complicating it. 
It was not until five years later when another court questioned the reasoning behind the Avalon and 
Peregrine decisions. In 2002, a California court addressed the issue of whether the security interest in 
a copyright can be perfected under Article 9.461 In the case, an airplane manufacturing company 
owned unregistered copyrights in drawings, technical manuals, blueprints and computer software. 
Some of the aviation documents had been in registered with the Federal Aviation Authority, but none 
had been registered for copyright. The company received secured financing with a bank taking a 
security interest in collateral which was described as follows: “all goods and equipment now owned or 
hereafter acquired” and including all “copyright rights, copyright applications, copyright registrations 
and like protections in each work of authorship and derivative work thereof whether published or 
unpublished now owned of hereafter acquired.462.” The bank perfected the security interest by filing a 
UCC-1 with the California Secretary of State.  Later, the company filed for bankruptcy without 
repaying the debt. Their copyright portfolio was a valuable asset, and one of the creditors wanted an 
assignment of all the copyrights. The Court agreed with Peregrine and held that the bank did not have 
a perfected security interest in the registered copyright. However, they refused to extend the 
Peregrine ruling to unregistered copyright.463 It also rejected the decision in Avalon and criticised it 
stating that “No circuit court has come to that same erroneous conclusion [by following the Avalon 
case].” 464 
In order to assess whether security interests in unregistered copyright had to be registered at the 
Copyright Act, the decision analysed the bounds of the Copyright Act.  The Court did find that 
“transfers” in Section 205, includes mortgages and other security interests; however, the court noted 
that recording transfers, assignments, and other documents is not mandatory but merely permissive.  
Next, the court discussed whether the step back provisions in Article 9 were applicable to unregistered 
Copyright. The first step back provision was deemed to be inapplicable because “the UCC does not 
defer to the Copyright Act under this broad step-back provision because the Copyright Act does not 
provide for the rights of the secured parties to unregistered copyrights.” The second Step-Back 
Provision was also deemed to be inapplicable because the Copyright Act does not provide for national 
registration of unregistered copyrights. The Court then addressed whether any of the three 
circumstances for federal exemption was applicable to this case. It found that none were and reasoned 
that pre-emption of Article 9 by the Copyright Act in respect to unregistered copyright is ineffectual 
as any work is given protection from its creation and did not require registration from that protection. 
Furthermore, the court reasoned that unregistered copyright would be useless as collateral if it were 
found that a security interest could not be perfected by following the laws of Article 9 which could 
not have been the intent of Congress. The World Auxiliary decision did not overturn Peregrine but 
weakened the broad presupposition that the Copyright Act will always pre-empt Article 9.  
iii. Conclusions  
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For the most part, the case law provides that security interests in registered and unregistered 
copyright, derivative works of registered and unregistered copyright and copyright royalties must be 
registered at the Copyright Office in order to perfect the interest. Although the latest case of World 
Auxiliary was highly critical of earlier cases, it is not certain that future courts will continue that trend. 
This is especially true in light of the low precedential value in all of these decisions.465 
In many of the cases where the Copyright Act pre-empted Article 9, the courts reasoned that the pre-
emption would result in an easier “streamlined process.”  These decisions failed to take into a number 
of factors which will actually make perfecting the security interest in copyright more complicated. 
The first problem is that the Copyright Act does not have specific rules on the time when perfection 
occurs. In the Copyright Act,466 there is a significant grace period for the registration of a copyright 
transfer which can then be extended by two additional months. The question is then will the security 
interest be perfected at the date of the filing or will it have been perfected from the date registration is 
completed?  If the security interest is deemed to have been perfected from the date of the filing at the 
Copyright Office, there will be a period where subsequent creditors will not have notice of the 
security interest. This is especially true in light of current practices at the Copyright Office. 
Additionally, registering the transfer of a copyright at the Copyright Office can be difficult. There are 
often administrative delays which make the process slow and add expenses. The Copyright Office can 
take anywhere from three weeks to a year to record a transfer document and issue a Copyright 
Certificate.467 Due to these delays, records cannot be relied upon for verifying ownership, the 
existence of a security interest or any other encumberment. This means that the creditor may have the 
burdensome and expensive task of continuing to perform title checks in cases where the debtor has a 
large portfolio of copyrights.  
Another problem is the treatment of after-acquired property in several of the decisions. Several courts 
ruled that security interests in copyright and even in royalties must be filed at the Copyright Office as 
they are created. This was true even for unregistered copyright even though the court did not comment 
on how a filing could be made when the underlying copyright itself was not registered. The process 
would be extremely burdensome for creditors as they would have to rely on the debtor to inform them 
when any new copyright arises and then rely on the debtor to register the copyright. The creditor will 
then have to register security interests repeatedly in all new copyrights from the same underlying 
security agreement. The filing process would have to continue throughout the life of the loan and 
would become a substantial burden on the creditor. Overall, the case law creates significant 
uncertainty and burdens on the creditor from the requirement to perfect a security interest in each 
copyright and other related rights. 
c. Trademarks 
i. The Lanham Act 
Federal trademarks are governed by the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. This includes registered trademarks 
as well as unregistered trademarks which are used in more than one state as per the Commerce Clause 
of the Constitution.468 The issue of whether the Lanham Act pre-empts Article 9 is undecided and 
causes uncertainty.  
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Trademarks like other forms of federally registered IP are deemed to be general intangibles in Article 
9. Pending trademark applications are also considered to be a type of general intangible. The Act does 
not refer to security interests specifically.469 Additionally, it is similar to the Patent Act in that it only 
provides limited mechanisms for recordings assignments and transfers of trademarks. Section 1060 (a) 
(2) of the Lanham Act provides that “Assignments shall be instruments in writing duly executed. 
Acknowledgment shall be prima facie evidence of the execution of an assignment, and when the 
prescribed information reporting the assignment is recorded in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, the record shall be prima facie evidence of execution.” Section 1060 (a) (3) goes 
on to state that: “An assignments shall be void against any subsequent purchaser for valuable 
consideration without notice unless the prescribed information is reporting the assignment is recorded 
is recorded at the USPTO within three months after the date of the assignment or prior.” Under this 
provision, it is mandatory to record an assignment or transfer of a trademark. An unrecorded 
assignment or transfer will be void against subsequently recorded assignments and transfers. The only 
exception to this is if the later assignment was given without valuable consideration. This is an 
unlikely scenario.  
It is unclear whether the Lanham Act categorises security interests as a type of assignment because 
“assignment” is not defined in the Act. The case law suggests that they are not. One of the leading 
cases held that security interests are not assignments because they are not “ an absolute transfer of the 
entire right, title and interest to the trademark.”470 Other courts have ruled that security interests are 
not an assignment but rather the possibility of a future assignment: “The rule is well established that a 
mere agreement for the future assignment is not an assignment either the mark itself or the goodwill 
attached to it.471 
If security interests are not assignments under Section 1060, then the USPTO will only record them 
on a discretionary basis. The Rules from the Commissioner of Patents provides that “Assignments 
under Section 10 of the act of registered marks, or marks for which an application have been filed, 
will be recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office. Other instruments which may relate to such 
marks may be recorded in the discretion of the Commissioner.472 The Rules do not have the same 
legal authority as the Lanham Act, but they provide an important interpretation of it. The discretionary 
recordation of security interests is problematic as it would be difficult to determine the date of 
priority. The interpretation of whether security interests are governed by Section 1060 is extremely 
important in determining whether the Lanham Act pre-empts Article 9, which is discussed in greater 
depth below. 
The uncertainty on pre-emption also affects more than just the registration of the interest. It also 
causes several other problems as well. One related issue is the question of whether a security interest 
severs the goodwill from the trademark. Section 1060 1(a) of the Lanham Act states that a mark shall 
be assignable with the goodwill of the business: “the goodwill of the business in which the mark is 
used, or with that part of the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by 
the mark.” As mentioned before this was to prevent “assignments in gross” and to ensure that the 
integrity of the trademark was kept intact.473  If the goodwill is not transferred with the trademark, the 
trademark is void. The early case of Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf found that “a trademark has 
no independent significance apart from the goodwill it symbolizes,… a trademark cannot be sold or 
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assigned apart from the goodwill it symbolizes.”474 McCarthy has remarked that “In US law, a 
trademark is the mere symbol of the goodwill and business associated with it, without those two it 
symbolizes nothing. Because of this reasoning, a trademark cannot be assigned without the goodwill. 
The purpose of the rule is to guarantee the continuity of the mark in relation to the goods or services. 
The rules have consumer protection in their mind at the utmost.475 Several courts have questioned 
whether goodwill must be included when a security interest is taken in a trademark. Part of their 
assessment included whether a security interest is a type of assignment and if so then whether the 
Lanham Act pre-empts Article 9. If that is the case, then the goodwill must be expressly described in 
the security interest in order to comply with Section 1060. Even when security interests are not 
considered to be assignments and when the Lanham Act has not pre-empted Article 9 some courts 
have recommended that the accompanying goodwill be included anyway. McCarthy agrees that a 
security interest in a trademark should also should include the goodwill: “this is due to the fact that 
although a security interest is an agreement that an assignment can occur in the future meaning that 
the security interest must not amount to an assignment in gross at the time of the creation of the 
interest.” 476 
As with the other forms of registered IP, the pre-emption question also raises the question of what 
constitutes a sufficient description of the trademark in the filing statement. Under Article 9, 
encompassing descriptions of the assets are acceptable. In the Lanham Act, each trademark is 
registered as a separate and distinct right. Several courts have assessed whether the asset description 
in the filing notice must conform to Article 9 or to the Lanham Act. If the latter is the case, each 
trademark will have to be listed in the filing statement and the term “general intangibles” would not 
be a sufficient enough of a description to perfect the security interest in a trademark.  
This also leaves the problem of how a security interest can be perfected in a trademark which is 
registered after the security interest has been registered. As mentioned previously, security interests in 
after-acquired property are allowed under Article 9. It is not clear whether it is allowed under the 
Lanham Act because upon filing the creditor would not be able to list a trademark that has not been 
registered yet.  In this area, it is not if the adequacy of the description is governed by the rules in 
Article 9 or the general tenets of trademark law.  
The above problems are caused by the uncertainty of whether the Lanham Act pre-empts Article 9. As 
mentioned pre-emption can only occur through the Step-Back Provisions in Article 9 or through 
implicit federal pre-emption. The first Step-Back Provision is not applicable because the Lanham Act 
does not expressly provide that it pre-empts Article 9.477 The first step back provision requires that the 
federal law must explicitly pre-empt Article 9, and it does not in this instance. The second Step-Back 
Provision exempts security interests from Article 9 filing requirements when “subject to a statute of 
the United States which provides for national registration or which specifies a place of filing different 
from that specified in this division of filing a security interest.478” If security interests are not 
considered assignments under Section 1060 then this provision does not apply as the Lanham Act 
contains no provisions on the recording of security interests. If security interests are considered 
assignments, then this clause could apply as it did with the Copyright Act. Section 1060 has a limited 
priority system for recording transfers and assignments which would be applicable if security interests 
are considered assignments.  The applicability of this Step Back Provision depends largely on whether 
security interests are considered assignments or not. 
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If the Step-Back Provisions do not apply then, it is still possible that federal implicit pre-emption 
could occur.479 The Lanham Act does not meet the criteria for field pre-emption. For this to be 
applicable “the scheme of federal law and regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable inference 
that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.” Since the Lanham Act does not contain 
explicit references to security interests, the federal law is not pervasive in this area. Even if security 
interests are considered assignments the deficiency of section 1060 rules on priority shows that the 
law in this area is not pervasive. It is a winner take all system. With security interests, it is possible 
that each creditor will have the right for the future transfer of the partial value of the trademark. Since 
that type of ownership or transfer is not envisaged in the Lanham Act, there is room for 
supplementation by state law. Additionally, the Lanham Act itself is limited to federally registered 
trademarks and inter-state unregistered trademarks. This shows that Congress has not created 
legislation so pervasive that there is no room for state supplementation in the case of trademarks.  
The second type of federal implicit pre-emption can occur if there is a conflict between the state and 
federal law which renders compliance with both to be a physical impossibility. This is not applicable 
in the case of the Lanham Act and Article 9. It does not apply because it is possible for a creditor to 
comply with both Article 9 and the Lanham Act. It is still possible to comply with both sets of laws 
even if security interests are considered assignments under section 1060. The priority scheme in 
section 1060 is really only a provision for the mandatory filing of assignments. It voids any 
assignments which are not filed within three months. It does not provide greater instructions in cases 
where two assignments are filed within that three month period. A security interest can be perfected at 
the applicable secretary of state and then the assignment can be filed at the PTO if a security interest 
is considered an assignment. If it is not then, there is no filing requirement with the USPTO. With 
either interpretation Article 9 and the Lanham Act do not cause a conflict which makes compliance 
with both a physical impossibility. The dual filing requirement would cause confusion and more 
uncertainty, but it is not physically impossible.  
The final type of federal implicit pre-emption occurs if Article 9 was creating an obstacle to a federal 
objective i.e. “state law impeded a federal objective.” This cannot be the case here. The Lanham Act 
does not contain any references to security interests, much less comprehensive provisions on them. If 
security interests in trademarks were part of a federal objective, they would have been included. One 
court persuasively writes: “If Congress intended to provide a means for recording security interests in 
trademarks in addition to assignments, it would have been simple to so state. However, for whatever 
reasons, Congress did not do so.480 
ii. Case Law 
The case law in this area is largely analogous to the law achieving perfection in the security interest in 
patents. Most courts have ruled that a security interest in a trademark must be perfected according to 
Article 9.481 It has also been ruled that the Lanham Act does not pre-empt Article 9. With this in mind 
in the following cases, five main points will be assessed in each case: whether security interests were 
considered to be assignments; whether the Step-Back Provisions of Article 9 were applicable; whether 
federal pre-emption could occur; whether goodwill needed to be included in the security interest; and 
whether any other requirements were needed to perfect a security interest in a trademark under Article 
9.  
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In 1978, the case of Haymaker Sports v. Turian was decided as an appeal from the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board482. The owner of several trademarks was unable to pay for attorney’s fees in 
another action, so they entered into an agreement where the trademarks and goodwill were given in 
escrow to the law firm. Under the agreement, if the debtor defaulted on the repayments then the 
trademarks would be taken out of escrow and assigned to the law firm. This is exactly what occurred. 
The Haymaker business failed to make the repayments, so the goodwill and trademarks were assigned 
to the law firm. The transfer of the trademarks and goodwill was recorded at the USPTO. Soon after, a 
new credit agreement was put into place with similar terms but with a new payment schedule and a 
new clause which stated “in the event the corporate defendants shall permanently cease to do 
business, then and in that event any of the said corporations shall have the right to continue the 
minimum payments provided for in this stipulation and upon payment by said owners of stock of the 
total minimum herein provided, the security shall be reassigned by the escrowees to the individuals 
making the said payments.”483 Haymaker eventually did cease trading, but one shareholder paid off 
the outstanding debt to the law firm anyway. After doing so, the shareholder was assigned the 
trademarks and goodwill which was also recorded. The shareholder owned a similar business and 
continued to use the trademarks in relation to similar goods.  
Another shoemaker named Haymaker Sports sought cancellation of the Avon trademark at the 
USPTO and argued that the mark had been abandoned. The TTAB found that the first agreement was 
for a future assignment of a mark and parties did not intend for it to have any immediate legal effect. 
484They then found that after the first default and then upon the second agreement, the trademark was 
“resurrected” as collateral, and an implied licence had been granted to Avon. The TTAB ruled that the 
two assignments were valid, not assignments in gross and the trademarks had not been abandoned. 
The appellate court reversed this decision and found that the first assignment from Avon to the law 
firm was invalid as it was an assignment in gross and making it void under the Trademark Act.485 
Although the agreement specifically assigned the goodwill along with the mark, the court ruled that 
the assignment amounted to a void assignment in gross because the law firm did not play an active 
role in the business, did not use the trademark itself, and never acquired any of the tangible assets 
upon transfer.486  The court also ruled that since the first assignment was invalid the later assignment 
to Turin, the shareholder, was invalid as well. Although Avon had entered into a new agreement after 
defaulting on the loan, it was still too late to resurrect the agreement to postpone the assignment until 
sometime in the future.487 
One of the most notable features of the case is that the court did not consider the security interest to be 
anything other than an assignment. It also did not contemplate the possibility that that the law firm 
could hold a trademark mark only as collateral and not as part of an ongoing business. Also, the 
decision lacks any discussion of pre-emption was notably absent. This could have been because of the 
fact that the defendants did not attempt to perfect the security under Article 9. It is surprising that in a 
case about security interests, Article 9 is not mentioned. The Uniform Commercial Code and Article 9 
had been in existence for at least ten years prior to the events of the case, so it is surprising that the 
Escrowees (who were lawyers), as well as the Assignees (also lawyers), did not consider registering 
the security interest at the relevant Secretary of State. Instead, the assignments were only registered at 
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the USPTO after the triggering events had occurred. This is one of the few cases where pre-emption is 
not the principle legal question in the case. Instead, the case turned on how to correctly assign 
goodwill along with a trademark. The answer from the court is that a portion of the tangible assets or 
business must be transferred along with the trademark in question. Haymaker has received criticism in 
subsequent cases. 
In 1984, the bankruptcy case of TR-3 again addressed the issue of security interests in trademarks and 
trade names.488.TR-3 received a secured loan from Capital Bank. As part of the security agreement 
TR-3 granted a security interest in all present and future general intangibles now owned or hereafter 
acquired.489 Capital Bank perfected the security interest by filing a UCC-1 with the California 
Secretary of State but not with the USPTO. TR-3 declared bankruptcy and in a court-approved sale 
transferred all of the assets to McKay Chemical free and clear of all liens and interests. The transfer 
included the trademark for the trade name “TR-3” as well as several applications for other trademarks. 
A class of creditors including McKay Chemicals filed for a declaration that Capital Bank did not have 
a valid, perfected security interest in the trademarks and trade names because they failed to register 
the security interest at the USPTO as per Section 1060 of the Lanham Act.  
The court did not mention the Haymaker case in their decision and gave an opposite ruling to that 
case. The court found that neither Section 1060 of the Lanham Act nor the rest of the Lanham Act 
contained any provisions for the registration of security interests in trademarks, tradenames, or 
trademark applications.490 They did not address the Step Back Provisions of Article 9 or implicit pre-
emption specifically, but they found that federal pre-emption did not apply: “It was not the purpose of 
Congress in enacting the Lanham Act to provide a method for the perfection of security interests in 
trademarks, trade names or applications for the registration of the same, or as a method for giving 
notice of the existence of a claim of a security interest therein.”491 They also held that security 
interests in trademarks and trademark applications cannot be perfected at the USPTO but instead must 
be perfected in the appropriate Article 9 register. The court did not address the issue of goodwill, but 
that was probably because the security interest included all of the assets of the company. Also, the 
competing creditors did not raise the issue or assert that the transfer to Capital Bank had been an 
invalid assignment in gross. Based on these findings, the court found that Capital Bank had a valid 
security interest in the trademarks, trade names, and applications. 
The next important case came later that same year and is one of the leading cases in this area: Matter 
of Roman Cleanser.492 In the case, a creditor had moved to intervene in a bankruptcy proceeding 
claiming they held a perfected security interest in a trademark which had incorrectly been sold by the 
trustee of the bankruptcy estate. Another creditor also claimed ownership of the trademark. The 
bankrupt party was a cleanser manufacturer which owned the trademark “Roman Cleanser,” 
“Roman,” “Easy Monday,” and “Romay.”493 In 1978, the creditor had given the debtor a loan and 
security agreement which granted a security interest “in and to all of Roman Cleanser’s then own and 
thereafter acquired goods, equipment, and general intangibles and the proceeds thereof as collateral 
for the payment of all indebtedness and liability then existing or thereafter arising.” The creditor filed 
a financing statement with the Michigan Secretary of State but not at the USPTO.  
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Firstly, the court ruled that security interests cannot be characterised as assignments under the 
Lanham Act because security interests are not an absolute transfer of the trademark but instead only a 
device to secure “an indebtedness.”494 They also held that the Lanham Act was not applicable to 
security interests in trademark because of this. Additionally, they held that because security interests 
are registered only at the discretion of the USPTO, perfection cannot occur by filing there.  Because 
of these reasons, it was found that the Step-Back Provisions of Article 9 and the federal implicit pre-
emption laws are inapplicable. The court ruled that because the Lanham Act does not pre-empt Article 
9, a security interest in a trademark is perfected by filing according to Article 9.495 
The question of whether a security interest severed the goodwill from the trademark was treated 
separately. One argument put forth by the trustee was that the security interest was void as a matter of 
trademark law because the secured party did not transfer a corresponding interest in the machinery. 
The also argued that in order to ensure that the goodwill was transferred with the trademark, 
machinery or other tangible assets should have been included as part of the collateral. The court 
harshly rejected this claim: “This contention has no merit.”496  In this case, the court ruled that the 
creditor only was deemed to have temporary ownership of the assets. This is the direct opposite of the 
court in the previous case where the law firm/ escrowees held actual ownership of the trademarks.497 
After obtaining ownership of the collateral, the debtor sold the trademark, goodwill, formulas and 
customer lists onto another company that wanted to manufacture the same products with the same 
formulas. The court ruled that since the formulas were included in the transfer, the quality of the 
goods associated with the trademark would not diminish.498 The goodwill would not be severed from 
the trademark because of the transfer. The court went so far as criticizing the claimant for even raising 
the point: “If the trustee’s assignment of the marks was valid, there is no basis for challenging NAC’s 
security interest.” 499 
Roman Cleanser changed the landscape of creating a security interest in a trademark. The court 
rejected pre-emption of Article 9 through the Step-Back Provisions or through implicit federal law. 
This case has been cited and followed in many of the subsequent cases and it reduced the legal 
uncertainty which had come from the Haymaker case. 
Five years later, In re C.C. & Co concerned the trade name “Pete smith’s Surf Shop.” 500  As a part of 
secured finance deal, the surf shop gave a security interest in all fixtures, personal property, inventory 
and accounts receivable and all after acquired property. The surf shop because bankrupt and then went 
into liquidation in 1998. A party named Pete Smith’s acquired the collateral at a public auction and 
claimed that it also acquired the trade name as part of the personal property that had been perfected by 
the security interest. The case before the court was on who owned the trade name “Pete Smith’s Surf 
Shop.” 
The court found that trademarks are general intangibles which are a type of personal property.501 It 
then had to assess whether the security interest in personal property had been properly perfected. The 
court first noted that Section 1060 and the rest of the assignment recording provisions in the Lanham 
would appear to mean that Lanham Act pre-empts Article 9 because of the Step-Back Provisions. 
However, the court then reversed this position by and pointed out the previous cases of Roman 
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Cleanser and TR-3.502 Following the holdings in these cases, the court held that the assignment 
provisions of the Lanham Act do not apply. It then held that a security interest is a device to secure 
indebtedness and not an absolute assignment of the goodwill and trademark (citing the wording in 
Roman Cleanser).503 After examining these cases, the Lanham Act and the legislative history of 
Article 9, the court found that perfection of a security interest in a trademark is governed by Article 9 
as adopted by Virginia.504 Following on from this reasoning, the court ruled that Article 9 also 
governs the sufficiency of asset description. They found that this case the description was sufficient 
under Article 9, as adopted by Virginia and the security interest in the trademark and its 
accompanying goodwill had been perfected. 505 
The C.C. case is important for several reasons. Firstly, the decision affirmed that a security interest is 
not an assignment under Section 1060 of the Lanham Act. It also affirmed that the Step-Back 
Provisions of Article 9 are not applicable to the Lanham Act. The court also clarified that a security 
interest in the goodwill connected to the trademark is perfected through the same filing at the 
applicable Article 9 register. The most interesting thing about the case, however, is that the decision is 
the first to discuss the sufficiency of a description in the financing statement. As mentioned above, in 
IP law registry descriptions are required to be highly specific and each entry is for one specific 
trademark. In secured finance, collateral is often described in general terms as it was in this case 
where the description was for “personal property.” This case held that using the term “general 
intangibles” as the asset description in a filing statement is enough to perfect a security interest in a 
trademark.  
A year later a similar case was decided in another bankruptcy court: In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo 
Co.506 The case concerned the bankruptcy of a large hotel and convention centre. The bankruptcy 
estate was sold as an ongoing business to partners of the defunct company. The bankruptcy court had 
to determine how to divide the proceeds of this sale. Several banks held security interests over various 
assets of the company including the trademark. The trustee alleged that none of the creditors held a 
security interest in the registered trademark because none had perfected the interest at the USPTO. 
The Court rejected that assertion and held that Article 9 solely controls the perfection of security 
interests in trademarks because the Lanham Act provides no adequate system of notice for interest in 
trademarks. 507 
The court came to this conclusion by interpreting Article 9 itself and citing the previous cases of 
Roman Cleanser, TR-3 and C.C. & Co. In regards to Article 9 the court mentioned the second step 
back provision and noted that “The newer statute does not clearly say that the federal statute must 
provide for national registration of security interests. It could possibly include a federal statute that 
provides for national registration of ownership. However, the change in wording of § 9-302 
apparently was not intended to change the law….The court concludes that perfection of a security 
interest in the service mark was governed by Tennessee’s version of UCC Article 9.. The court has 
found three cases that all agree: Article 9 of the UCC, not the federal statute, governs perfection of a 
security interest in a trademark or other mark subject to registration under the federal statute only 
provides for registration of ownership and was not intended to provide notice of security interests.”508 
                                                          
502 Ibid. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Ibid at 948. 
505Ibid. 
506 Chattanooga Choo Choo, 98 B.R. 792, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 795 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989). 
507 Ibid at 801. 
508 Ibid at 796. 
107 
 
The court, in this case, did not discuss the other step-back provisions or whether federal pre-emption 
would apply on its own. Also, the court did not discuss whether a security interest is a type of 
assignment under the Lanham Act. Actually, the decision refers very little to the Lanham Act, and it is 
only mentioned in its discussion of pre-emption. 
The most interesting facet of the case is not about pre-emption at all but rather the sufficiency of the 
description in the financing statement. The Chattanooga decision questioned the sufficiency of the 
asset description in the financing statement in order to determine whether a security interest had been 
perfected in a trademark. The court decided that the four banks with security interests in the business 
had not adequately described the trademark in a financing statement and therefore had not perfected 
an interest in the trademark. Three of the creditors did not make any references to intangible property 
in the financing statements.509 The fourth mentioned intangible personal property but not the 
trademark specifically. The court ruled that this was not sufficient enough of a description to perfect a 
security interest in the trademark. This should not be taken to mean that generalised descriptions of 
the asset would not perfect the interest in a trademark. The financing statements of the fourth bank 
had been very detailed in describing other assets and went so far to itemise assets like beds, table, and 
lamps. This could have been part of the court’s considerations when determining that the interest had 
not been perfected in the trademark. Unhelpfully, the court did not comment on what would constitute 
a sufficient description aside from specifically naming the trademark.  
Even though the court does not specifically mention goodwill, it discusses the value of the mark as 
part of the operating business. This discussion uses the same theory of goodwill being attached to the 
trademark even if it does not explicitly use those terms: “The Choo-Choo was sold as an operating 
business to buyers who intended to operate it and are operating it. Furthermore, the testimony of the 
trustee’s expert witness…revealed that name recognition is important to bringing business to the Choo 
Choo, especially tourist business. Without the right to use the service mark, the buyers would lose the 
advantage of years of advertising and doing business under the name Chattanooga Choo Choo.”510 
The most cited parts of the Chattanooga decision are the ruling on the sufficiency of asset description 
in the financing statement and the ruling on the importance of the trademark as part of the operating 
business. Although the court found that Article 9 governs the perfection of a security interest in a 
trademark, it also found that the description in the financing statement must be sufficient before 
perfection can occur. This could be interpreted to mean that the asset description must be highly 
specific and reference the trademark outright. This is not certain, though.  The decision, in places, 
almost hints that trademarks and goodwill could be included when the description includes general 
intangibles, but that is only in the dicta and not part of the holding.  
The implicit discussion of goodwill is also important. The court concluded that the trademark was 
naturally part of the operating business. Its existence away from that business was not a viable 
alternative to court. Like in the Haymaker case, the court found that trademarks and their goodwill 
must be captured together in the security interest. The case law shows that ignoring the goodwill as 
part of an operating business is only done at the peril of the creditor. 
The issue of the sufficiency of the description was raised again in 1991, in the case of in re Topsy’s 
Shopps.511 The Court addressed the question of whether the description “general intangibles” was 
sufficient to perfect a security interest in intellectual property rights in general512. A creditor had taken 
a security interest in the following property: "All Franchise Agreements of [debtor]; all accounts 
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receivable of [debtor]; all of [debtor's] inventory; all of [debtor's] equipment; all goods returned to or 
repossessed by [debtor] and all right, title and interest of [debtor] in all goods the sale or lease of 
which or the furnishing of which in the performance of services gave rise to Collateral; all patent 
rights, trademarks, service marks, trade names and other general intangibles; and all proceeds of, and 
all additions and accesstions [sic] to, the Collateral."513   
On the same day, the debtor granted a security interest to another creditor in all of the following 
property: "All Machinery and Equipment, Furniture and Fixtures, (including automotive) Leasehold 
Improvements, Inventory and all present and future Accounts Receivable, proceeds arising therefrom, 
chattel paper, contract rights, and general intangibles, however, evidenced or acquired, now owned, 
purchased with loan proceeds and hereafter acquired, and all additions and accessions thereto."514 
Both of the security interests were perfected by filing at the Kansas Secretary of State, but the first 
creditor did not perfect his interest until thirty days after the second creditor filed. In the first trial, the 
second creditor was given priority over all assets including IP rights. The first creditor appealed 
arguing that the debtor’s intellectual property was not included in the second creditor’s security 
interest because the description was inadequate. On appeal, the court rejected this argument and were 
persuaded by the fact that the definition of general intangibles in Article 9 includes intellectual 
property.515  
In the next case, In re 199Z, Inc, a clothing company sold two trademarks and gave a promissory note 
which gave security over their business, trademarks, goodwill, and assets. 516  The security interest 
was recorded at the USPTO, and a UCC1 financing statement was filed at the California Secretary of 
State. The creditor foreclosed on the assets and then resold them to itself. Less than a year later the 
debtor went into bankruptcy, and the trustee sought to set aside the transfer where the creditor had 
sold the assets to itself. The creditor alleged that the UCC filing did not perfect the security interest in 
the trademarks as this would have meant that they received more than they would have when the 
trustee made a distribution to creditors under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.517 In order to assess 
the validity of the asset transfer that the creditor made back to itself, the court had to decide how a 
security interest in a trademark is perfected. 
The court ruled that a security interest is not an assignment under 1060 of the Lanham Act and that 
since the filing of a security interest is not covered by the Lanham Act, Article 9 controls perfection. 
518In this case, the court found that the filing at the California Secretary of State perfected the security 
interest and would be used to determine the priority of conflicting interests. It did not discuss whether 
the filing at the USPTO, but it can be inferred that it did not affect the filing at the Secretary of State. 
Federal pre-emption is only briefly mentioned as not being applicable, but a full analysis was not 
done. The decision did not mention the Step-Back Provisions of Article 9 in their assessment on pre-
emption. Instead, the court followed the previous decisions of Roman Cleanser, and TR-3.  
The case did not bring any changes to the developing case law but rather reaffirmed the previous 
cases. The court found that the Lanham Act does not apply to “pledges, mortgages or hypothecation 
of trademarks.”519 Accordingly, the Court ruled that the correct way to perfect an interest in a 
trademark was to follow the Article 9 as adopted in the applicable state. It also suggested that USPTO 
filings do not perfect the interest nor do they provide a priority date. 
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One of the most famous cases on taking security in a trademark is the 1996 case of The Clorox 
Company v Chemical Bank. 520 The case highlights some of the complications that can arise from a 
poorly structured loan agreement. In the case, the Clorox Company petitioned the USPTO’s 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) to cancel the trademark “SUPERSCRUB” which was 
owned by a rival company.521 Clorox alleged that the trademark was invalid because prior to the 
registration of the trademark, security had been taken in the trademark application. Under trademark 
law, it is prohibited to assign an intent to use application prior to registration unless the application is 
assigned to a successor in the business and the accompanying goodwill is transferred as well.522 The 
problem was that by virtue of the security agreement, the application had been inadvertently 
transferred. Also, this addition to the law had been recent. The creditor, who had been assigned the 
application and eventual registered mark, argued that the intention behind the agreement had been 
only to create a security interest and not a transfer.523 They also argued that they should not be 
penalised by a recent addition to the law which had occurred after the application had been assigned. 
Surprisingly, the board ruled that the mark should be cancelled and that the assignment was void.524 
Accordingly, the assignment to respondent, prior to the filing of the verified statement of use, of the 
intent-to-use application which matured into the registration at issue was not only invalid under 
Section 10 of the statute, since there was no transfer to respondent of the assignor’s ongoing and 
existing business under the “SUPER SCRUB” mark, but the resulting registration for such mark was 
also rendered void. In violating, whether unwittingly or otherwise, the statutory provision against 
assignments of the kind which took place herein, respondent and its assignor engaged in the very 
trafficking in a mark (albeit for the purpose of providing security for a loan) which Congress plainly 
sought to prohibit in order to safeguard the intent-to-use system by ensuring that applicant’s intention 
to use a mark is bona fide. Respondent’s registration issued in violation of the prohibition contained in 
Section 10 and should therefore be voided, i.e., cancelled as contended by petitioner.”525 
Although the Clorox case is about trademark applications and assignments, it still has important 
ramifications for security in trademarks. This case has shown that even in cases where the security 
agreement assigns the trademark even though it only intended to give an interest, that trademark law 
will automatically pre-empt Article 9. It also leads to questions about mortgages which are permitted 
under Article 9. In the case of assignment to create a mortgage, it is essential that goodwill is 
transferred along with the trademark or the trademark will be destroyed. The Lanham Act does not 
have as strict of rules for transferring registered marks as it does for transferring applications. 
However, in this case it is easy to see how a security interest in general intangibles or all trademarks 
could run afoul of the prohibition in Section 10. It is easy to see how a creditor could inadvertently 
take security in mark which would lead to the assignment to a mark upon the bankruptcy of the debtor 
which could destroy the mark.  
In the next case of In re America’s Hobby Center, Inc. a committee of unsecured creditors challenged 
the claims by a secured creditor who asserted it had a perfect security interest in the trademark of the 
bankrupt debtor.526 The secured creditor had filed at the New York Secretary of State. The filing 
statement included all present and future trademarks in the asset description. The unsecured creditors 
                                                          
520 40 USPQ 2d 1098 (1996). 
521 Ibid at 1098. 
522 The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 116 (1989) Section 1(b)added provisions to the Lanham Act in 
Section 10 which prohibit trafficking of trademarks prior to the filing a statement of use. The only exception to 
this rule is in cases where the trademark application is assigned to a successor in business.  
523 The Clorox Company v Chemical Bank 40 USPQ 2d 1098, 1111 (1996). 
524 Ibid at 1110. 
525 Ibid at 1111. 
526 223 B.R. 275 (1998). 
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claimed that the security interest had not been properly perfected. The court pointed out the large 
amount of ambiguity still left in security interest in trademark: “None of the Congress, the Supreme 
Court, the Second Circuit, nor the New York Court of Appeals has spoken definitely on whether a 
security interest in a trademark is perfected only upon recording it with the trademark office, or 
whether filing in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is 
adequate. Whereas the weight of such authority is more in line with a determination that the UCC 
would control, the matter is hardly free of doubt.”527  
The court also warned that three factors contributed to the confusion: Section 1060 of the Lanham 
Act, the lack of a definition for assignment in the Lanham Act, and the applicability of the Step -Back 
Provisions of Article 9. Interestingly, the court did not actually analyse the applicability of pre-
emption from either federal implicit law or from the Step-Back Provisions. Instead, the court based its 
decision on the previous case law and the Official Comments of the revised version of Article 9. In 
particular, the court focused on the Official Comment that stated: “the federal statute itself must 
provide the method for perfecting the interest.”528 The court ruled, albeit hesitantly, that Article 9 
governs the perfection of security interests over trademarks but pointed out that further disagreement 
and litigation is likely to occur over this issue: “Whereas the strength of the Committee’s claim is 
questionable, the proposal for clarification of the UCC underscores that there is room for 
disagreement and, therefore, for litigation.”529 
The issue of perfecting a security interest in a trademark was actually a small part of the case. The 
main case was on other bankruptcy matters. Accordingly, the court did not discuss other matters in the 
perfect issue such as whether goodwill was captured in the security interest or whether the description 
of the asset was sufficient. This is one of the least persuasive opinions given in the matter, but it is 
important because highlights the amount of judicial confusion in the matter and the lack of clear 
precedent. 
The last notable case was also decided in 2000: Together Development.530  In the case, a bankrupt 
online dating service wanted to avoid a security interest in their trademark in order to sell the 
trademark as part of the bankruptcy estate. The debtor argued that the security interest in the 
trademark was not perfected because the financing statement had been filed at the USPTO and not at 
the Connecticut Secretary of State. The creditor conceded that their interest in all other assets was 
unperfected, but they argued that their interest in the trademark and accompanying goodwill had been 
perfected. 531 
In the decision, the court analysed f the history of the Lanham Act in relation to Article 9 and made 
several important observations. Firstly, they noted that the Lanham Act does not define “assignment” 
which “casts doubt on whether the term includes the grant of a security interest.”532 They reviewed 
this problem from a historical perspective. The court noted that the Lanham Act was passed in 1946 
which was prior to the passing of the Uniform Commercial Code. It was in the Commercial Code 
where the terms “security interest” and “security agreement” were used to describe consensual liens in 
personal property. The court points out that in 1946 the terms “chattel mortgage” and “conditional 
sale” were used to describe the legal vehicles to take consensual security in personal property. At this 
time it was also common to refer to a grant of a mortgage in a trademark rather than an assignment 
and the Lanham Act does not mention mortgages. The court summed up the issue well by stating: 
                                                          
527 Ibid at 286 
528 UCC s 9-104 official comments. 
529 In re America’s Hobby Center Inc 223 B.R. 275 (1998). 
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“Thus ordinary language usage points away from treating the grant of a security interest as an 
‘assignment’ under the Lanham Act.” This is the first court that analysed the Lanham Act in the 
context of the ordinary language of the time it was written. 
The Court also pointed out that the language of the Act itself makes a distinction between the two. 
The first instance is in Section 1060 the Lanham Act, which uses the term “successor to the business.” 
This would indicate that assignment occurs as part of an outright sale of the whole business: “its 
reference to ‘successor in business’ suggests Congress had in mind an outright assignment in the 
context of the sale of an entire business of which the trademark is part.” The Court then argues that in 
the Copyright Act, Congress has intentionally included consensual liens whereas in the Lanham Act 
they intentionally did not.  The lack of inclusion meant that Congress intentionally designated Article 
9 as the controlling law of security interests in trademarks. The decision is highly critical of the legal 
uncertainty that exists. They went so far as to conclude that registration of a security interest solely 
with the PTO is “trap for the unwary.”533  
Surprisingly, no noteworthy decisions have been published since Together Development. Although 
the case law has shown that courts have routinely found that the Lanham Act does not pre-empt 
Article 9, there is still a great amount of judicial uncertainty on the issue. As with the other forms of 
IP, there is also the problem that the decisions have low precedential value because they are from 
bankruptcy courts or lower level district courts. 
iii. Conclusions 
Although the majority of the case law has held that the Lanham Act does not pre-empt Article 9 the 
matter is not fully settled. In the two recent cases of Together Development and America’s Hobby 
Center, both courts highlighted the lack of precedence on the issue.534 The court in Together 
Development even called security interests in trademarks as “trap for the unwary.”535 As with the 
other IP rights, the case law has little precedential value because it has been decided by bankruptcy 
courts and low-level district courts. In many of the above cases, the court followed the decisions from 
earlier courts, but they were not under any obligation to do so.  
Also, the case law is poorly developed in several key areas. Few decisions give guidance on what 
constitutes a sufficient asset description. Some courts ruled that the use of term “general intangibles” 
is sufficient to perfect an interest in a trademark. Another court ruled that it was not but then did not 
state what is sufficient.  The case law is even less clear on the topic of perfecting the goodwill of a 
trademark in a security interest. Some of the cases ruled that part of the operating assets of the 
business must also be included in the security interest, or the goodwill will be severed from the 
trademark. There was also confusion on whether the use of the term “general intangibles” in the filing 
statement is sufficient to perfect the interest in the goodwill as well.  
Also, questions on dual filing have not been fully resolved. In the case of In re 199Z, Inc,   the 
creditor had filed notice of the security interest with the California Secretary of State and the USPTO. 
536 The court ruled that the state filing perfected the interest, but they did not comment on whether the 
USPTO had any legal effect. Also, none of the cases decided whether a USPTO filing would have 
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priority over conflicting interests or even unsecured creditors. It is also important to note that none of 
the cases addressed whether a state filing would perfect an interest in an after-acquired trademark. 
The question of how to perfect a security interest in a trademark is far from being resolved. The 
overall pre-emption problem has yet to be resolved with any certainty. Additionally, there is 
uncertainty on the exact procedures to follow to perfect the interest and how to determine priority. 
4. Conclusions 
All three types of registered IP are difficult to use as collateral in a security interest taken under 
Article 9. In particular, none of the three registers are designed for nor adequate for the filing of 
security interests, yet many courts have argued that they are indeed the appropriate place to register 
the interest.  
The cases above are decisions of bankruptcy courts or on appeal from the decision of the bankruptcy 
courts. No future courts will be under any precedential obligation to follow the rulings made by the 
previous courts. In the cited cases, the courts often followed the rulings of other cases but sometimes 
they rejected the rulings and the logic behind them. They did not have to do either can could have 
made their ruling on their own interpretation of the law and facts before it. A bankruptcy court is 
likely to follow its own decisions in other cases or to follow the decisions of other bankruptcy courts 
within the same district, but there is unlikely to be widespread horizontal stare decisis.  
The lack of binding precedent is further exacerbated if any future cases were between two creditors 
with competing security interests or in a case where the IP had been sold to another party. The 
decisions made in regards to bankruptcy estates would not be binding upon cases decided in higher 
state or federal courts. The courts have also not ruled on circumstances on the priority of creditors 
when one has filed at the state level and the other at the federal. There has also yet to have been a case 
where there are conflicting dates of perfection on those filings. The outcome of these cases is 
uncertain because of the lack of binding precedent.  
This means that creditors still face uncertainty in how to perfect their security interests in any of the 
three types of registered IP. If the creditor wants to secure all three types of registered IP they may 
have to file at four different registers to perfect their security interest.  The dual filing problem is not 
just found in the U.S.  Other common law jurisdictions such as England and Australia also have the 
same problem with dual registration.537   
Australia has a federalist system similar to the US where each territory has its own registry and then 
there is also the federal IP registry. Australia also has experienced this problem with multiple 
registration systems as it has more than forty registers which operate independently from one 
another.538  Essentially, there are separate national and territorial registries for company changes and 
then separate, national intellectual property registers. Each IP registry is further separated into two 
registers: one to prove ownership and scope of the right and one for the registration of security 
interests. The problems associated with multiple filings in the UK are discussed in Chapter 4. Neither 
the UK nor Australia has solved the problem of multiple registries.539 Despite creditors’ intentions, 
dual filings have not been shown to resolve any procedural uncertainty in any jurisdiction. Without a 
resolution of the conflict between state and federal law creditors cannot be certain where to file and 
which filing will actually be deemed to have been perfected. 
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The creditor will also face the other problems associated with perfection. Some cases have ruled that 
using the Article 9 rules of asset description which allows the term “intangibles” is sufficient to allow 
the security interest in an IP right to attach and be perfected. Other cases have ruled that individual IP 
rights must be listed. The same uncertainty is true in regards to after-acquired property. The judiciary 
has been hostile to the possibility that a security interest in an IP right which was not created at the 
time of the agreement could still attach and perfect. Under Article 9 this is possible, but the Federal 
Acts themselves do not contemplate the possibility of after-acquired property. 
The pre-emption question is unlikely to be solved simply by one future judicial decision as one case is 
unlikely to have such a vast fact pattern. The process of moving through the appellate system would 
also be timely and costly for any creditor seeking to enforce their security interest. The high level of 
risk and extra burden placed on the creditor mean that IP cannot be financed as easily as other types of 
assets. Because of this, the IP owner is unable to fully realize the value of the IP to their business. 
There needs to be a greater awareness of the problems that occur when taking a security interest in IP.  
There also needs to be greater awareness of the conflict between Article 9 and the IP Acts. There are 
indications of greater awareness as currently the American Bar Association has a task force that is 
working on recommendations for the problem.540 The work of the task force shows that the problem 
of using IP in secured finance is at least gaining the attention of the legal community.541 
 5. Recommendations 
Article 9 is considered to be flexible, logical and business friendly. Its adoption has streamlined the 
previously fragmented patchwork system found by the laws in each state. It has allowed secured 
finance to become more certain and easier to obtain for individuals and companies alike. The 
flexibility of Article 9’s mechanisms allows it to be used to take security in most kind of assets. 
Additionally, registration and perfection under Article 9 is straightforward. A creditor can perfect a 
security interest by filing in the lex domicilii of the creditor, which is either the state of the debtor’s 
incorporation or the state of their headquarters. For non-corporate debtors, the creditor files in the 
debtor’s state of residence. The laws on determining where to file in Article 9 are clear and 
straightforward.  
The state registers for Article 9 security interests have been created solely for that purpose. In this 
regard, they are unlike the IP registers which were created for an entirely different purpose. Also the 
main purpose of the IP register is not to give creditors notice of a security interest but rather to show 
the breadth of the IP right. It is for this reason that the IP registers are not well suited for recording 
security interest. Also, IP laws and registers cannot encompass security interests in multiple IP rights 
or in after-acquired IP.  
It is for these reasons that the best solution to the conflict caused by Article 9 and the registered IP 
Acts, is to legislate that Article 9 governs security interest in IP rights. Statutory intervention is 
required because of the current case law and the problem of stare decisis. It is unlikely that any one 
case would be able to definitively determine that the IP Acts do not pre-empt Article 9. This 
legislation would dictate that perfection occurs by registering the security interest at the applicable 
state registry and not an IP office. The other issues such as adequate asset descriptions and the after-
acquired property problem would also be solved by clear statutory amendment. It is only with serious 
statutory reform that IP and finance can begin to act in harmonization with each other to reach the 
potential of the IP-Finance Growth Spiral. 
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CHAPTER 6: INTERNATIONAL HARMONISATION  
1. Introduction 
The breakdown in the IP-Finance Growth Spiral caused by ineffectual laws for is both an international 
and a cross-border problem. It is an international problem because many of the world’s legal 
jurisdictions have legal problems for taking security in IP rights.   Tt is also a cross-border issue 
because there is little harmonisation between jurisdictions and no clear guidance on how to proceed 
when there is a conflict between national laws. This problem is becoming increasingly common as 
many IP portfolios contain IP rights from multiple jurisdictions. Knopf correctly stated back in 2002: 
“Many deals are international and may involve portfolios of intellectual property that are registered in 
many countries, or may exist in many countries as unregistered copyrights or trademarks.”542 
Although there are numerous international treaties regarding intellectual property rights, until 2010 
there were none that focused on the use of IP as security. In particular, until recently there had not 
been any proposals for an international, central register of IP rights where notices of security could be 
registered.  There had been some limited mention of a central registry for trademarks in the Madrid 
Agreement and Protocol but neither contained provisions on registering security in those trademarks.                                                                                                                              
In 2006 the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) and the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade (“Uncitral”) began cooperating on the development of a Legislative Guide on 
Secured Transaction focusing on t secured finance in IP rights. This chapter will discuss the findings 
of a WIPO’s questionnaire and subsequent report that was used to assess the legal situation found in 
WIPO member states for taking security in IP rights. Then it will discuss Uncitral’s Legislative Guide 
on Secured Transactions (the “Guide”).and the Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions: 
Supplement in Security Rights in Intellectual Property (the “Supplement”). 
A discussion of the WIPO report and will show that the UK and the US are not the only jurisdictions 
where a conflict of laws causes a break down in the IP Finance Growth Spiral. The recommendation’s 
in Uncitral’ s Guide and Supplement will be compared with the current position of UK and US law 
and also the recommendations will be compared with the recommendations set out in the conclusions 
in Chapter 4 and 5. Additionally, it will also show that a lack of harmonisation and cross-border 
mechanisms leads to a further breakdown in the IP-Finance Growth Spiral  
2. The WIPO Report 
a. History of the Report 
As part of the collaboration between Uncitral and WIPO, in 2007, the WIPO Secretariat sent out a 
questionnaire to its member states in order to gather information on how security interests in IP are 
dealt with in each member’s states national laws543. The questionnaire was designed to collect 
information on how secured transactions are provided for in IP law which would then assist WIPO 
and Uncitral in identifying key legal issues for inclusion in the Guide and Supplement. A large 
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number of member states responded to the questionnaire including the UK and the US.544 It should be 
noted that since the UK is a member of WIPO (rather than individual countries in the UK) all 
responses from the UK law relate to UK law and not to the law of any of the individual nations within 
the UK. In this Chapter references will only be made to UK wide IP law and also the UK wide 
Companies Act so the term ‘UK law’ will be used.  
Many of the questions in the questionnaire related to where and how security interests in IP are 
registered in member states. The questions also focused on how a security interest is created in an IP 
right, how it is perfected, and then how interests are prioritised. In 2009, WIPO published the 
Information Paper on Intellectual Property Financing which included the questionnaire, the results of 
the questionnaire and an analysis of the results in Annex 1 (the “Annex”). 545 The section below will 
discuss each question and the responses from the member states. It will also compare the responses 
from the US and the UK with the responses from the other member nations. 
b. The Questionaire and its Results 
The questionnaire contained only eight questions on the key issues in using IP as security546. The 
questions were on a variety of areas beginning with questions on the legal framework. The first few 
questions address whether security is governed by IP law or ‘Other Laws’ as described in the 
questionnaire.  The member states’ responses to each question were highly varied with some member 
states providing lengthy descriptions of the legal situation for IP financing in their jurisdiction 
whereas others provided only single word answers547. The questions then move to perfection and 
registration. The final questions query the rights of third parties in relation to an encumbered IP right.  
The first question asked whether there were any legal provisions on security interests in IP548. 61% of 
the responding member states affirmed that its jurisdiction did contain laws on the matter. 36% 
reported that there were no such provisions in their laws549. The responses from the latter group 
showed that a surprising number of countries with developed systems of intellectual property have no 
laws regarding the use of those IP as collateral. In this regard, the UK and the US both reported that 
they had legal provisions on taking security in IP like the majority of the responding member states. 
Question two asked whether the laws of security interests in IP were found within IP law, other laws, 
both IP and other law or no laws. 12%, the smallest group reported that such provisions were found 
only in IP law550. The majority of member states, 49%, reported that applicable laws were found in 
both IP law and in other laws. 43% of the members reported that relevant laws were found in other 
laws. Of the member states that reported other laws were the source for provisions on security in IP, 
30% of them gave the caveat that “other laws” governed security interests in copyright but not 
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necessarily other IP rights. 22% of the member states reported they did not have any laws which 
addressed the issue at all. It is interesting that 22% of the reporting states reported that they had no 
applicable law whereas, in the previous question, 36% reported the same. WIPO does not explain the 
incongruity between the responses, so the reason for the anomaly is uncertain.  
For question 2, the UK reported that IP and other laws governed security interests in IP except for 
copyright. It reported that security interests in copyright were governed by other laws only and not by 
IP law. The US reported that IP and other laws governed copyright but only other laws governed 
security interests in patents and trademarks. It is interesting that the US reported this despite the fact 
that the Article 9 pre-emption issue is still not settled for patents or trademarks.551 The UK and the US 
in this regard are like the majority of other reporting member states and have a mix of IP and other 
laws which govern the creation of security in IP rights.  
The third question asked which set of laws governed the following issues: the creation or the granting 
of a security interest in IP; the method of perfection or making the security interest effective against 
third parties; how priority is given to such interests; and enforcement of the security interest. In 
regards to creation, 65% of the member states reported that laws other than IP law governed. 50% of 
the member states also said that other laws governed perfection. Only 40% of the member states 
reported that other laws governed how priority is determined.  64% of the member states reported that 
issues of enforcement were governed by other laws. The response shows that the most common legal 
structure is one where other laws govern the majority of the legal issues surrounding the interesting 
except for issues of priority between competing security interest which are governed by IP law. It is 
not clear from the responses whether there is a conflict between IP and other laws in member states 
where laws on priority are governed by IP law but the rest of security interest in an IP right. The 
response also showed that there is no clear majority of countries using the same legal structure to 
govern security in IP.  
For question 3, the UK reported that IP law governed the creation and perfection of the security 
interest except for copyright. As shown in Chapter 4 this is not an entirely true assessment as the 
Companies Act also governs security interests taken in a registered company’s trade marks and 
patents.  The US reported in a similar way by stating that other laws governed the creation and 
perfection of the security interest. Again, this is not an entirely true account, as shown in Chapter 5, 
because Article 9 governs the security interests in IP. These responses will be discussed in greater 
detail below.  
The fourth question asked where security interests in IP were recorded. The majority of countries, 
67%, reported that they were recorded in an IP specific registry.552 31% of the member states reported 
that they used another form of register, and 14% said they had no registry at all. This question is 
surprisingly complicated. As shown in the chapters 4 and 5, 553  it is common to find dual filing 
requirements in many jurisdictions, but it is unclear which register prevails and whether all types of IP 
share the same registry.554 The UK reported that security interests in copyright are recorded in another 
register and that security interests in other IP rights are recorded in an IP register. As shown in 
Chapter 4, security interests in patents and trade marks owned by a registered company must also be 
registered in the register at Companies House. The UK did not report the requirement for filing in two 
registers. The US reported that security interests in IP could be registered at the IP register or at 
another register. The term “or” is incorrect in the response. In shown in Chapter 5, it is still unclear 
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whether registration following the rules of Article 9 or the registration at the applicable IP register 
will prevail. Creditors may not perfect their interest by only filing at the register of their choosing but 
instead will file at both to try to mitigate any lack of certainty.  As the majority of member states 
reported that security interests in IP are registered solely in the IP register, it could be very likely that 
they have the same problems with dual registration found in both the UK and the US.  
The fifth question asked how a security interest in IP becomes effective against third parties and 
whether registration is required. The results were extremely diverse in this regard. 555 40% of the 
member states responded that a filing must be made in an IP specific registry for it to be effective 
against third parties. 29% of the member states reported that such a security interest becomes effective 
upon creation and that no further registration was required. The final 18% of member states said that 
the interest would only become effective when registered in another type of registry. It is interesting 
that the US responded that perfection occurs when registering in an IP specific registry when, as 
shown in Chapter 5, the majority of security interests in registered IP rights are perfected by filing at a 
general registry. This also conflicts with the response for question four, where it was reported that 
security interests in IP can be registered at an IP register or another register. The UK reported that a 
security interest in IP becomes effective against third parties on creation. This response is not taking 
account of the Companies Act, which would apply to many of the security interests created in IP right 
as shown in Chapter 4. It is also interesting to note that the number of member states which responded 
to this question is significantly lower than the number that responded to other questions556 
Question six asked whether an interest can be recorded in an IP specific registry and how filing in that 
registry affects priority against later interests. It also asked whether this filing gives priority over only 
those with prior knowledge, those without knowledge or whether it created the presumption of 
priority or if it had any effect at all. This question once again showed the divergence between the 
member states557. 37% reported that recording the interest would give priority over all competing 
parties regardless of knowledge. 26% said that it had no effect. 11% reported that it was a 
presumption of priority and in 5% it was only effective against competing parties without knowledge. 
The seventh question asked whether a security right in the IP also includes the right to any proceeds 
realized from the IP right, such as licence fees. The responses were diverse558. 41% of the member 
states reported that a security right in an IP right includes the right to take all proceeds from the IP. 
34% of the member states reported that said that it does not. In the UK and the US, a security interest 
can be taken separately in the IP right or in the licence fees. It is not an automatic assumption that a 
security interest in the IP right also gives an automatic right to any licensing fees. Notwithstanding, in 
both countries many security agreements, are structured so as to take a security interest in both the 
underlying IP and also any licensing fees or royalties derived from the IP right. 
In the last question, member states were asked what occurs when the IP subject to the security 
interest, is infringed by a third party and whether the secured creditor is allowed to take legal action 
alone or whether they must act in concert with the IP owner. The question also asked whether the 
secured creditor can seek damages and/or seek to obtain an injunction. Additionally, the question also 
asked whether the rights of the secured creditor in infringement actions are determined by the 
contract, solely by IP law or if it is unaddressed in the law. 31% of the member states reported that the 
creditor may take action alone while 20% of the member states reported that the creditor must take 
action along with the owner. In member states where the creditor is allowed to take action alone, 34% 
of them reported that the creditor can either claim damages or seek an injunction. Only 3% reported 
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that the law restricted the creditor to seeking injunctions only, and 5% reported that the secured 
creditor can only receive damages. In 32% of the member states, the security agreement governs who 
may take action against third parties whereas 6% of the member states reported that IP law solely 
dictates whether the creditor can take action against third parties. 6% of the member states reported 
that there were no laws which determined the rights of the creditor in infringement cases. In both the 
US and the UK either party may take actions against third parties but this can modified through 
agreement.559 
d. Conclusions from the WIPO Report  
The WIPO questionnaire and report demonstrated four points which are particularly relevant to this 
thesis. The first is that there is not a general legal structure used to take security in IP throughout the 
member states. The responses to the questions showed that the member states use very different laws 
and legal mechanisms to allow security in IP to be taken. This is especially true in the areas of 
perfection and registration. Since the responses showed that the member states have such varied laws, 
harmonisation of laws amongst the member states will be extremely difficult.  
The second point is that many member states either have inadequate laws or no laws for taking 
security in IP. Some of the responses showed that in many member states the practice of using IP as 
collateral is not regulated, or it simply does not occur. The later was reported by several African 
countries and other nations with poorly developed secured lending facilities560. It also showed that 
many member states have no applicable laws on the issue at all561. This includes Thailand, Ethiopia, 
and Georgia. In these countries, the practice is not forbidden, but it is not explicitly allowed either. 
The report also showed that several of the reporting member states do not have a registry where a 
security interest in an IP right could be perfected. In these cases, the security interest could be created 
and enforceable between the two parties but it is unlikely that the security interest would have any 
effect on third parties. In member states where there are no applicable laws or where there is not a 
register, the IP-Finance Growth Cycle will be severely inhibited. Even if the practice is not forbidden 
outright, it is unlikely to occur in these member states. The lack of appropriate legal structures and 
mechanisms is likely to make the level of uncertainty too great for creditors. 
The third finding from the report is that there are still major problems and concerns when using IP as 
security in member states with highly developed intellectual property laws and secured finance 
laws562. In this regard, the UK, and the US share similar problems with other member states in a 
similar position. In the area of perfection, many member states reported that IP and other laws 
governed security in IP. Conflicts between the two sets of laws are very likely to occur in this 
situation which is going to increase the uncertainty and risk for creditors.  The responses regarding the 
appropriate registers for security interests in IP also shows that many member states have legal 
problems in this area. A large number of member states reported that security interests in some IP 
rights are registered at an IP specific registry whereas security interests in other types of IP are 
registered at another registry. In these member states, there will be a level of uncertainty for creditors 
attempting to register their security interest like as is found in the US and the UK.563  Creditors in this 
situation would face the problems with dual registration and may have to register the security in an IP 
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specific registry as well as general registry Dual registration increases both cost and uncertainty564. 
The responses to the questions on perfection and registration, alone, show that in many member states 
legal uncertainty is interfering with the IP-Finance Growth Spiral.  
After producing the report, WIPO began working with Uncitral in order to provide a set of proposed 
guidelines to follow to either develop or enhance their own systems of laws in this area565. Since the 
release of the report, WIPO also has continued to stress the importance of legal change and then 
eventual harmonisation. In 2009, the WIPO Director General stated in an interview: “The connection 
between financial securities and the underlying economic value has become too tenuous, making it 
difficult to be certain that the valuation system is in place and understood. Securities also have 
become more complex in recent years, lacking transparency which in the current economic climate 
adds to distrust. Nevertheless, the intangible economy has arrived with more than 50 percent of the 
top companies in the credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s index dependent on intangible assets. 
Global trade in intellectual property is valued at more than $300 billion.” 566  
3. Uncitral Supplement 
Uncitral released its recommendations for a general secured transaction regime in the Guide in 2007. 
Three years later they released a supplement specifically focusing on IP: Uncitral Legislative Guide 
on Secured Transactions: Supplement in Security Rights in Intellectual Property (the “Supplement”). 
The aim of the Supplement is stated to be to “promote low-cost credit by enhancing the availability of 
secured credit… In line with this objective the Supplement is intended to make credit more available 
and at a lower cost to intellectual property owners and other intellectual property rights holders, thus 
enhancing the value of intellectual property rights as security for credit.”567 Specific legal  objectives 
of the Supplement are stated to be the following568: 
(a) To allow person with rights in intellectual property to use intellectual property as security for 
credit; 
(b) To allow persons with rights in intellectual property to use the full value of their assets to 
obtain credit; 
(c) To enable persons with rights in intellectual property to create a security right in such rights 
in a simple and efficient manner; 
(d)  To allow parties to secured transactions relating to intellectual property maximum flexibility 
to negotiate the terms of their security agreement; 
(e) To enable interested parties to determine the existence of security rights in intellectual 
property in a clear and predictable way; 
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(f) To enable secured creditors to determine the priority of their security rights in intellectual 
property in a clear and predictable way; and 
(g) To facilitate efficient enforcement of security rights in intellectual property. 
It also emphasises that the Supplement aims to allow party autonomy but not without limitation: “The 
law recommended in the Guide generally recognizes the principle of party autonomy, although it does 
set forth a number of exceptions.” 569  The Section does not set out any rules on how party autonomy 
should be encouraged or restricted but instead offers guidance through examples. Additionally, each 
example includes the general warning that the agreement between the parties is always subject to local 
intellectual property law, and if the local law forbids such an arrangement, it will not be honoured 
even if the Guide and Supplement would allow for it.570 Also, the Supplement stresses that party 
autonomy in contracts allows IP rights to be fully used to their potential in order to obtain financing.  
Intellectual Property is defined in the Supplement as “(Property, such as a patent, trademark or 
copyright.”571 This rather broad statement is clarified with the limitation that it has to be a type of IP 
right which is capable of being transferred under the appropriate local law. For example in some 
jurisdictions, only the economic benefit of copyrights may be transferred, but the moral rights of the 
copyright may not be.572 So moral rights would not be considered a type of Intellectual Property in 
jurisdictions where it cannot be transferred. This is a very broad definition despite the limitation that it 
refers to transferable IP only. The Supplement clearly intends to cover trademarks, patents, and 
copyright but it is unclear whether other rights are included as well.  
The Supplement defines security as “all transactions serving security purposes, regardless of how they 
are denominated by the parties or by law relating to IP.”573  This language would suggest that any type 
of transaction which gives rise to a security right, whether arising from IP law or any other 
commercial law, is considered to be within the scope of the Supplement.  It is assumed that this would 
include all categories of security interests such as mortgages, charges, or liens.  The Supplement states 
that it includes transactions where ownership and title are transferred as types of security.574 Royalties 
and revenue from IP licenses are included within this definition. In the Supplement, the definition of 
transaction is extremely wide just as it is with IP. The Supplement divides IP financing into two 
categories: transactions in which the rights themselves serve solely as security for credit; and 
transactions where IP is included with other moveable assets as security for credit. The later can occur 
in cases of whole business securitisation or even with floating charges.  
The Supplement gives recommendations for each key area. Often there is more than one 
recommendation for each area in order to try to make the Supplement in order to accommodate a wide 
variety of legal systems and to make the Supplement as flexible as possible. For example, the 
Supplement gives a recommendation for the best method of registration but then it also offers several 
other alternatives. In this Chapter, the Supplement’s recommendations on perfection, registration and 
priority will be analysed below. 
a. Recommendations on Perfection 
The Supplement has several recommendations that impact the area of perfection. Although the 
recommendations on the creation of a security interest are out of the scope of this thesis, it should be 
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noted that the Supplement recommends that creation and perfection be treated as two distinct steps. 
The Supplement defines creation as an agreement between a debtor and creditor which only binds 
those two parties. It then defines perfection as the act required to make the security interest binding on 
third parties. Some critics have argued that the recommendations to distinguish creation and 
perfection are biased towards common law countries and in particular the US. 575 The Supplement 
argues that the main reason for this distinction is to minimise the amount of formalities needed to 
effectuate security interests. In legal systems where creation and perfection are combined a range of 
formalities are required. For example, the law may require the title of the IP to be transferred to the 
creditor and then licensed back so the debtor can continue to use it. In this regard, the Supplement has 
chosen to take the so-called ‘functional approach’ to security interests rather than the formal 
approach.576 The former approach is the same taken by the US and many of the other common law 
nations except England577. In England, a security interest is effective against third parties upon 
creation in the common law and to some extent in registered IP law but not within the Companies 
Act578.  
In the Supplement, perfection generally occurs when the security interest is registered in an 
appropriate register.579 The term “appropriate register” becomes controversial when used in relation to 
security on IP580. Although the Supplement does not require the implementation of a new register, it 
does stress the importance of a single register for interests in IP. This is in line with the 
recommendations in the Guide, which advocates for the creation of a single register for all security 
interests. The Guide also recommends simple filing requirements for both existing and potential rights 
(allowing the floating charge) and also single registration for multiple rights if the same parties. In the 
Guide, the register is indexed according to the debtor, and the register is freely available for searching 
by all interested third parties. In the Guide, registration perfects the interest and then priority is given 
based on the time of registration.581 The Supplement seems to prefer the registration of interests in a 
general registry but also offers alternatives is a jurisdiction already has an IP specific registry. 
The main recommendation in this area is that a jurisdiction should not have competing registries or 
dual registration. The Supplement does not take a definitive position on whether a security interest 
should be perfected through registration at the general registry or through registration at the IP 
registry but it emphasises registration should occur through a single filing only: “security rights in 
intangible assets may be made effective against third parties by registration of a notice in the general 
rights registry or of a document of notice in a specialized registry.”582 This wording seems to indicate 
that the Supplement leaves the individual government to decide on whether the single filing should 
occur in the general registry or at the IP registry. In this regard, the Supplement has taken a statement 
against a dual filing requirement, but it does not necessarily provide a solution to jurisdictions where 
there is a conflict of laws causing dual filing. 
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The issue of filing at a general registry or an IP specific registry was heavily debated during the 
writing of the Supplement. It is for this reason that the following statement was made: “As this matter 
is beyond the scope of secured transactions law and, in any case, (creation of a specialized registry) 
would require additional effort and expense by States, the Guide does not recommend that States that 
currently do not have a specialized registry for certain types of intellectual property create such a 
registry in order to permit the registration of a document or notice of a security right in intellectual 
property. For the same reason, the Guide does not recommend that the states, which currently do not 
permit the registration of a document or notice of a security right in an intellectual property registry 
amend their laws to permit such registration. Finally, to avoid duplication of effort and expense, the 
Guide does not recommend a rule that requires registration of a document or notice of a security right 
in both the relevant intellectual property registry and in the general security rights registry. “ 
This statement would suggest that the Supplement does not outwardly take a position against 
perfection through specialized registration in the IP registry, but it seems to discourage the practice. In 
keeping with its usual form, however, the Supplement allows the possibility of a specialist register but 
does not advocate for the creation of one if it does not already exist: “the Guide neither recommends 
the creation of a specialized registration system (for intellectual property or for any other type of 
asset), if one does not exist, nor interferes with existing registration systems.”583 
In cases where there is a conflict between registers, the Supplement gives the pragmatic suggestion by 
recommending that the two registers find a way to coordinate. The suggestion is that when a security 
interest is registered it could be shown on both registers. For example, an entry on the general register 
could include a link to the IP register. This is less of a problem in jurisdictions which have electronic 
registers. In such jurisdictions, coordination between the two registers is not an impossible task.  If a 
jurisdiction uses paper-based registers then providing ongoing indexing and linking between the two 
registers would be much more difficult. Such coordination between registers is certainly desirable. 
However, it would not answer questions on which registration perfects the interest or how interests 
registered in the two registries will be prioritized. The Supplement in this regard does not find a 
solution to the problem of dual filing which diminishes some of the positive attributes of the 
recommendation it does give.  
The Guide and Schedule both state that the time of perfection should be deemed to occur when the 
registration is viewable by the public. For electronic submissions, this could be almost instantaneous 
but for paper-based ones, there will usually be a delay. In this regard, the Supplement prefers the rules 
from Article 9 (priority dates from registration) rather than the English common law (priority is dated 
from creation). A further discussion of the Supplement’s recommendations on priority is given below. 
Neither the US nor the UK is compliant with the Supplement’s recommendations on registers. The 
Supplement stresses that its most important recommendation is that jurisdictions should not have 
competing registries or dual registration. In the UK, this is not the case as the conflict between the 
Companies Act and IP legislation makes it unclear where a charge in an IP right should be 
registered.584 Also, UK law is not compliant with the recommendation that registration perfects the 
interest because security interests in copyright from non-registered companies do not have a register. 
The existence of an IP specific registry in the UK is not the problem but rather the existence of the 
Companies Register in addition to the IP register creates the problem of competing registers and a 
need for dual registration.  
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The US is not compliant with the recommendations on competing registers and dual registration 
either. The conflict between Article 9 and registered IP law causes confusion as to where security 
interests should be registered in order to be perfected. It also leaves questions on the priority of 
competing security interests at the registers. The preferred recommendation in Supplement is that 
interests in IP should be registered at a general register. If US laws were clarified so that the laws of 
registered IP do not pre-empt Article 9, then the US would be fully compliant. 
 
 
b. Recommendations on Priority 
In the larger Guide, priority is defined as a conflict between two secured creditors.585 The Supplement 
specifically excludes conflicting IP transferees from this definition586. This is in furtherance of the 
overall concept of a security interest which is not a transfer of an IP right in the Supplement. In the 
Supplement, as a general rule, priority is calculated based on the date of perfection. As shown above, 
the date of the security interest is determined by the date of its registration. In the Supplement, this is 
the preferred method of determining priority. However, the Supplement is flexible and allows for 
knowledge based priority rules to remain along with the general priority rules but only in very narrow 
circumstances587. Knowledge-based priority, discussed in greater details in Chapter 4, occurs when a 
subsequent interested is registered with knowledge of a prior unregistered interest. In that case, 
despite the registration, the subsequent interest will not have priority over the unregistered right. 
Knowledge-based priority is limited in the Supplement to circumstances where the applicable 
jurisdiction already has IP laws which contain knowledge based priority provisions.588 This is the case 
in the UK as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
Overall, the Supplement has limited recommendations on priority.589 This is because the Guide has 
already contained comprehensive provisions on priority, and the Supplement does not need to 
duplicate the effort. The Supplement does, however; identify common problems encountered on 
determining the priority of creditors with conflicting security interest in an IP right. 
One of the main problems identified is transferring encumbered registered IP rights.590 The 
Supplement follows the Guide and recommends that if an encumbered asset is to be transferred, then 
the transferee should take the asset subject to the security right if the security right has been correctly 
perfected.591 The transferee will only take free of the security interest if the security interest has not 
been properly perfected. The Supplement recognizes that in jurisdictions with specialized IP registers, 
a security interest registered in the IP specific registry will have priority over a security interest 
registered in the general registry. Also, the Supplement recommends that if an interest is not 
registered in the IP specific register, then the transferee will take the IP right without the security 
interest. The Supplement does not make any recommendations on transferring encumbered 
unregistered IP rights because it is not a common problem in most jurisdictions.  
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In the Supplement, the recommendations that the transferee takes subject to the security interest has 
two important exceptions.592 The first exception is when the holder of the security interest has 
authorised a transfer which is not subject to the interest. The second exception occurs when there is a 
transfer in the ordinary course of business where the buyer does not have knowledge of the security 
interest and that the transfer would violate the security agreement. These are the only exceptions to 
the general rule when the security interest has been perfected at the appropriate registry. Of these two 
exceptions, the “ordinary course of business rule” is particularly important. The rule is made to 
protect “every day, legitimate transactions” including non-exclusive licensing, from being subject the 
security interest593. In this regard, the Supplement treats non-exclusive licences separately than other 
transfers of IP rights. This is in recognition that the IP right subject to the interest may be licensed to 
third parties and that such licenses themselves can be subject to a separate security interest. When 
either the IP right or the licence is subject to a security interest, there may be a transfer of the asset to 
the creditor upon default of the debtor594. The second exception allows for the rights of licensees to be 
unaffected despite a security interest in the underlying IP right. Essentially, the Supplement wants to 
ensure that security interests do not have a chilling effect on licensing. Due to the inclusion of the 
ordinary course of business rule in the Supplement, certain licenses such as off the shelf software 
would not lose end users licenses if the underlying copyright of the software is taken as security.595 
The Supplement’s recommendations on priority differ from UK law in several ways.596 For example 
in Section 33 of the Patents Act, the priority of a registered interest is subject to whether it was 
registered with knowledge of a prior unregistered interest. As mentioned previously, the rules on 
priority in the Patents Act conflict with the Companies Act, which does not give an exception to 
priority for knowledge. In the Companies Act, a charge is void unless it is registered (perfected) 
within the 21 day grace period. Knowledge does not effect the date of perfection and how subsequent 
priority is to be determined. In this regard, the conflicting laws mean the UK does not mean either 
recommendation. 
The Supplement’s preferred recommendation that date of perfection should determine priority is 
similar to US law. Neither the registered IP laws nor Article 9 contains provisions which allow for a 
prior unregistered security interest to take priority over a subsequent registered interest with prior 
knowledge.597 In both sets of laws the date of perfection determines priority regardless of whether the 
registration was made with knowledge of a prior unregistered interest. The close alignment between 
the recommendations and US law in many key areas is one point of criticism by many commentators. 
This will be discussed below. 
c. Description requirement 
The “description requirement” is addressed in this thesis as a problem in perfection, particularly in 
Chapter 5, but it can also be considered an issue in attachment as well. The Supplement addresses the 
issue in its section on creation, but the recommendations also impact perfection. 
Additionally, the Supplement requires a sufficient description of the IP in the agreement. In this, like 
in other sections, reasonableness is the standard: “the asset is reasonably described.” 598 Neither the 
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Supplement nor the Guide describes what “reasonable” means. If there is written evidence of an 
agreement and the asset is reasonably described, under the Supplement the security interest has been 
created and is binding between the two parties. Asset description is also mentioned in Section 130 A 
on the registration situation where it states then when registration of the notice of the security interest 
that there must be a description of the encumbered asset.  
Unfortunately, the Supplement does not address the underlying conflict between secured finance law 
and IP in this regard. As mentioned previously, the asset description is often vague and general in 
order to try to capture the largest number of assets in the interest. IP rights, on the other hand, are 
specific. The Supplement does not comment on whether the common asset description of “general 
intangibles” is enough to perfect an interest in an IP right. 
d. After-acquired property 
The Supplement states that the ability to perfect a security interest in a future IP right is essential.599 It 
also states that its recommendations provide extra protection for debtors in the area of after-acquired 
IP600. Many jurisdictions have developed mechanisms that allow for the creation of an interest in the 
after-acquired property as discussed in Chapter 4 and 5. The allowance for a security interest in after-
acquired property means the creditor will not have to take additional requirements or undergo 
additional formalities when taking security over a rapidly changing asset pool. For example, in 
England, this has been accomplished through the development of the floating charge.601  
The concept of after-acquired property has been traditionally problematic in IP law for two reasons. 
Firstly as mentioned in previous chapters, IP law does not generally recognize that an IP right, which 
is created through registration, can be transferred before its creation. Secondly, and more pertinently 
to this discussion, the ability of a security interest to attach to unforeseen future IP rights can be 
detrimental to the debtor/IP owner. The fear is that an IP owner could unintentionally transfer future 
IP rights which may not be in any way related to the loan transaction. The scenario could easily occur 
when an IP owner who is “young and needed the money” signs an agreement where the creditor is 
able to impose overreaching contractual terms which creates a security interest in all future IP rights.  
The Supplement attempts to balance commercial pragmatism with protection for debtor/IP owners. It 
recommends that security interests in after-acquired IP should be allowed, but it should not be the 
default legal position.602 The Supplement recognizes that collateralizing future IP rights is a useful 
tool in raising finance (it has historically been important in the film industry) In many jurisdictions, 
for example, a security interest can be taken in a patent application which converts into an interest 
taken in a patent after it has been granted.  Another caveat on security in after-acquired IP is that the 
IP right in question must have been reasonably identifiable in advance603. This prohibition will mean 
that that the security interest will only to attach to assets which were determinable at the time of its 
creation. For example, a film which has not been made can be used as collateral for financing to make 
that film. However, the security interest would not attach to all future films of the IP owner because 
their value cannot be anticipated at the time of the security agreement. 
In this section, the Supplement also addresses the related problem which occurs with updates, 
adaptations, and derivative works of the IP right.604  In some jurisdictions, derivative works are 
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automatically captured by a security interest in the underlying IP.605 This most often occurs with 
software; where changes to the software code (updates, upgrades or even debugging) are considered 
to be captured by the interest in the underlying IP.  Some jurisdictions take the opposite approach and 
do not allow the security interest to attach to a derivative work without specific provisions in the 
security agreement which expressly includes derivative works are included.  In general, most 
jurisdictions treat derivative works as new and separate IP rights which must be captured by a 
separate and new security interest. The Supplement takes the same position on derivative works that it 
takes with other types of after-acquired IP: “If future rights may not be encumbered, improvements 
may not be encumbered (by the original security interest).”606 This suggests that the Supplement 
endorses the ability of the security instrument to attach to derivative works of the original IP but only 
by specific reference in the security agreement and if they are contemplated at the time the security 
interest was created. 
The Supplement also states that “States enacting the recommendations of the Guide may wish to 
consider reviewing their law relating to intellectual property and, if it does not, to consider permitting 
the registration of a security right in future intellectual property.607” This suggests that the ability to 
create security in a future IP right is considered to be a critical issue in the Supplement. 
e. Provisions for private international conflicts of law  
The last section of the Supplement gives recommendations in cases where a debtor’s assets used as 
security for a loan include IP in another jurisdiction. In this regard, the law where the debtor is located 
may conflict with the law where the IP right is located (the lex domicilli conflicts with the lex 
protecionis). Conflict of laws provisions usually addresses such conflicts. The Supplement recognises 
that many such provisions may provide that the location of the debtor is the controlling law. This 
would make it difficult for the creditor to enforce an interest in an IP right in a country different from 
the debtor. The Supplement gives three recommendations in determining the law applicable to a 
security interest in an IP right. It states: “the law should provide that: (a) the law applicable to the 
creation, effectiveness against third parties and priority of a security right in intellectual property is 
the law of the State in which the intellectual property is protected; (b) A security right in intellectual 
property may also be created under the law of the State in which the grantor is located and may also 
be made effective under that law against third parties other than another secured creditor, a transferee 
or a licensee; and (c) The law applicable to the enforcement of a security right in intellectual property 
is the law of the State in which the grantor is located.”608 
The first recommendation is for the principle of lex protectionis which is embedded in national laws 
as well as international conventions protecting IP. Under this view, a secured creditor would have to 
ensure that a security interest is effective and enforceable under the laws of the state where the 
intellectual property exists. The Supplement notes that this approach has many inefficiencies.609 One 
of the greatest is that a creditor will have to register the interest in several States. One example of 
when this could occur is if the debtor holds IP rights in more than one nation. Another example is if 
the debtor holds assets not limited to IP in one nation and then an IP right in another.  
The second recommendation is for a hybrid approach. The Supplement states that: “the approaches 
based on the law of the State of the grantor’s location and the lex protectionis could be combined in 
the following way. The law of the State of the grantor’s location would apply in principle to the 
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creation, third-party effectiveness, priority and enforcement of a security right in intellectual property. 
However, the third party effectiveness and priority of a security right as against the rights of an 
outright transferee or licensee of intellectual property would be governed by the lex protectionis. This 
rule would apply irrespective of whether or not the lex protectionis provided for registration of a 
security interest in intellectual property in an intellectual property registry.610” The Supplement states 
that this method will lower transactions costs because a secured creditor may always register under 
the lex protectionis and because the creditor will only need to be concerned with making the interest 
effective against third parties under the laws in the State where the grantor is located. The Supplement 
mentions that the biggest difficulty with this hybrid method is that there is the strong possibility that 
the application of the law of the state of the grantor’s location may be considered to be contrary to the 
public policy in the lex protectionis. Under internationally mandatory rules the lex protectionis would 
prevail. 
The third recommendation would face the same difficulties in enforcement in the lex protectionis. 
There are advantages to this method as only one set of laws would theoretically govern the 
transaction. The biggest disadvantage is that the courts of the lex protectionis are unlikely to apply the 
foreign law of grantor’s location. The Supplement states that the greatest advantage of this approach 
is in the situations where security is taken over IP rights in more than two jurisdictions: “it should be 
noted that, under the recommended approach, if a security right encumbers intellectual property in 
States A, B and C, the security right would be effective in all such States against the insolvency 
representative if such effectiveness has been achieved under the law of the State of the grantor’s 
location.” 611 
The advantages of the second and third recommendations are numerous and would allow for greater 
certainty for creditors and reduced transaction costs. The biggest problem is that they are not likely to 
occur as most States are likely to reject foreign laws and apply the lex protectionis. Sato notes that “It 
would be rather be said that the discussion on conflict-of-laws rules in the IP Supplement highlights 
the limitations in solving the problems by providing a legal form (a legislative guide) or by providing 
a methodology (an applicable law).”612 For such recommendations to be widely implemented there 
would have to be a larger agreement to international treaties and conventions before the second and 
third recommendations would be widely adopted.  
4. Reception of the Recommendations 
There is relatively little scholarship on the Supplement and what has been published has given it a 
mixed response. Some scholars have greeted the early work of the Supplement with cautious 
optimism. Tosato, in particular, has written that the Supplement is unlikely to be the ultimate solution 
for individual countries or for the international community in general, however, it is an important first 
step in a journey.613 As he writes: “However this work is not complete, and the road ahead appears 
lengthy and torturous.”614   
Some critics of the Guide and Supplement say that they are an example of “soft law” which does not 
take a decisive stance on any issue, and therefore, they fail to bring about harmonization on a 
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substantive level615. This is true to some extent as neither gives concrete solutions to key problems. 
However, it should be remembered that the Supplement is an important starting point. The purpose of 
the Supplement is to provide countries with widely divergent legal systems, individual areas to reform 
without having to replace the legal systems which are familiar to them. It is also the first attempt by 
an international organisation to address the legal problems with security interests in IP. Although 
there has been a large amount of success in harmonizing actual IP law, 616 the same is not true for the 
laws of secured finance. The laws of secured finance are generally inherently connected with a 
jurisdiction’s property laws, which almost impossible to harmonize due to its inherently national 
characteristics. In this respect, Uncitral should be praised for attempting to address the issue at all.  
Other scholars617 have noted the similarities between US Article 9 and many of the recommendations 
in the Supplement and the Guide. McCormack argues that the Guide as a whole will be less successful 
because of these similarities with US law, particularly in light of the economic downturn in 2008. It 
should be noted that McCormack’s article focuses on the Guide and does not specifically mention the 
Supplement.618 It is more of an overall objection to harmonisation and particularly against the 
transplantation of US law into foreign jurisdictions rather than as a detailed analysis of the Guide. Part 
of his argument is that liberal systems of secured financing are not necessary for the overall economic 
stability of a nation and he correctly points out that several highly economically developed countries 
such as Germany do not operate with a liberal credit system.619  
It is difficult to judge yet whether individual countries will adopt the recommendations in the Guide 
or Supplement. One Japanese scholar has pointed out the Japanese government would be better 
waiting to see what other nations do before adopting the recommendations620. As mentioned 
previously, there is current work on recommendations in many countries for legal reform this area, but 
they are still not finalized so they cannot be compared with the Supplement. Malaysia and Singapore 
have recently announced initiatives to help facilitate the use of IP as an asset class. These initiatives 
include changes to the law of registering security interests in IP621.  It remains to be seen whether the 
initiatives will result in final legislative changes and how closely those changes align with the 
Supplement. It also remains to be seen whether other jurisdictions will show an interest in 
implementing the recommendations in the Guide and Supplement622. 
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The Supplement in some ways demonstrates the intrinsic tension caused by conflicting laws of 
secured finance and IP.  The Supplement attempts a difficult balancing act in this regard. On one hand 
the Supplement wants to normalise the use of IP as security. On the other, the Supplement is aware 
that many jurisdictions have a conflict between IP law and secured finance law, and they may not be 
willing to adapt wholeheartedly to recommendations made by an international group.  There seems to 
be an underlying belief that if it is explicitly stated the Schedules defers to local laws, then countries 
would be more likely to adopt the recommendations. The Supplement is ambitious and attempts to 
balance many objectives: preserve the integrity of IP law; providing flexible recommendations for 
changes in secured finance law; and balance the rights of the parties against the limits of national 
sovereignty. In order to meet all of these objectives the Supplement is very flexible and the 
recommendations it makes could probably be adopted in a variety of legal systems. However, the 
great flexibility of the recommendations also means that they do not always offer definitive solutions 
for key legal problems in this area. 
The WIPO report and the Supplement show that (a) security interests in IP are a legal problem in the 
majority of the world’s jurisdictions and (b) there are no simple solutions for legal change but rather a 
need for extensive statutory reform in each jurisdiction and internationally. The WIPO survey and the 
Supplement show that there is a growing awareness that the legal conflict between IP and secured 
finance law has serious economic ramifications. Throughout the world, many economies are shifting 
from traditional ones where the main value is from tangible assets, into an economy where digital 
assets have the most value.  A growing awareness of the problem is important, but awareness alone 
will not solve it.  
Whether the Guide and Supplement are viewed as a success or a failure will depend on the criteria 
used for judging them. It is likely to be a failure as a tool of widespread harmonization, but it is 
already successful for beginning the dialogue which will need to occur for harmonization to occur at 
any level. The most important aspect of the Guide and Supplement is that they have started a dialogue 
on this subject which will lead many countries to assess their own laws regarding IP and security 
interests. The great success of this project by Uncitral is that it has begun a dialogue of this issue at an 
international level. Of course, it will be up for individual nations to assess whether the 
recommendations are appropriate or even helpful in their own economies. Sometimes the greatest 
obstacle in any international legal problem is just bringing the nations to the negotiating table in the 
first place. 
The recommendations in the Supplement itself can be considered to be both flexible and pragmatic, 
but they will not fix some of the underlying problems in this area. The recommendations have been 
drafted to be relevant to various kinds of nations. They could be relevant to a jurisdiction without any 
kind of secured financing laws at all to a country with highly developed systems of both IP and 
secured finance. When it comes to the later, there are many places where the recommendations are 
silent or even admit that fixing a conflict is outside of the Supplement’s scope. The success of the 
Supplements is that it has brought extensive awareness to the issue and at least made some 
recommendations for reform. While its success as a harmonizing instrument is unlikely at a high 
level, it is most likely to be a useful guide for a variety of jurisdictions, and it is a successful first step 
to greater legal reform and harmonisation. It is only when legal reforms have been made on a national 
level and an international level that the IP Finance Growth Cycle will be able to function properly. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Probably the only criticism of the author of this thesis is that sometimes the flexibility means that true 















CHAPTER 7: THE SECURITISATION OF IP ASSETS 
1. Introduction  
The most recent securitisations of IP receivables have shown that it can be a useful tool for the right 
type of transactions which are structured in the right way. As mentioned in chapter 2, securitisation is 
known as a quasi-security interest because it uses contractual terms to effect security over assets 
instead of using the traditional filing mechanisms of a security interest623. That being said, many 
securitisations also include the use of security interests as a way to help decrease risk for the creditor. 
Securitisation has a split reputation. In the past, it was called a revolutionary way of raising finance by 
some, but then more recently it has been vilified and called the cause of the recent financial collapse. 
The truth probably lies somewhere between the two. Securitisation can provide a cost-effective way 
for companies to raise finance from intellectual property rights but only in certain situations. 
This chapter will discuss securitising IP revenues and also IP rights as a comparison to taking a 
security interest in an IP right. First, a brief introduction and explanation of securitisation will be 
given. Then, the history of the securitisation of IP revenue will be discussed.  Section 5 will consider 
new developments in IP securitisation. Finally, the chapter will give conclusions on securitisation and 
its applicability to IP revenue and IP rights. 
2. Securitisation 
Securitisation is a transaction which allows non-marketable securities to be packaged into marketable 
ones. It begins with the process of pooling or bundling, various types of debt or cash flows. The debt 
or cash flow can be anything from residential mortgages (most infamously) to pass through securities. 
In the UK, the statutory definition of securitisation is “(a) transaction or scheme, whereby the credit 
risk associated with an exposure or pool of exposures is tranched having the following characteristics: 
(a) payments in the transaction or scheme are dependent upon the performance of the exposure or 
pool of exposures, and (b) the subordination of tranches determines the losses during the on-going life 
of the transaction or scheme.624” 
 In this type of deal, an asset, usually receivables, are offered as security to back the debt. These type 
of securitisation result in an asset-backed security (“ABS”). Traditionally, securitisation was 
commonly used to pool debt repayments such as mortgages, called a Mortgage Backed Security 
(“MBS”).625 As discussed in Chapter 2, securitisation is considered a form of quasi-security. As with 
other types of quasi-security, a contractual interest is held over the asset rather than a propriety one 
created by a security interest. Also, an important difference is that in securitisation,  revenue streams 
are securitised rather than any underlying assets. Whole business securitisation is slightly different in 
this regard, and that will be discussed further below.  
Securitisation has evolved from the practice of factoring. Factoring is a transaction where a company 
sells its receivables to a factor, most often a bank, for an upfront payment which is lower than the 
amount to be eventually collected through the receivables626. The factor usually only pays 75%-80% 
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of the value of the receivables and also charges a fee for arranging the transaction627. The amount paid 
for the receivables will also depend on the risk level of the receivables628. Factoring can be more 
expensive than a bank loan, but it also offers a number of benefits. The first is that a company with a 
lower credit rating obtain finance at a lower cost. This is because factoring uses the credit rating of the 
payer of the receivable and not the credit rating of the receivable beneficiary. Another benefit is that it 
provides liquidity and can ensure a steady income flow. This is particularly true with publicly traded 
companies that want to avoid a large drop in revenue in the particular quarter. Factoring allows them 
to avoid having to report an earnings dip at the end of the quarter which could lead to a drop in the 
share price. Also, factoring has the added benefit of not being on the company books whereas a loan 
would have to be reported. Factoring previously was called last resort financing, but this opinion has 
changed in recent years as many companies rely on it to meet quarterly forecasting commitments and 
to help ease tax obligations.629 Securitisation takes the principles of factoring and then adds additional 
mechanisms and parties.630 For these reasons, securitisation is much more complex than factoring. 
The full details of the structure of securitisation are discussed more in depth below. 
a. History 
Securitisation began in the 1800’s in the US when farm mortgage railroad bonds were issued as 
mortgage-backed securities.631 However, despite these early foundations, securitisation did not 
become prominent until the 1970’s. The first mortgage based securitisations began in 1970 when the 
US Department of Housing founded the Government National Mortgage Association (called 
GinnieMae) which began issuing and selling mortgage-based securities backed by a portfolio of 
mortgage loans632. In 1986, the first non-mortgage-backed securitisation deal was formed using bank 
credit cards receivables which privately placed $50 million worth of bonds issued from outstanding 
bank card debt633. The deal which securitised credit card debt demonstrated that if yields were high 
enough, loans pools such as consumer debt could support asset securitisation for assets with higher 
expected losses and administrative costs than a traditional mortgage based deal. Thus, if there was 
enough expected cash flow the deal could be successful regardless of a higher level of risk and cost to 
structure the deal. This type of securitisation was extremely beneficial to the banks as it allowed them 
to ease their balance sheet and capital constraints but at the same time allowed them to retain 
origination and servicing fees. The initial credit card securitisation was so successful that investors 
widely accepted credit card receivables as collateral for securitisation and banks were able to develop 
further mechanisms to normalize the cash flows. 
Securitisation did not begin in Europe until the late 1980’s and really only gained prominence in debt 
based finance in the 1990’s. The first securitisation structure used in Europe was known as the UK 
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Mortgage Master Trust.634 After its creation, the trend moved to mainland Europe and also expanded 
to other types of assets.635 Securitisations also began to use more esoteric types of assets such as in the 
case in Greece where the Greek government securitized their own lottery receivables.  
Prior to the economic downturn in late 2008, it was estimated that securitisation had become 
widespread in the US economy and that an estimated $10.24 trillion dollars were connected to 
securitisation636.  Even at the height of popularity of securitisations of intangible securitisations were 
still the minority and barely made a ripple in the world of finance. In 2004, 21% of securitisations 
were credit card-backed securities, 25% were home equity based, 13% were automobile-backed 
securities and collateralized debt obligations were 15%. Smaller sectors included student loans (6% 
and a big industry in the US), equipment leases (4%).637 It would seem that despite the popularity of 
securitisation, banks still shied away from using revenue streams from intangibles.  
The small number of securitisations of intangibles contrasts greatly with a large number of 
publications which touted the benefits and possibilities of using IP in securitisation638. Despite the 
academic interest, the practice of IP securitisation never became popular. In 2008, at the onset of the 
credit crunch securitisations, in general, hit a new low.639 During this time, securitisation was often 
portrayed negatively in the popular press. Many articles used securitisation as an example of the 
complex financial dealings which allowed bankers to haphazardly ruin the economies of the US and 
Europe.640 It is surprising that despite the negative press, several important IP securitisations occurred 
during the economic downturn and were successful. These will be discussed fully later in the chapter. 
Below is a brief introduction to the legal structures and mechanisms of securitisation which must be 
set out to understand how IP securitsation differs from securitisations of traditional asset pools. 
b. The Structure of a Securitisation 
Securitisation has unique legal attributes which distinguish it from other types of financing. As 
mentioned previously, securitisation is the pooling of revenue streams and then packaging them into 
marketable securities641. The key features and players in a securitisation will be discussed below in 
order from the beginning of the securitisation, when an income stream is pooled, to the end, when 
bonds are issued. The diagram below shows the basic structure of a securitisation. 
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A securitisation begins when the party known as the originator pools revenue streams. To put this into 
more simplistic terms, the originator takes receivables from various debtors or parties and puts them 
into a common pool. The originator could be a bank that is receiving mortgage payments or for the 
purposes of this thesis, an IP owner receiving licensing fees. In a traditional securitisation, the 
originator was usually a bank collecting mortgage repayments or credit card payments. Recently, 
businesses have begun to securitise their own receivables.642 This is a new development, as in the past 
banks and other financial institutions were usually the originator in a securitisation. In IP 
securitisations, the owner of the IP right is usually the originator. Occasionally, though a third party 
will pool licensing streams from the IP rights of multiple owners. Regardless of the identity of the 
originator, the task of pooling the revenue streams and then securitizing them is particularly 
complicated. For this reason, the originator usually hires an arranger, often a large investment bank, to 
set up and complete the transaction643.  
Securitisation has several notable benefits for the originator. Most are similar to the ones from 
factoring. The main benefit is that it gives liquidity. Securitisation allows a company to get an up-
front payment without having to wait to collect the full amount owed from a revenue stream. Another 
benefit is that securitisation can enable an originator to pay less for finance than they would through 
traditional means and without changing the ownership structure of the company644. This is particularly 
true when the pooled receivables have a higher credit rating that the originator. When this is the case, 
the cost of securitisation can be lower than the cost of other types of debt based finance. Also, the 
originator can receive this funding without having to change or dilute its share structure. Another 
benefit to the originator is that securitisation allows for the transfer of risk. In a traditional 
securitisation, after the assets have been transferred to the SPV, the originator no longer has to be 
concerned or even associated with them645. The originator has received a payment and therefore 
locked in the value of the asset for accounting purposes. Also, the originator no longer carries the risk 
that the revenue streams might not generate the full amount due. 
Securitisation also has additional benefits for the originator for accounting and financial reporting. 
One benefit is that the originator can remove the receivables or asset from their balance sheet without 
removing the potential earnings of that asset646. This can be extremely useful for companies which 
have set capital requirements which need to be within a certain time frame. For example, a company 
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may or may not want to include the receivables as earnings within a particular reporting quarter. 
There are other accounting benefits from securitisation as well. In some cases, an originator can 
record a securitisation as an earnings bounce.647 The transfer of the revenue streams is recorded as a 
true sale which is recorded as an earnings boost for that quarter. Critics have noted that this distorts 
the true earning of a company on the financial markets648. Despite the artificial bounce created in a 
company’s earnings, recording a securitisation in this way is not prohibited by law. 
The main disadvantage of securitisation for the originator is the cost.  Even basic securitisations are 
extremely expensive and .the more specialised the securitisation, the more costs will be incurred to set 
it up. The costs include legal fees, the cost of the arranger, the cost to set up the SPV and also 
underwriting fees. The costs of securitisation are so expensive that usually only high earning 
companies can afford to use them. Securitisation also excludes small companies from using it because 
of certain rules in accountancy. For example, a securitisation can diminish the quality of the 
originator’s asset portfolio which causes financial difficulties for smaller companies. This is because 
revenue streams with a high rating are transferred away from the company and removed from its 
balance sheet.  The company may have an overall reduced credit rating as a result.  
ii. Special Purpose Vehicle 
The second step in securitisation occurs when the originator transfers the pooled assets or revenue 
streams to a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”)649. An SPV is a legal entity specially created to hold the 
transferred assets. The SPV’s also issues securities to investors and then ensures the appropriate level 
of dividends are paid on the securities. The SPV is separate and distinct from the other parties in the 
securitisation.650 The SPV is the central participant in the securitisation as it is the entity with which 
all the other parties interact. Despite the central role of the SPV, it is the least substantive entity. An 
SPV does not have any employees, and its sole stated purpose is to issue bonds and hold the relevant 
assets. It does not conduct any business beyond that purpose. The restricted purpose of the SPV  helps 
ensure that there is bankruptcy remoteness between the SPV and the originator. Bankruptcy 
remoteness will be discussed at length below. 
Since the activities of the SPV are limited, another party will be needed to collect the receivables and 
to ensure they are paid in a timely fashion. A servicer is appointed by the SPV to perform this task.651 
The servicer can be a third party, but it can also be the originator or a company within the originators 
group of companies.652  The servicing agreement includes the duties and services of the service. The 
most important provision in the servicing agreement is that the SPV has the right to replace the 
servicer in cases of poor performance, errors, or fraud.  
The SPV is also likely to appoint a paying agent whose main role is to make payments on the 
principal and interest payments on the securities. The paying agent is usually a large bank or financial 
organisation.  As with the other agents of the SPV, it is appointed by the SPV through a paying 
services agreement. There may be more than one paying agent in cases where multiple securities have 
been offered or when the securities have been offered in different jurisdictions.  
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Despite the fact that an SPV is usually just a thinly capitalised shelf company, the English courts have 
begun to grant it greater significance. In 2014, in the case of Titan v. Colliers, the court ruled that the 
Issuer (SPV) was the correct claimant in a case against a valuer for the negligent valuation of 
commercial property.653 Security holders usually are the claimants in these case as they the ones who 
suffer a loss. In this case, however, the court was prepared to find that the Issuer had suffered a loss 
from a faulty valuation. The Issuer relied on the valuation when it acquired a loan that turned out to be 
worth much less than the amount paid for it.  The court did not find the fact that the Issuer 
subsequently securitized the loan and passed any risk onto the security holders to be relevant to the 
case. It is important to note that the court did acknowledge the “look through” nature of an SPV but 
noted that a crucial feature of the transaction was that the Issuer was obligated to ensure that any sums 
recovered from legal proceedings were properly distributed to note holders as set out in the 
transaction’s cash flow waterfall. Portions of this decision were overturned on appeal.  However, the 
appellate court also found that the SPV could issue a claim and could theoretically suffer a loss.654 It 
remains to be seen whether subsequent cases will expand the commercial importance of an SPV and 
whether this trend will continue in other jurisdictions. 
iii. Bankruptcy Remoteness 
As stressed throughout the chapter, one of the goals of (and benefits of) securitisation is for the SPV 
to be bankruptcy remote from the originator. Bonds or securities issued from a securitisation often 
have a higher credit rating because of bankruptcy remoteness as it lowers the overall risk of the deal. 
Bankruptcy remoteness has evolved from the legal principle that a company has a separate personality 
from the individuals managing it and from the other legal entities connected to it. In the UK, the 
courts have strongly enforced the principle since the 1897 case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.655 
Following that case, other courts have continued to hold that each company has a separate legal 
identity, even in groups of companies. This principle is also found in the US and other common law 
countries. In the US, the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific held that corporations have a 
separate, legal personhood and therefore have rights under the equal protection clause.656 
Bankruptcy remoteness is important for all parties in securitisation. It is important for the originator 
because it does not want continuing responsibility for the assets after it has transferred them to the 
SPV. It is also equally important for investors who want to ensure that the securities retain their value 
if the originator enters bankruptcy.657 Bankruptcy remoteness results from two separate legal 
mechanisms: the company structure of the SPV and the structure of the asset transfer from the 
originator to the SPV658. As mentioned previously, the SPV is structured as a separate and 
independent company or trust from the originator or issuer. In the SPV’s company creation and 
governance documents, it also is given the very narrow purpose of collecting the revenue streams and 
then issuing securities.659  
To ensure bankruptcy remoteness, the transfer of the assets from the originator to the SPV must 
qualify as a true transfer. If the transfer does not qualify as a transfer, then the bankruptcy remoteness 
of the SPV and originator is diminished. For example, if the transfer includes provisions where the 
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originator has the right to repurchase the receivables at the end of the securitisation, the transfer could 
be re-characterised as a loan which would not give the same amount of bankruptcy remoteness.  
 These two factors help ensure that the originator and SPV are not construed as having a connection 
which would allow a court to “pierce the corporate veil.” For IP securitisation, this would mean that 
even if the owner of the IP right enters insolvency, licence fees or royalties would still be paid to the 
SPV regardless of the identity of the eventual owner of the IP. 
iv. Securities 
In order to buy the assets from the originator, the SPV issues tradable securities to fund the purchase. 
Investors purchase the securities through a public offering or by private placement.  The securities 
performance is directly linked to the performance of the asset and not to the performance of the 
originator. Also, additional steps are often taken to increase the credit rating of the securities.  
In order to increase the value of the securities, the SPV will often take steps to enhance the credit 
value (credit enhancement). Credit enhancement is an extremely complex area. The following 
methods of credit enhancement are given only to serve as a brief introduction to the topic.  The 
purpose is for the sake of comparing securitisation with security interests as credit enhancement is 
only used in securitisation. A full assessment of credit enhancements in securitisation is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  At the most simple level, credit enhancement makes a particular security offering 
more attractive to investors. Credit ratings help investors determine whether securities are worth the 
price they are paying for them and whether they are “investment grade” quality.660 Unsurprisingly, 
securities with a higher credit rating will be more attractive to investors.661 In order to be investment 
grade quality, securities from a securitisation often need a form of credit enhancement. Credit 
enhancement means that the credit quality of the bonds sold to investors is increased above the credit 
rating of that of the originators unsecured debt bond.662 Two common methods of credit enhancement 
will be briefly discussed: third party guarantors, and tranching. 
A  third party guarantor provides a guarantee or a partial guarantee that it will repay the investors a 
portion of the value of the bond in case of the failure of the revenue streams and then the subsequent 
failure of the SPV to repay the bonds. 663  A third party guarantee can take the form of anything from 
surety bonds to guarantees from parent companies. Insurance companies will also often act as 
guarantors and will underwrite the deal. As with other types of third party guarantees, insurance 
guarantees will not completely alleviate all risk but will mitigate the possibility of complete risk.  
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Tranching is the second form of credit enhances often used by SPV in securitisation. Securities are 
often split into tranches which are characterized by varying degrees of subordination.664 Each tranche 
has a different level of credit protection or risk exposure.665 There is generally an A class with its 
more junior subordinate classes (B, C, D) which function as protective layers for the A class.  The 
senior class has the first claim on revenue that the SPV receives and then the junior classes receiving 
repayment after the investors in the senior class have been paid. This arrangement is also known as a 
cash flow waterfall.666  If the underlying asset pool becomes insufficient to pay all of the classes than 
the most junior class, absorb the first losses and the upper-level tranches remain unaffected until the 
losses exceed the amount of the entire pool of assets.   
Tranching provides credit enhancement for several reasons.667 The first is that risk can be transferred 
away from the senior classes and dispersed into the junior classes. The senior class of securities will 
receive a higher credit rating because of it.  Although the senior bonds have the lowest risk and the 
highest credit rating, the junior classes can be equally attractive to investors. They are sold at a lower 
price but with potential for high reward.  
Tranching is not without risk and can cause a number of problems. The first problem is that tranching 
adds extra complexity to a deal which can mean additional risk.668 The estimations and valuations of 
the asset pool and its distribution are not always accurate which can lead to unanticipated risk. Also 
structuring the tranch is complex and often requires the involvement of asset managers and other 
parties adding extra expenses669. This complexity also causes extra risk since the structure of the 
tranched bonds are harder to understand.  The complexity may even result in an artificially high rating 
from a credit rating agency. 
3. Laws of Securitisation  
Despite the complexity and popularity of securitisation, it is not governed by a single regulatory 
regime in either the US or the UK. This is because securitisation is largely governed by the laws of 
contracts. However, in cases where the resulting securities are publicly traded additional rules are 
applicable. Recently, the EU has published a proposal for a series of regulations which would give 
common rules for securitisation (called the Securitisation Regulation) across the member states. The 
goal of the regulation is to create a European framework which would create simple transparent and 
standardised securitisation (called STS).  The Securitisation Regulation is not in force yet so in the 
UK multiple sources of law apply to a securitisation including various domestic laws, EU directives 
and the rules from the financial regulators. Domestic laws come from a wide range of sources 
including the Law of Property Act of 1925 and the Capital Requirements Directive.  Most of the 
relevant laws are from regulations on the sales of securities: the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (FSMA), the Prospectus Rules, the Listing Rules, and the Disclosure and Transparency Rules of 
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the Financial Services Authority (FSA).  Recently, the Regulated Covered Bond Regulations 2008 
was introduced and contains provisions applicable to securitisation.670  
Along with the aforementioned regulations and rules, securitisation is also governed by numerous 
other sources:  common law, equitable law, and company law are all applicable to securitisation. This 
is particularly true in regards to the formation and governance of the SPV and the initial transfer of 
the assets from the originator to the SPV. Contract law also plays a key role in as a securitisation as 
the parties in the transaction will only be contractually connected to one another.  
There are few specific laws on securitisation in the US, and there is no single regulatory regime. As 
mentioned above, this is because securitisation is largely governed by the laws of contract. However, 
just as in the UK, a variety of laws from many sources may apply to different aspects of the 
securitisation: Article 9 on security interests671, the Bankruptcy Code672, Title 13 on Business Credit, 
Title 12 on Banks and Banking, the Security Exchange Act of 1933 and most recently the Dodd-Frank 
Act.673 Additionally, the structure of the SPV is governed by state corporate legislation. A full 
discussion of the laws of securitisation is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the complexity of the 
matter should be noted.674 This intricacy is no different when applied to the use of IP in a 
securitisation. 
Securitisation is much more complex than granting a security right. It is often said that one of the 
benefits of securitisation is that there are fewer formalities to secure the asset. This is true in regards 
to securing the asset only but not in other areas. In fact, if the issued securities are publicly listed then 
there are there are going to be numerous formalities.  For the purpose of this thesis, the key 
differences are that formalities are required to perfect a security interest whereas they are not in 
securitisation because the security is created through contract. There are also other additional 
differences between secured finance and securitisation. For one, a securitisation is not a secured loan 
that the IP owner will have to repay but rather an upfront payment where no more action is required 
by the originator. This is slightly different with true control whole business securitisation, discussed 
below, but for the most part, securitisation is not a loan. 
Another difference is that in securitisation is that there is no legal conflict with IP law. This could be 
because of the fact that revenue from IP is being taken as security and not an IP right.  However, it 
was shown in Chapters 4 and five that in some cases even licences and licencing fees could be pulled 
into the conflict between IP law and the laws on security interests. Also, securitisation bypasses the 
filing requirements need to take a security interest in IP.  The SPV and investors do not need to worry 
about whether their interest in a revenue stream has been properly perfected and whether they may 
have a lower priority against other conflicting rights. When a revenue stream has been securitised, 
there will be no other competing interests in the claim. The transfer of the receivables may be invalid 
because of contractual reasons, but it will not be invalid because registration formalities have not been 
met. In this respect, receivables generated from IP are no different from those generated by any other 
asset.   
4. IP Securitisation 
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The first securitisations of IP generated receivables had a similar structure to traditional asset-backed 
securitisations.  The first IP securitisations began in the 1990’s and had varying levels of success. The 
first and most famous (or infamous) IP securitisation were known as Bowie Bonds. Bowie Bonds 
were introduced in 1997 by the investment banker David Pullman, known for his work in the music 
industry. In exchange for a $55 million up-front payment, David Bowie agreed to transfer the royalty 
streams of his music back catalogue for ten years.675 The back catalogue included 25 albums and 287 
songs which were recorded before 1990. At the time of the deal, this catalogue was selling around 1 
million copies annually.676. The main benefits of the transaction for David Bowie were that he 
received a large upfront payment, did not have to pay tax on the royalty streams for the life of the 
bond and kept any future copyrights. As with a typical securitisation, the royalty streams were 
transferred into an SPV, which issued ten-year bonds. Initially, the bonds had an interest rate of 7.9% 
which was a higher return rate than a 10-year Treasury note. The bonds were also guaranteed by 
Bowie’s record label, EMI, who had recently signed another record deal with Bowie. For the first few 
years, the bonds performed well however by 2004 they had been downgraded to slightly above junk 
status.677 The falling rating was blamed on the collapse of music sales in the wake of illegal 
downloading.  
The securities issued from this type of deal are often called celebrity bonds. In the years following the 
initial success of the Bowie Bonds several other performers, including James Brown, securitised their 
song catalogue. In 1998, Pulman began to securitize the song catalogue of multiple artists and 
songwriters as opposed to previous deals where he securitised the catalogue of a single artist. One of 
these products was the Motown Bond, which securitised royalty streams from the songwriting team of 
Holland, Dozier and Holland.678  Celebrity bonds were not that successful and in the early 2000’s, all 
of their credit ratings had been downgraded. The failure of the music industry overall was cited for the 
failure of the celebrity bonds. 
In 2005, it was assumed that with the introduction of I-tunes and other new legal models of selling 
digital music that celebrity bonds would become popular again. This has not been the case.679 In 2011, 
Goldman Sachs created bonds, securitised the song catalogues of Bob Dylan and Neil Diamond, but 
they were ultimately cancelled due to a lack of interest from investors.680  It remains to be seen 
whether the celebrity bond market will ever become popular again in light of their widespread failure. 
It also remains to be seen whether ASB will become a viable option for IP securitisation. 
5. Recent Trends in IP Securitisation 
In recent years, two new types of IP securitisation have emerged which use a different structure than 
ABS. The trend began before the recession, and despite the economic climate, the securities retained 
their value. New securitisation deals which were created after the economic crisis have also been 
successful despite the continuing economic downturn. There are several factors which make these 
transactions different from the IP securitisations of the 90’s: the type of assets, the type of originator, 
the structure of the deal, and the involvement of the originator with the assets after the transfer. The 
two, new types of securitisation are called whole business securitisation and patent portfolio 
securitisation. The first is the most significant and will be discussed in depth below. 
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a. Whole Business Securitisation 
Despite the general drop in general securitisation, in 2008 whole business securitisation (WBS) began 
being used to securitise trademark portfolios. WBS was first used in England in the mid-1990’s.681 By 
2010, WBS had become one of the major financing options in the UK, and the total issuance of WBS 
securities was worth £4.5 billion, comprising more than 45% of all asset-backed of securities.682The 
main difference between ABS and WBS is that in WBS the originator’s operating assets are 
securitised. This is in contrast to ABS, where singular, isolated assets, not part of the originator’s 
operations, are securitised to issue bonds. The type of WBS used in the UK has also been called a 
“true control” securitisation683. In the true control model, the originator takes a loan from the special 
purpose vehicle which raises the money by issuing bonds to investors. Also, this is in contrast to 
traditional ABS where the originator transfers the assets to the SPV outright in exchange for payment, 
not a loan.  
In WBS, the proceeds of the operating assets are transferred to the SPV to repay the loan. Then to 
secure the loan, the SPV takes a floating charge over all of the originator’s assets.684  The floating 
charge is beneficial to the SPV for numerous reasons. As mentioned in chapter 4, the holder of a 
floating charge will have a substantial amount of control over the debtor in case of default. The SPV 
will be able to become the receiver of the originator upon insolvency and will be able to sell the 
originator’s assets which will ensure that the investors will continue to be paid. The added security 
from the floating charge often causes the securities to have a higher credit rating.685  One problem 
with this structure, however, is that it is uncertain whether it will decrease the bankruptcy remoteness 
between the SPV and originator. This is discussed in greater depth below.  
686 
When WBS began in the US, structural changes were needed to retain a bankruptcy remote structure 
under US law. The originator’s assets need to be sold or transferred into the SPV and not merely 
secured with a security interest. Also, there cannot be a secured loan between the SPV and originator 
like in the English true control method without diminishing the bankruptcy remoteness. The US 
method is called the “true sale” structure as opposed to the “true control” method in the UK.687 In this 
structure, the operating assets are transferred into the SPV, and the SPV pays the originator for the 
asset from revenue raised from the sale of the securities. At the end of the securitisation, the operating 
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assets are transferred back to the originator if the financing has been repaid. In true sale WBS, the 
originator will continue to operate the business by performing the role of the servicer. If the originator 
becomes insolvent, contractual triggers will remove the originator as the servicer and will enable 
another server to take over managing the assets in the SPV688. Bankruptcy remoteness is maintained in 
this structure because the SPV is not adversely affected by the bankruptcy of the originator. 
WBS has become particularly relevant to IP securitisation because many types of IP and their 
licensing fees are part of a company’s operating assets. Traditional ABS securitisations were often 
impractical for IP and its associated revenue streams because they cannot be separated on-going 
company operations. IP and its revenue streams are usually continually exploited by the company and 
cannot be transferred away from the originator to the SPV. This is particularly true for brand owners 
and franchising businesses as will be shown in the case studies.  
 
Another reason that WBS has become a popular method for securitising IP portfolios is because the IP 
owner will remain involved in maintaining the IP. This is true despite the fact that the originator has 
transferred the IP to the SPV in a US style WBS. The IP owner can ensure that their IP rights, and the 
value of their IP rights, are maintained while benefiting from the payment from the transfer. In a 
traditional ABS, the IP owner is not under any obligation to develop or maintain the assets in the 
SPV.689 Because the IP was not part of their operating assets, the originator may not find any added 
benefit in doing so. The ongoing connection between the IP and the originator also protects investors. 
The receivables are likely to meet projections when the IP owner is contractually obligated to ensure 
that the IP right is maintained. Also, the IP owner is probably in a better position to maintain the IP 
than a third party would be. The key features of WBS will be described in relation to securitising IP 
revenue below. Also, several case studies will be considered. 
i. Role of Originator in WBS 
In WBS, the originator is contractually obligated to maintain the securitised assets even after they had 
been transferred to the SPV. That is the key difference between WBS and other types of 
securitisation.690  In WBS, the goal is not just to isolate and securitise cash flows but to also ensure 
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that the cash flows continue at their projected rate. In order to do this, agreements are put in place 
between the SPV and the originator to maintain the profitability of the assets which bring in the cash 
flows.691 This interaction between the assets and the originator in WBS is fundamental. In particular, 
for the purposes of this thesis, when WBS is used to securitise IP revenues, the originator is in a better 
position than the SPV manage the IP and the licensing from it. To accomplish this, the agreement 
includes specific contractual obligations to incentivise the originator’s management of the operating 
assets.  
An unusual feature of WBS is the contractual obligations and covenants placed on the management of 
the originator. These ensure that the assets will continue to perform well. One such contractual 
obligation is structured operating conditions.  For example, in recent deals which specifically involved 
trademarks, some of the operating conditions stipulated that the SPV had to approve any company 
action which could impact the brand or the quality of the goods being sold under the trademarks. 
Before the originator could engage in any activities such as downsizing or outsourcing (anything 
which could impact the quality of the product), they need to seek approval from the SPV.  
Other contractual provisions put additional obligations on the stakeholders in the originator. In several 
deals, there were covenants in place which ensured that senior manager’s compensation was 
dependent on maintaining credit rating levels of the securities. If the securities’ credit rating were 
downgraded, then the senior manager would receive a lower compensation package. The obligation 
incentivises senior managers to ensure that operating assets are correctly maintained and exploited. 
The contractual obligations also serve as a form of credit enhancement because investors will have 
more certainty that they will at least receive their investment back.  It has been said that WBS is not 
only making turning unmarketable products into marketable ones692, it is also making those products 
less volatile.693The majority of the deals which have used WBS to securitize IP revenue, have been 
made with originators that have a strong business from franchising and have strong trademark 
portfolios. In these deals, the originators used the financing to strengthen and expand their brand and 
accompanying trademarks.694 
ii. Bankruptcy Remoteness 
One concern in WBS is that the close relationship between the originator and the SPV could decrease 
their bankruptcy remoteness. This concern is also exacerbated by the relative newness of the WBS 
structure, and there is little case law testing it.695 In previous cases, which tested the bankruptcy-
remoteness of traditional ABS structures, the courts measured bankruptcy remoteness by testing how 
well the SPV was insulted from the possible insolvency of the originator and also how well the SPV 
was protected from entering insolvency. 
In light of this uncertainty, some mechanisms have developed to mitigate concerns on bankruptcy 
remoteness.  In the true sale structure, it is necessary to ensure that the asset transfer is considered a 
true sale.696 If the court considers the transfer a true sale,  in the case of bankruptcy of the originator, 
then there will not be the risk that the assets are included in the bankruptcy estate. Several things are 
done to ensure that the transfer is a true sale. Firstly, when the assets are transferred any existing 
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liabilities of the originator in the assets are not transferred to the SPV. If this is not done, the transfer 
could be viewed as a fraudulent conveyance or even a voidable transfer upon the bankruptcy of the 
originator. The courts will scrutinize whether the originator is transferring the assets as a way to avoid 
repayment of debt or other financial entanglements.697  It is important that the assets transferred to the 
SPV truly have value and are not just disguised to look like they have value. 
Most experts have stated that the true control method of WBS securitisation is not riskier than ABS 
despite the closer relationship between the originator and the transferred assets. Since the transfer is 
structured as a loan and the operating assets are held with a floating charge, the structure is protected 
by the UK insolvency regime and by the laws of security interests. The point has not been tested by 
any courts but theoretically, the bankruptcy remoteness will not be decreased by the true control 
structure. 
iii. Case Studies 
This section will discuss two recent WBS securitisations of trademark revenues. In both deals, the 
originators were two large franchisors: Dunkin Doughnuts and Domino’s Pizza. The companies and 
the deals share many similarities. Both primarily earned revenue through franchising. This meant that 
their portfolios of trademarks were some of the most valuable of their operating assets. Their 
operating assets also included other IP rights such as copyright, business method patents and know-
how. In both case studies, the originators transferred their trademark portfolios along with their other 
operating assets to SPVs. As mentioned previously, usually in securitisation only the revenue streams 
associated with the IP are transferred to the SPV. The transfer of the actual IP is quiet novel in 
securitisation.698   
Dunkin Doughnuts  
In 2006, Dunkin Brands, the parent company of Dunkin Doughnuts and Baskin-Robbins, raised $1.7 
billion in a WBS securitisation.699 This was done to finance a leveraged buy-out of Dunkin Brands 
from three private equity funds. Dunkin Brands is one of the leading fast food franchisors in the 
world. At the time of the securitisation, it had stable earnings from the franchising fees.  
As the originator, Dunkin Brands transferred all revenue-generating assets to several SPVs.700 The 
asset portfolio included all IP rights, existing franchising agreements and all future franchising 
agreements. The multiple SPV structures were used to try to increase the amount of bankruptcy 
remoteness. Dunkin Brands also acted as the servicer of the assets held by the SPV and were therefore 
in charge of operating the business.701 Credit enhancements were added which included such as the 
overcollateralization of the SPVS, reserve accounts and provisions for rapid amortization.  The senior 
tranches of the notes also included a financial guarantee from Ambac, which gave them an AAA 
credit rating.702  
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The financial guarantee from Ambac turned out to be the biggest problem in the deal and almost led 
to its failure.  Two years after underwriting the notes, Ambac’s credit rating quickly declined.703 As 
the financial crisis continued into 2009, Ambac collapsed and faced takeover from the Wisconsin 
Office of the Commissioner of Insurance. This takeover would have caused the Dunkin Brands deal to 
enter into rapid amortization which would have bankrupt the parent company. Luckily, the regulator 
decided to segregate Ambac’s structured debt from its insurance operation. The segregation saved the 
Dunkin deal.  
Despite this early problem, the Dunkin notes continued to perform well throughout the financial 
crisis. The Dunkin business also performed well. In 2010, it had record sales and expansion.704 The 
success of the originator contributed to the notes performing well, and they were paid off as 
scheduled. Despite the success of this deal, the number of securitisations dramatically decreased until 
2011.705 This is most likely due to the failure of other types of securitisations rather than WBS.  
Domino’s 
Domino’s Pizza Inc. owns 60% of the pizza franchises in the US.706  In 2012, there were at least 4584 
franchises in the US.707 Dominos used WBS to securitise their franchising revenue in two key deals. 
In 2007, Dominos securitised their franchising revenues to invest in improving their business 
methods.708 Dominos received a payment of $1.85 billion which was reinvested in the business. The 
reinvestment focused on making improvements in the supply chain management including 
streamlining vegetable processing.709 It is unclear whether these improvements generated new IP 
property. The changes could have resulted in the creation of new know-how or even new business 
method patents. The reinvestment was also used to increase marketing and advertising. In exchange 
for increased support from the franchisor, franchisees had to make some contribution to advertising 
and use a larger percentage of their retail sales to fund both local and national advertising. The 
recapitalization plan immediately benefited the company and within a  year, Domino share price 
increased by 12.8% to $32.38.710   
The securitisation was facilitated by the creation of the SPV, Domino’s Pizza Master Issuer LLC711.  
It issued notes backed from their royalties and licensing as well as their international income.  The 
main notes were for five years at a fixed rate with no amortization but with possible one year 
extensions. The notes were put into three tranches with the top being given a triple-A credit rating. 
The notes had credit enhancement and were insured by Ambac and MBIA.712 
This deal was successful enough for Domino’s to enter into a new securitisation deal in 2012. The 
second deal is particularly notable because it has occurred after the economic downturn.  Domino’s 
received over $ billion from the second deal, which it used to pay off some of the debts of the parent 
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company.713 The second securitisation used the same SPV structure that was used in the first deal. 
Like in the first deal, Domino’s. transferred all significant operating assets including their trademark 
portfolio to several SPVs. It is not clear if the second deal allowed  Domino’s to increase their IP 
portfolio but it did increase their share price714 The only real difference between the deals is that 
additional credit enhancements had to be second deal had to make the securities investment quality. 
After the onset of the economic downturn, significantly more credit enhancements are needed to 
ensure even a moderately high credit rating. One big difference is that the whole deal cannot be 
“wrapped” by an insurance company which was done in the Dunkin Brands deal715. That type of 
credit enhancement was called a monoline wrap716. Before the financial crisis, the majority of WBS 
notes with published ratings were insured through the use of monoline wraps. After the financial 
crisis, a monoline wrap is virtually unavailable. The notes issued from the second Domino’s WBS 
were not wrapped, and the senior tranches had a lower rating of a BBB+.717 After the economic 
downturn, insurers can no longer take the same roles as the ultimate financial guarantors and therefore 
of the ultimate risk taker.  Now instead, insurers can still be designated as a neutral servicer and as a 
control party that exercises the creditor’s rights in relation to all of the bond classes. This later 
agreement is now known as a servicing agreement.  
In the second deal, the originator, again, served as the servicer of the assets. This time, they had more 
duties as servicer. The servicing agreement contained more covenants with stronger stakeholder 
incentives if the notes performed well.718 It also contained more limitations on the originator’s 
business activities. One notable covenant limited the amount of additional debt which would be taken 
on by the originator. The covenants also restricted the amount of dividends paid out for shares in the 
originator and related companies.719  Specifically, the originator was limited in their activity in the 
following areas: alteration of business model, the selling of assets, making loans and investments, 
M&A activity, taking on additional debt, incurring liens or other security interests, declaring 
dividends or repurchasing capital stock and entering into affiliate transactions. There were also a 
number of scenarios where the holder of the majority share of notes would have the right to assume 
control over all of the securitized assets. This scenario would trigger upon insolvency, default of the 
loan payments, or insolvency of the insurance underwriters.  
For our purposes, one of the most important covenants was in regard to the maintenance of the assets. 
Any IP transferred into the SPVs or used to generate revenue transferred into the SPV had to be 
maintained by the originator. These covenants meant that the originator had to ensure that their 
registered rights were renewed and that the appropriate infringement actions were brought.720 The 
covenant is a tremendous development and certainly helps both the IP owner and bondholders alike in 
the transaction.  
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One concern in this deal was whether bankruptcy remoteness would be maintained with the even 
closer connection between the originator and the assets transferred to the SPVs. Since this deal and 
others like it have been successful and the originator has remained solvent this point has yet to be 
tested. Legal and financial commentators of the deal have said that the increasingly strong relationship 
between the originator and the assets probably did not decrease the level of bankruptcy remoteness.721  
Since the deal was successful, the bankruptcy remoteness was not tested.  
An interesting aspect of the two Domino deals was that their notes performed strongly, both, before 
and after the economic downturn. From these two WBS securitisations, it has been shown that when 
the right type of securitisation is done in the right type of company, IP securitisation can be extremely 
successful.  
b. Patent Portfolio Backed Securitisation 
Patent portfolio securitisation is the second type of securitisation which has developed recently. The 
structure of the securitisation is similar to a celebrity bond but instead of securitising copyright 
royalties, the royalties from a pool of patents are securitised. Previously, patents and their royalties 
were seldom securitised. This is surprising, considering that patents are often considered to be the 
most valuable of all intellectual property rights and viewed the most favourably by the accounting 
community. It has been theorized that patent portfolio securitisation will become more common.722 
Almost all of the reported patent securitisations (whether of a portfolio or of a single patent) had 
pharmaceutical companies as originators.723 The first (reported) patent securitisation was in 2000.  
Royalty Pharma AG, an investment company that specializes in creating deals for the pharmaceutical 
industry, organised the deal.724 The royalties paid for Yale University’s patent on the HIV drug Zerit 
which had been licensed to Bristol Meyers Squibb were securitised. The pharmaceutical company 
received $100 million for the deal. The Zerit royalty stream had been valued at $115 million dollars 
just before the securitisation. For the deal, debt and equity based securities were issued in three 
tranches at descending credit ratings. Despite initial enthusiasm, the deal failed in 2002 after an early 
amortization occurred.725  The deal’s failure was actually caused from missed sales projections at “a 
systemic level” which happened when Bristol Meyers Squibb unexpectedly sold the Zerit licence 
from its portfolio at a significant discount. The reasons behind the sale are not clear. After the sale, 
revenue from Zerit never reached its projected levels. However, in spite of the deal’s failure the 
structure of the securitisation was considered innovative.   
Subsequent securitisations of pharmaceutical products have been more successful. As shown with the 
Zerit securitisation, securitizing the revenue from one asset increases the risk of failure. The risk of 
deal failure is much lower if it is spread out over several revenue streams from several products. In 
particular, in 2003, an SPV called Royalty Pharma Finance Trust was set up to hold the royalty 
payments of thirteen biopharmaceutical products.726 Variable funding notes with a relatively high 
credit rating were sold to raise $225 million dollars.  The diversification revenue streams helped 
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hedge the risk of possible underperformance of any one patent.  The deal was highly successful, and 
such success has been attributed to the larger and more diverse portfolio of assets.  Other transactions 
have since followed, which use the structure of the Royal Pharma deal.727 They have been called 
successful, but there is little information on the overall health of the securities throughout their 
lifespan.728 
There have been few reported securitisations of non-pharmaceutical patents royalties, but there is no 
reason to think other types of patents would result in any less successful of a deal. In fact, other types 
of patents could even be more successful as they do not have as many of the regulatory complications 
that surround pharmaceutical productions. The success of these recent pharmaceutical royalty deals is 
likely to pave the way for other types of patent asset classes being used.  
What is interesting about these securitisations is that are more in line with traditional IP ABS 
securitisation rather than the emerging WBS securitisation. The only difference between the 
traditional Bowie Bonds style securitisations is that in the assets backing the deal have been more 
varied. The type of underlying IP has not varied, they are all royalties from pharmaceutical patents, 
but they capture the revenue streams of a number of products. Their success has probably been in part 
due to being able to mitigate risk by using different patent groups. The equivalent of this for celebrity 
bond would have been, perhaps, to use, the music catalogues from multiple artists and songwriters.  
With the success of these deals, it can be inferred that a larger asset pool helps minimize risk and is a 
viable way to securitise patent receivables It is indeed this strength in numbers which seems to 
overcome all of the possible difficulties cited above and perhaps will lead to patents become the gold 
standard in IP securitisation. 
6. Conclusions of the Securitisation of IP 
1. Securitising IP versus securing IP 
The securitisation of IP is a topic that tends to attract extreme views. After the first celebrity, bonds 
were issued a string of articles lauded the possibility of IP securitisation.729 This enthusiasm dried up 
quickly after most celebrity bonds were downgraded to junk bonds. The same rise and fall of public 
opinion occurred with patent securitisation. Initially interest in the Zerit deal was high but then 
faltered after the bonds failed in 2000. The new wave of WBS has sparked some remerging interest in 
the topic, but it remains to be seen whether it will continue. At the time of writing this thesis, 
securitisation overall had yet to regain the level of popularity that it enjoyed before the economic 
downturn.  
Securitizing IP and its associated royalties does not seem to bring the same legal complications found 
when securing the same assets. Using ABS to securitise IP revenue, the risk is the same as it would be 
for other assets without the same legal complications. Although many ABS securitisations of IP 
revenue failed, like the notorious Bowie Bonds, it was not the legal nature of IP that was to blame. 
The same is true with the Zerit securitisation. Conversely, though, securitising IP revenues did not 
necessarily have additional benefits not found when securitising other types of revenue streams. In 
this regard, IP performs like any other asset. Just because IP revenue is being securitised, it does not 
mean that the securities will perform well. In securitisation, the quality of the asset will help 
determine the return on the securities. If the IP is not a quality asset than the revenues streams being 
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securitised will not lead to high performing securities. The same is true in regards to mortgage 
securitisation. If the underlying mortgages are low quality, then the security will not perform well 
either. 
 Other elements of the securitisation also determine the performance of the securities more so than the 
type of asset being securitisation. If the credit enhancement of the securities is faulty, then the 
securities will not have a high rate of return throughout the life of the product. This is true whether the 
product is securitised patent licensing fees or mortgage repayments. This shows that the actual 
structural of the deal can be just as important as the quality of the asset being securitised. IP 
securitisation does not change this fact. In both regards, IP faces the same limitations as any other 
type of asset.  
Whole business securitisation has also shown that some of the traditional barriers to securitising IP are 
no longer in place. Previously, IP was part of the operating assets that could not be diverted away 
from the business. In such cases, WBS has been shown to be a viable way to securitise IP revenue. 
This is especially true since the structure of WBS ensures that IP owner will continue to maintain the 
value of the IP. Before WBS, it was difficult to securitise IP such as trademarks. The Dunkin 
Doughnuts and Dominos valuations have proven this is no longer as difficult. WBS is not without 
risk, though. One such risk is the floating charge taken over the originator’s operating assets in the 
true control method of WBS. The floating charge acts as a form of credit enhancement. However, 
when the originator owns IP, the same problems will occur as when taking a floating charge in an IP 
right. In this regard, the true control method of WBS adds risks that are normally avoided in 
securitisation. It remains to be seen whether the credit enhancement of the floating charge outweighs 
the added risk. Overall, though, the WBS structure has been shown to be successful when securitising 
IP. 
As shown from above, there are numerous benefits to securitising IP that are not found when securing 
IP.  One of the benefits is that IP securitisation does not cause the same conflict with IP law. Investors 
of securitised IP revenue do not have to worry that their investment may fail because the security in 
the IP was not properly perfected. It is tempting to say that IP securitisation shows that overly 
formalistic legal systems of secured finance are the sole reason for the failure of an IP Finance 
Growth Cycle. This is not exactly true, though.  
 IP securitisation shows that the formalities required to secure an IP right hinder the IP-Growth Cycle. 
Also, it shows that in jurisdictions with more formal systems of secured finance the conflict is likely 
to be greater. However, it also shows that the removal of legal formalities when using IP as collateral 
does not automatically create an IP- Finance Growth Cycle. With securitisation, the formal 
requirements of security interests have been removed yet IP is not always an ideal asset for 
securitisation. The history of IP securitisation has shown that IP has the same amount of limitations 
and risk levels associated with other types of assets more commonly used. As with any other asset, the 
success or failure of the investment is contingent on the quality of the asset and how the financial 
investment has been structured. This means that when legal uncertainty is removed from taking 
security in an IP, it can perform just as well as other types of assets would in a similar financial deal. 
However, IP securitisation and security in IP are not the same. They are done for a different purpose 
under different structures. Securing IP allows a creditor to take a property right in IP whereas in IP 
securitisation an SPV takes contractual security in IP revenues. Nevertheless, some of the lessons of 
IP securitisation can be extended to securing IP. If the legal conflict between IP law and secured 
finance was removed, then IP could function the same as any other asset being held as security. In this 
case, the IP-Finance Growth Cycle would have a better chance of forming since there is no longer a 









CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
1. Legal Problems when using IP as Collateral 
The thesis has shown that the legal tension between IP law and the laws of secured finance inhibits 
the formation of the IP-Finance Growth Spiral. Firstly, the thesis demonstrated that intangible 
property and IP rights, in particular, are becoming increasingly important as assets in secured lending. 
Secondly, it has proven that the current legal framework of secured lending conflict with the laws for 
registered IP. The conflict is particularly strong in the areas of perfect, registration and priority. 
Thirdly it has been shown that certain changes in the law could alleviate most of the problems caused 
by the two sets of laws.  
In Chapter 2 several things were demonstrated. Firstly, it showed that there are certain legal 
difficulties when using IP as collateral. One problem is that many creditors are unaware of the 
problem and will attempt to capture as many assets as they can in their security interest. In such cases, 
they will find many unexpected difficulties if they need to enforce their interest upon default of the 
debtor. Another problem is that when creditors are aware of the legal complications of using IP as 
collateral they are often reluctant to do so. This means that IP owners will either be unable to obtain 
financing at all, they will receive less value for their IP or they have to pay higher costs for the credit. 
Chapter 3 showed the quantitative effect the legal conflict.  Specifically, it showed how IP is valued. 
At present, there are many doubts about the accuracy of IP valuation because such valuations are 
often highly subjective. Also, some methods of valuation are not well suited to value IP. Because of 
this and because of intrinsic risk related to IP, IP valuations often use a high discount rate. The 
discount rate is even higher when IP is being used as collateral. Solving the legal problems of taking 
IP as security would not solve all problems with IP valuation. However, it would allow one aspect of 
the discount rate to be lowered. This would be a huge step in helping IP owners get better value for 
their IP when using it as collateral for debt based financing.  
Chapter 2 also showed that IP is becoming increasingly important as an asset. This is because of the 
emergence of the digital or knowledge-based economy. The importance of IP is increasing in two 
ways. The first is that traditional “brick and mortar” companies are finding that their IP rights are 
becoming important for purposes of growth and financing. The second is that the changing economy 
has led to the emergence and rapid growth of digital businesses. In these businesses, their main assets 
are IP rights. This includes companies such as Facebook and Google. Digital companies have begun 
to play an important role in economic growth.  The changes in the economy have made it necessary 
for companies to rely on their IP for growth and financing yet the current state of laws makes it 
difficult for them to do so. 
Also, the changes in the economy have led to the emergence of an IP-Finance Growth Spiral. Growth 
spirals can be found in other areas of the economy. For example, it was shown in Chapter 2 that it has 
been theorised that an economic growth spiral can be observed between the availability of monetary 
flow and household spending. The principles of the spiral can be applied to IP and finance to show the 
same patterns of company and economic growth. As a company obtains more IP rights, it can use 
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those rights to facilitate company growth. That growth, in turn, allows a company to obtain more IP. 
The same is true with financing. When a company is given financing, it can grow and obtain more 
assets. Company growth allows the company to create more assets which allows it to obtain more 
financing. IP and finance can allow a company to grow exponentially. If a company can use their IP 
to obtain financing, then they can grow and create more IP. The new IP allows them to obtain more 
financing so they can achieve even more company growth. This growth pattern is the IP-Finance 
Growth Spiral. The legal complications considered in this thesis, inhibit the formation of the spiral. In 
some cases, they may even destroy it. When a company cannot use their IP to obtain financing, their 
growth is limited. This inhibits their ability to create more IP, which inhibits their potential for 
receiving additional financing. Since IP is becoming more important as an asset, in both companies 
and the economy, the inhibition of the IP-Finance Growth Spirals has serious ramifications. 
The legal problems found when taking security in IP were examined in Chapter 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, 
several legal problems were identified in the UK. The first problem is that the schemes for perfection 
and priority in the registered IP acts are not well suited for security interests. In each Act, provisions 
on the transfer or assignment of the respective IP right are applied to security interests. This is 
inappropriate because security interests, not even mortgages, are not an absolute transfer of the IP 
right. Additionally, the acts are problematic because of their schemes on priority. In the Patents Act 
and the Trade Marks Act, registration is not mandatory.730 Generally, registration of a security interest 
perfects the interest but in both acts, there is a confusing exception. If a creditor has knowledge of an 
earlier unregistered interest than the subsequent registered charge will have lower priority. This is 
problematic because there the provisions do not define knowledge or set out threshold criteria. In the 
Registered Designs Act it is unclear whether registration is mandatory or not.731 This makes it difficult 
to determine whether registration perfects an interest and how interests should be prioritised.  
Also, the provisions on registration in all three acts make it difficult to register security because one 
secured loan may require multiple filings at the UKIPO if the owner has more than one IP right. This 
contrasts to the Companies Act where each transaction only needs to be registered once. It also creates 
problems with floating charges. As mentioned in Chapter 4, floating charges “hover over” the assets 
of a company but then after a crystallising event occurs, they are converted into a fixed charge. This 
leads to the question of when a floating charge can be registered in an IP right. If the creditor has to 
wait until the floating charge crystallises, the creditor will be forced to register after the IP owner has 
become insolvent. This means that the creditor is unlikely to have priority. Also, it creates a conflict 
between the laws of security interests and IP law on the priority of the interest. A similar problem is 
that the IP acts do not seem to allow security to be taken in after-acquired IP rights.   
In the registered IP Acts, there are also problems when a mortgage is taken in a registered IP right. To 
create a mortgage, the IP right must be assigned to the creditor. The transfer creates questions on the 
rights and responsibilities of the creditor and debtor. In one case, the court had to consider whether the 
debtor/IP owner had the ability to sue a third party for patent infringement.732 The court ruled that the 
debtor does have such rights, but this ruling has not been extended to the other registered IP rights. 
Also, there are specific questions of whether the debtor/IP owner has the duty (or even ability) to 
maintain the IP right in other ways. With trade marks, there are also specific areas of uncertainty. It 
has not been tested whether the mortgaging of the mark is a violation of the use provisions of the 
Trade Mark Act.  
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In addition to the conflicts between the registered IP Acts and the Companies Act mentioned above, 
there is a general tension between the Acts on perfection and priority.733 Under the Companies Act, a 
security interest must be registered in order to be perfected. If a creditor does not register the interest, 
it will be void. If the security is taken in a registered IP right owned by a registered company, the 
creditor will also have to file at the UKIPO. The multiple registration system leads to a great deal of 
uncertainty. For example, it is unclear whether the registration of the interest at the companies register 
counts as “knowledge” under the Patents Act or the Trade Marks Act. It also leads to questions on 
how such registrations should be prioritised in cases of conflicting interests.  
Chapter 4 also compared security interests in registered IP to security interests in copyright. It showed 
that copyright does not have the same conflicts with the Companies Act, so it is easier for creditors to 
take security in copyright owned by a registered company than it would be to take security in that 
company’s registered rights. However, Chapter 4 also showed that the Copyright, Patents and Designs 
Act was deficient for creditors taking security in copyright owned by an individual. The CPD has 
limited provisions on perfection and priority. Also, the main problem is that there is no register of 
such security interests. This makes secured lending using the copyright owned by individuals as 
collateral extremely difficult and in some cases impossible.  
It was also shown that in the UK as a whole there are some concerns about the application of national 
laws to UK-wide rights. The laws of secured lending in Scotland were discussed in relation to IP 
rights. The discussion shows that in some cases there will be a conflict between the laws of England 
and Wales and Scottish law when enforcing a security interest. The law on secured lending is not 
harmonised between the jurisdictions of the UK, which creates difficulty when creating security in IP 
rights that are in force across the UK. 
Chapter 5 showed that in the US the main problem is whether the registered IP acts pre-empt Article 
9.734 The problem is exacerbated because the current body of case law is insufficient and has low 
precedential value. The case law also has conflicting rulings in relation to each type of registered IP 
and in relation to registered IP in general. Also, each Act has its own problems when taking security 
in the relevant IP right. In general, though, the conflict between IP law and Article 9 creates problems 
in pre-emption and priority. The problems are in some ways similar to the UK. 
The first problem caused by the uncertainty on pre-emption is that it is unclear where a creditor 
should file to perfect their interest in an IP right. Under Article 9, interests must be filed at the 
applicable state register in order to be perfected. In the registered IP acts, transfers of the IP right must 
be registered to have priority over subsequent transfers. In the Patents Act and the Lanham Act, 
security interests are not specifically included. This makes it uncertain as to whether a security 
interest must be registered at the USPTO. In the Copyright Right, hypothecations and mortgages are 
mentioned as registerable transfers. The problem with this is that these concepts are references to 
older terms used in secured finance which have now been replaced. Also, mortgages and 
hypothecation previously required a transfer of title. The introduction of Article 9 changed how 
security interests are classified and also created. Also, in all three acts, the provisions on transfers are 
ill-suited for security interests because they are intended to determine priority for absolute transfers of 
the applicable IP right. 
There is also the problem that the registers for IP rights are inadequate. In Chapter 5, it is shown that 
the registers are only capable of showing the boundaries of the IP right. They are not suited for 
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showing security interests. Also, in both registers, there is a considerable time lag between when the 
interest is filed and when it appears on the register. The time lag creates uncertainty for creditors who 
are unable to fully see whether any earlier interests have been given. Also, the acts do not clarify if an 
interest is perfected on the date of the filing or on the date the filing appears in the register. That 
creates additional uncertainty and adds risk for creditors. 
Article 9 and the registered IP Acts also conflict on perfection. As mentioned above, it is unclear 
whether a security interest needs to be registered at an IP register, a state register or both. In practice, 
this has led to the practice of dual filings. That is a bit of a misnomer because actual more than two 
filings are often made. A creditor will often register at the state register, then register for each IP right 
separately. In this situation, it is not only unclear as to which filing perfects the interest but it is also 
unclear as to how the filings are prioritised. There are also additional concerns when taking credit in 
after-acquired IP rights. The situation is similar to the UK in regards to floating charges. Under 
Article 9, security can be taken in future rights. It is unclear if this is allowed under the IP acts 
because theoretically the IP right does not exist yet. It also leads to practical concerns on how to 
perfect an interest in after-acquired IP. Will a creditor need to file at the state register and then keep 
making fillings at the IP register as IP is created or obtained? In particular, this creates problems for 
the software industry because updates and upgrades are considered derivative works which are 
protected by copyright law in their own right. This means that a creditor will have to keep constantly 
making filings in order to maintain the security interest in the software.   
The conflict also creates special concerns for trademarks. In the UK, trade marks can theoretically be 
separated from their goodwill. This is not the case in the US. In the US, trademarks must be 
transferred with goodwill. This usually means that some part of the operating business is transferred 
along with the trademark. It is unclear whether trademarks and goodwill must be captured together in 
a security interest. In several cases, the security interest inadvertently severed the goodwill from the 
trademark which destroyed the trademark right. Other cases found that a security interest does not 
harm the relationship between the trademark and the goodwill. For these reasons, creditors need to be 
very careful when taking security in a trademark.  
Chapter 6 demonstrated that the US and the UK are not the only jurisdictions that had legal problems 
with taking security in IP rights. This was shown by analysing a recent questionnaire and report from 
WIPO on IP in secured lending. The WIPO report showed that some countries have no laws at all or 
undeveloped laws on the use of IP as collateral. It also showed that in numerous jurisdictions, there 
was overlap between the laws of secured financing and IP law. The UK and the US fell into the latter 
category. Interestingly, the responses from the US and the UK were inaccurate and failed to show that 
there are numerous legal problems in both jurisdictions. 
Following on from the WIPO report, Chapter 6 discussed the recent recommendations by Uncitral on 
reforming laws to better accommodate taking security in IP (the “Supplement”). In the Supplement, 
Uncitral has identified that there are international problems and cross-border problems in the use of IP 
in secured lending.  The Supplement has highlighted the emergence of the worldwide digital economy 
and the importance of IP in that economy. It also showed that many companies have an international 
portfolio of IP rights which they want to use in obtaining financing. This is problematic since IP rights 
are national rights, and there is no harmonisation of the laws of secured financing. The Supplement 
also shows some of the cross-border concerns which can arise when taking security in IP, particularly 
in regards to conflicts of laws and enforcement. The recommendations have received a mixed 
response from the academic community. Some critics have said that the Supplement is too similar to 
US Article 9 which makes it unsuitable for adoption by many countries. Others have said that the 
Supplement is positive because it raises awareness of the problems with taking security in IP. Also, it 
is the first step in further negotiations for greater harmonisation. Some of the recommendations of the 
Supplement will be discussed below.  
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Chapter 7 compared securitising IP with using IP as security. The purpose of the comparison was to 
show how IP functions as an asset without the problems associated with the formalities found in 
secured lending. It was shown that when securitising IP revenue, it performs the same as other 
revenue streams. In asset-backed securitisation, there is little conflict with IP law. There is a certain 
amount of risk that cannot be mitigated because of the intrinsic nature of IP rights. For example, the 
risk that an IP right is invalid cannot be changed. However, this risk is not necessarily higher than the 
intrinsic risks from other types of assets. Even in the case of securitised mortgage repayments, there is 
always the risk that the repayments will dry up or that the mortgage was faulty. In this regard, it is the 
quality of the IP asset being used that determines the success of the deal. This is no different from any 
other asset. 
In this chapter, new developments in IP securitisation were also examined. Whole business 
securitisations of trade mark licensing fees have been successful in several recent deals. The practice 
has shown that IP rights which were previously unreachable can now be securitised.  Also, new asset-
backed securitisations of patent pools have shown potential. The success of both types of 
securitisation shows that IP revenues can be successfully used in such deals. Currently, securitisation 
is still considered risky after the recently economic downturn. It remains to be seen whether 
securitisation as a whole will regain its popularity and whether such popularity will extend to IP 
securitisation. 
The thesis as a whole has shown that despite the fact that IP is an increasingly important asset, there 
are still legal complications that need to be addressed. Creditors need to have greater legal certainty in 
both the US and the UK on where to register to perfect their interest in an IP right. They also need 
clarity on what effect that registration has on its priority against competing interests. The legal 
complications make creditors reluctant to use IP as collateral or increased costs in doing so. Because 
of this, the laws of the US and the UK need to be reformed to better accommodate taking security in 
IP. 
2. Recommendations 
Specific recommendations have been made in Chapters 4 and 5. They will be discussed further below. 
However, the following principles need to be incorporated in any legal reform. The first is that the 
laws of perfection and registration must be clear. A creditor needs to know what formalities must be 
followed in order to perfect their interest. That means a creditor needs to know where to file and 
when. The conflict between secured finance laws and IP law requires a creditor to file multiple 
registrations at multiple registries for the same transaction. That increases the amount of due diligence 
that must be performed and increases the overall cost of credit. Also, in many cases, the creditor will 
have to keep making filings. This also adds costs and is time-consuming. The law needs to provide 
certainty in this regard. Otherwise, the use of IP as an asset will continue to be restrained.  The best 
way to solve this problem is to reform the law so that one transaction only requires one filing. The 
application of this to the UK and the US is discussed below.  
The second principle is that the law needs to provide clear rules for determining priority. This is 
closely related to clear rules on perfection. A creditor needs to have visibility of earlier security 
interests and also certainty that their registration will have priority over subsequent interests. The law 
must abolish competing registers or at least clarify the priority of interests between competing 
registers. The application of this second principle to the laws of the UK and the US will be discussed 
below as well.  
The third principle for reform is that in cases of transfers of title, the debtor/IP owner shall continue to 
have the same rights and responsibilities for that respective IP right. This is more of a problem in the 
UK since mortgages are still fairly common. However, in either jurisdiction, the transfer of the IP 
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right should not impair the debtor to utilise and maintain the IP right. The debtor is in a far better 
position to do this than the creditor because the creditor is often a financial institution who does not 
plan on using the IP right for anything other than a financial asset. The debtor should continue to have 
the right (and even duty) to sue third parties for infringement. Also, the debtor should be responsible 
for ensuring that the IP right is maintained by paying renewal fees and any other required formalities. 
In cases of trade marks, the transfer of the mark should not destroy the mark or make it void. This will 
be further discussed below.   
If IP is ever going to be fully realized as an asset in debt based financing, then these principles must 
be adopted by the US and the UK. In order to better facilitate the IP-Finance Growth Spiral, 
significant legal changes need to be made in the US and the UK. Specific changes are discussed 
below. 
 
a. Reformation of UK Law 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, there is unlikely to be a complete reform of the laws of secured financing. 
Such reforms have been discussed many times in the past but have never been adopted. In light of 
this, specific legislation needs to be introduced to remedy the problem.  
The first reform should be that the Companies Act should govern the use of registered IP as security 
when the IP is owned by a registered company. The conflict of law between the Companies Act and 
the registered IP acts creates numerous problems. The best way to alleviate these problems is to stop 
the conflict altogether. It was shown that the IP acts have insufficient and unclear provisions on 
perfecting an interest, and then the priority of conflict interests. The UKIPO register is also not well-
suited for security interests. The companies register is much better. Also, the Companies Act has clear 
provisions on secured lending. The principles have also been tested in the courts. The same is not true 
for security interests under the registered IP Acts. For these reasons, the Companies Act should 
govern security interests in registered IP rights owned by registered companies. Also, charges in 
registered IP rights should be registered in the companies register. Priority of such interests should 
then be interpreted through the Companies Act and the common law as is done with other assets.  
Security interests in IP owned by individuals create separate problems. It requires changes to the IP 
Acts and to the UKIPO. For this purpose, a specific register for security interests at the UKIPO should 
be created. The register would be based on the name of the debtor and not the IP right. It would allow 
a creditor to make one filing to perfect an interest in multiple IP rights. It would also alleviate the 
problem in copyright law where there is currently a lack of a register. Accordingly, the IP acts should 
be amended by the introduction of one piece of legislation that gives clear guidelines on taking 
security in IP rights. The act should be as close as possible to the Companies Act to help harmonise 
secured lending laws. It also should include provisions which extend the Van Gelder case to all IP 
rights. For trade marks, it should include provisions that state that the creation of a security interest 
does not contravene the use requirements of the Trade Mark Act.  
These suggested reforms follow the three principles mentioned above. There would be greater 
certainty on perfecting an interest because a creditor would know whether the interest should be filed 
at the companies register or the UKIPO. Also, priority would be governed from one source only. 
There would no longer be competing registers and competing laws. For cases of IP owned by 
individuals, one filing could perfect the interest which would give clarity on priority. There would no 
longer be problems of taking a floating charge in an IP right. Also, the problem with after-acquired 
property would be eliminated. It would also provide a place to perfect unregistered IP rights which is 
currently unavailable. Furthermore, the duties and rights of the debtor would no longer be a problem 
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in cases of a mortgage. Also, in cases of security in trade marks, the threat that the mark could 
revoked is eliminated.  
These suggestions will help with some of the jurisdictional problems mentioned in Chapter 4. A 
creditor would be able to perfect their interest in a UK register. They would not have to rely as much 
on principles of national law to govern the perfection and priority of the interest. This is not a perfect 
solution as there are still cross-border problems with company charges. Unfortunately, these problems 
cannot be alleviated without a complete overhaul of secured financing laws UK-wide. This would be 
difficult and would also conflict with principles of devolution and private international law. However, 
these suggestions at least minimise the problems in some way.  There is also the possibility that 
jurisdictional conflicts could be minimised by the introduction of lex domicilii conflicts of laws 
provisions within the IP Acts. 
These suggestions do not fully agree with the recommendations by Uncitral. Uncitral does not 
recommend for the creation of an IP specific register. In the case with the UK, such creation is 
necessary in the absence of greater reforms of secured lending laws. The suggestions in this chapter 
do conform to some of the Uncitral recommendations, though. For example, Uncitral suggests that 
secured financing laws should usually govern security in IP. The suggestion above is for the 
Companies Act (and an equivalent version for individual owners of IP) to govern security interests in 
IP. In this case, principles of secured lending rather than transfers of IP will govern. This will create 
clearer rules and greater clarity of the use of IP as collateral in the UK. 
b. Reformation of US Law 
Although the US has a fairly advanced system of secured finance, changes are going to be needed to 
cope with the changing digital economy. At present, the conflict between IP law and Article 9 
severely hampers the IP-Finance Growth Spiral. The main problem is the uncertainty of whether the 
registered IP acts pre-empt Article 9. This, in turn, causes uncertainty in matters of perfection and 
priority. 
The best solution to this problem is to introduce federal legislation that clarifies the pre-emption 
question. None of the registered IP laws should pre-empt Article 9. Article 9 should govern the 
perfection and priority of security interests in IP. It was shown in Chapter 5 that the registered IP Act 
and their accompanying registers are not suited for security interests in their respective IP rights. Also, 
the registers are not equipped to cope with the registration of security interests in IP. This 
determination would solve the problem of dual registration and multiple filings. Creditors would 
know how to perfect their interest and be able to determine the priority it will be given.  Also, it 
would alleviate the conflict on the adequacy of an asset description because Article 9 would govern 
the sufficiency of such description. The similar problem with after-acquired property would also be 
solved because Article 9 would solely govern security interests in after-acquired IP. Such legislative 
determination would increase certainty and clarity for all of the legal problems mentioned in Chapter 
5. 
Although the suggestion seems simple, removing the pre-emption problem would positively impact 
the use of IP as an asset. If Article 9 solely governs security in registered IP rights the amount of 
uncertainty would be significantly decreased. This, in turn, would make creditors less reluctant to 
accept IP as collateral and also less likely to increase the cost of using IP as collateral.  With definitive 
answers and fewer complications, the IP-Finance Growth Spiral would be better facilitated. 
3. Practical Changes 
Legal changes would significantly increase the viability of IP as collateral, but another change needs 
to occur as well. There is a lack of awareness of the issue. Many IP owners do not understand that 
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their IP can be used as collateral. Also, there is a great deal of ignorance in the financial community 
on IP as collateral. For this reason, many deals are mismanaged at the peril of the IP owner and the IP 
right.  
There are small indications that this may be changing. Of course, Uncitral has raised awareness of the 
problem with the release of its Supplement. Also, WIPO has continued its efforts to increase 
awareness by providing information and resources for IP owners and financial organisations alike.735 
In the UK, the recent Hargreaves report discussed the importance of IP as an asset. It did not discuss 
specific issues of using IP as security, but it did recognise its importance as an asset. In the US, the 
American Bar Association has a working group which will issue suggestions for reform. The EU has 
also started a group to explore the issue and look for solutions.736  This shows that the problem is no 
longer being viewed as obscure or unimportant. 
Creating awareness creates certainty which is the lynchpin of the financial industry. If creditors feel 
more comfortable using IP as collateral, then its use will increase. This will become increasingly 
important as IP becomes more important in company growth and economic growth in general. If the 
laws are reformed and there is greater awareness, then the IP-Finance Growth Spiral will have an even 
better chance of forming.  
4. Final Thoughts 
With the current problems using IP in secured finance, it is a surprise that IP is used as collateral at 
all. The tension between secured financing law and IP creates a large amount of unnecessary 
uncertainty.  Due to the emerging importance of intangibles and most notably IP, the conflict is only 
likely to become more serious. IP is going to be increasingly used as collateral because parties have 
less of a choice from the changing nature of companies and the economy. As IP becomes the prime 
asset in a company’s holdings, then both parties will want to utilize for negotiating finance. It would 
be irresponsible for the laws not to change to cope better with such economic realities. 
The IP-Finance Growth Spiral is likely to play an increasingly important role in the growth of 
companies and economies. Nations and the international community as a whole are going to find that 
old laws of secured finance and IP law have begun to hinder company and economic growth. It is only 
when these legal obstacles are removed that the potential of the IP-Finance Growth Spiral can be 
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